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Foreword
This publication is prepared as a part of the Digital Democracy 
Project, in turn constituting a part of the project Innovation 
Incubator; Grundversorgung 2.0, co­funded by the EU and based 
at the Center for Digital Cultures (CDC), Leuphana University, 
Lüneburg, Lower Saxony, Germany.
The tasks given, upon which this publication reports, are:
i) Research on the forms of public sphere, deliberation, decision­
making and governance in modern democracies and how they 
are impacted by evolving online tools and practices
ii) Development of a model for a “digital democracy” based on 
the best practices found in the research
The first five chapters focus on point (i), while the two final 
chapters focus on point (ii).
As the full model presented in Chapter 7 is supported by already 
existing software, a trial can be based upon this publication’s out­
lines for what in the following is called the Citizen Lobby.
Lüneburg, December 2013 
Leif Thomas Olsen 
Guest Researcher, Leuphana University 
Associate Professor, Rushmore University

Executive summary
This research sets out to explore why our current democratic 
models are failing in the face of the interactive Web and its 
endless opportunities for exchange and dialogue, and how a 
better democratic model—taking these opportunities into con­
sideration—could be designed. 
Following Habermas, this publication assumes a public sphere 
influencing the governing structures through a four­spoke 
structure. These four spokes are (i) the private intimate realm 
(family and social life), (ii) the private economic realm (individual 
financial and intellectual capital), (iii) the public intimate realm 
(media) and (iv) the public economic realm (corporations and non­
government institutions).
It is further assumed that although the private intimate realm 
formally elects parliamentarians (and hence governments) its 
influence is limited in both time and scope, since elections only 
take place with multi­year intervals, while policy—and hence 
politics—is shaped daily. Day­to­day influences over elected 
politicians are largely driven by the public economic realm, which 
in turn is influenced by owner­driven interests representing the 
private economic realm, channelled via the public intimate realm 
(media)—to a large extent privately owned and hence over­
lapping with the private economic realm. As these forces lobby 
the elected incumbents with what Habermas calls “generalised 
particularism”—biased and typically commercially driven inter­
ests that, towards the public, are both re­formulated and re­
presented as being of general concern and benefit—the economic 
side of our socio­economic equations is given far more attention 
than the social side. The global trend towards neo­liberalism is 
built on this priority, which—at the same time as it has created 
remarkable growth—also caused rapidly increasing discrepancies 
in both income and wealth, and has given rise to widespread 
discontent over how our current democratic systems serves to 
represent their constituencies.
12 The Internet has been seen for a decade or more as the tool by 
which the private intimate realm shall be able to restore influence 
over elected politicians. Many initiatives with this aim have been 
launched, but although some gains have been made the overall 
impact is still modest. Some also see the emerging peer­to­peer 
(P2P) mode of production as a promising challenge to corporate 
power over political life. The road from such a promise to real 
change, however, still seems long, as P2P yet needs to secure its 
underpinnings in general, and its financial platform in particular, 
before it can take on such a monumental task. It is also far from 
certain that the Web will prove to be any more democratic than 
our current democratic institutions, since the Web is very quick to 
build new elites—and elitist practices (which is extensively elab­
orated upon in this publication). Although the Web may promote 
different elites, and these elites may think and work differently, 
as compared to parliamentarian democracies lobbied by the 
corporate sector, this does not mean societies by default will 
become more democratic.
The “long tail”—or the power­law distribution—that is quite 
manifest on the Internet, will in fact deny the public sphere 
to establish the kind of broadly supported and well­reasoned 
arguments that policy must base upon. To base policy on opinions 
is, as Habermas already pointed out 50 years ago, insufficient 
and shortsighted. This publication therefore outlines a modus 
operandi for a Citizen Lobby, intended to balance—but not 
replace—the interests of the institutional lobby. This Citizen 
Lobby shall be mandatory and remunerated under law, i.e., not 
based on voluntary input, since voluntary lobbies soon become 
driven by vested rather than public interests. This new lobby will, 
based on the Citizen Lobby’s day­to­day monitoring, and through 
an anticipated and entailing shift in focus from election to re­
election, motivate elected politicians to give at least equal effort 
to the interests of the private citizens making up the electorate, 
as to the corporate citizens who do not.


[ 1 ]
The framework:
From parliamentary 
democracy to the 
Citizen Lobby
This introductory chapter aims at providing an overview of how 
this publication—and its eventual “model”—has developed. Since 
the research it reports on aims at exploring why our current dem­
ocratic models are failing, in the face of the interactive Web and 
its endless opportunities for exchange and dialogue, and how a 
better democratic model taking these opportunities into consid­
eration could be designed, a wide range of issues are of impor­
tance. This chapter will lay out the issues elaborated on in this 
publication and give a brief introduction to some of them. The 
intention nevertheless goes no further than to lay the foundation 
for further reading, each chapter dwelling on one or a few of the 
issues raised in this introduction.
A call for action
The Inter­Parliamentary Union (IPU) in Geneva, a high­profile 
UN­linked NGO promoting parliamentary democracy as it is 
known around the world, discussed during their 128th Annual 
Assembly in March 2013 “the use of media, including social media, 
to enhance citizen engagement and democracy.” A 34­point 
16 summary list of this discussion, including a 28­point reference list 
to UN Human Rights Council Resolution 20/8, dated 29 June 2012, 
stipulates in direct response to the UN recommendation
that parliaments develop strategies and guidelines for 
enhancing citizen engagement in the democratic process 
through the use of media, including social media (Inter­
Parliamentary Union 2013),
and emphasises
that dialogue between citizens and parliamentarians has 
the potential to foster greater respect for democracy and 
democratic institutions, thereby countering declining voter 
participation and promoting greater accountability. (ibid.)
That declining voter participation equals a democratic deficit 
is nothing new, but what is new is that this now is seen also by 
the parliamentarians as a reason to engage in a “dialogue” with 
voters—rather than just enhancing further their “information 
efforts,” which traditionally have been (and nevertheless also still 
is) called for.
The Inter­Parliamentary Union’s arguments for calling for such 
a dialogue by their member parliaments were that the UN had 
urged parliaments and parliamentarians around the world to 
ensure that their
citizen engagement efforts are accessible to all regardless of 
gender, age, socio­economic status, place of residence, dis­
ability, religious belief, ethnicity or political affiliation (ibid.),
for which the IPU Assembly felt that personal contacts “in the 
field” would be of “irreplaceable nature” for all elected politicians. 
For this they—just as many private citizens do—see social media 
as a new tool, eyeing
the potential of social media to facilitate greater citizen 
engagement through interaction between parliamentarians 
and citizens (ibid.),
17while noting
that media, including social media, may also enhance citizen 
engagement by allowing people to create networks, motivate 
each other, engage in monitoring activities and contribute to 
the decision­making process. (ibid.)
Concerns raised by this group of elite politicians however 
included that citizens ability to engage with parliamentarians 
depends partly on access to technology as well as their 
knowledge of parliament and parliamentary procedure, which 
is why they felt that “parliamentary work [must] be explained to 
citizens in a comprehensible and attractive manner” (ibid.). They 
also noted
that there are difficulties in using social media to build a con­
sensus by gathering various opinions in a balanced manner 
although they function well in disseminating a certain 
political opinion. (ibid.)
Furthermore, referring to the UN encouraging
parliaments to use media, including social media, as part 
of a platform to interact with citizens, while ensuring that 
any social media engagement would not replace offline 
engagement, including through traditional media (ibid.), 
the 2013 Assembly confirmed
that the digital divide may impede citizens’ access to 
information provided through social media, hence the 
importance of guaranteeing all citizens access to information 
technologies as well as using traditional media to keep the 
public informed. (ibid.)
All these quotes can be summarised as a call for a direct dia­
logue between elected politicians and the electorate, using social 
media as a communication tool, while ensuring that also more 
traditional means of communication such as traditional media 
and face­to­face dialogue are employed, and, perhaps more 
18 notably, that this dialogue is intended to boost voter participation 
and engage voters in monitoring political activities and contribute 
to the decision­making process. This means a stronger role for 
public participation, which by default means a step back for the 
representative function of elected parliamentarians—although 
their role of representatives per se would not be challenged.
This 34­point list is however only a call for their member parlia­
ments to do this. But how it shall be done, and to what extent, is 
neither stated nor suggested. Difficulties in using social media 
to build consensus by gathering various opinions in a balanced 
manner is for instance not addressed, only noted, bringing us 
right back to Jürgen Habermas’ public sphere dialogue—and its 
dilemma of balancing reason and opinions.
An October 2013 article in Huffington Post by Eduardo Paes, 
the Mayor of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, echoes similar concerns; the 
“old” type of political representation of passive citizens (whether 
informed or not) by elected politicians is not working anymore. 
He writes that
[t]he digital revolution has deepened the crisis within 
representative democracy. But as it forces its demise, it 
might also dictate its future. Traditional representative 
democracy within nations is no longer enough. People want 
more participation and collaboration with their government. 
They demand to be closer to institutions and authorities. 
(Paes 2013)
Elected officials feel the heat. But do they know how to resolve 
the problems?
The lobby
Colin Crouch, in his book Post-Democracy, points to a “problem” 
that is rarely mentioned by elected politicians, which will not 
only influence but also in turn be influenced by the kind of 
development the above quotes suggests: a changing balance (or 
19perhaps rather imbalance) between private citizens and what is 
increasingly being known as “corporate citizens”—better known 
as “the lobby” (Crouch 2010, 17–18).
Crouch describes, for instance, the last decades’ most prominent 
political trend—that towards “liberal democracy,” which is not 
confined to the West but is also (through the process of glob­
alisation) quickly spreading to the non­West—as one 
that stresses electoral participation as the main type of mass 
participation, extensive freedom for lobbying activities, 
which mainly means business lobbies, and a form of polity 
that avoids interfering with a capitalist economy. It is a model 
that has little interest in widespread citizen involvement or 
the role of organizations outside the business sector. (Crouch 
2010, 3) 
Quoting Lindblom, he argues that business lobbies are successful 
partly because they can claim they will suffer financial losses and 
therefore possibly move to a different jurisdiction if their con­
cerns are ignored—leading to loss of jobs and tax revenues—and 
partly because they can view lobbying costs as investments (since 
successful lobbying creates better conditions for their business, 
from which they can profit financially). Non­commercial lobbies 
cannot recover their lobbying cost through increased profits; at 
least they cannot calculate a return on investment from lobbying 
in the way the corporate lobby can (ibid., 17–18).
According to Dean, Anderson, and Lovink (2006, xxvii) in their 
introduction to Reformatting Politics, this already strong force also 
benefits from the trend to discreetly replace traditional dem­
ocratic representation with “reputation management,” by which 
they refer to the use of the Internet in general, and social media 
in particular, to build a “name” through high frequency partic­
ipation—creating high “visibility”—whereby views and opinions 
can be voiced in ways considered authoritative by many, simply 
because they appear through such a visible and already rec­
ognised channel. This kind of “managed reputation” can quite 
20 easily be developed by well­funded think tanks and lobbies in 
support of their particular and commercial interests, which by the 
“reputed channel” is re­formulated as being of a general concern 
(which Habermas calls “generalised particularism,” see Chapter 
2). The average blogger, who only can act as yet another voice 
among many others, may feel like being on par in a public and 
to many seemingly democratic debate, but has very much less 
chance of being heard. See further Chapter 4 below, where the 
Internet’s (and P2P’s) 80/20 power­law distribution, or “long tail,” 
is discussed.
These authors taken together (being two examples of a growing 
body of literature) therefore point to the risk that the combina­
tion of money and technology, to which a typical corporate citizen 
has significantly better access than the typical private citizen—
risks hollowing out the democratic aspects of our current political 
systems—and that this is not only well known, but also well 
planned.
Cluster politics may complicate things even further. In younger 
parliamentary democracies in general (e.g., India and Kenya), 
and in those where the so­called “international community" 
has implemented such a system in particular (e.g. Afghanistan 
and Iraq), political parties often are based on segregating 
criteria, making political views and opinions secondary to cluster 
belonging, such as racial, religious or tribal clusters (Olsen 
2010, 108). The premise that political parties are the movers of 
democracy here often proves false, since all such institutional 
segregation (i.e., where the loyalty factor risks overshadowing 
the political factor) is dis­advantageous to fair and peaceful 
political interaction, hampering rather than enhancing political 
democracy. Among Euro­Americans this often is seen as a 
problem others may have—but hardly anything they themselves 
would need to suffer from.
However, if/when the term “cluster” is also interpreted to include 
economic and/or speculative interests, where such interests favour 
21members of a certain cluster—here “lobby”—in a way similar to 
how the above mentioned clusters (racial, religious or tribal) tend 
to favour their own members over non­members, this loyalty 
factor becomes an issue to take into consideration also in mature 
democracies. In spite of most political parties in the West avoid­
ing to specify their target groups in terms of race, religion or tribe 
(although, e.g., anti­immigrant parties often do), they normally 
profile themselves so as to attract certain economic groups, e.g., 
low­ or high­income earners, by promoting higher subsidies or 
lower taxes respectively, or different sectors of society, e.g., the 
corporate or public sector by promoting corporate involvement 
in public services or not, or boosting public sector salaries or not 
(see also Anthony Judge, chapter 4). These underlying leanings 
towards one side or another are then exploited by the institu­
tional lobby, acting in clusters to secure political priority for their 
own interests and concerns.
Although the South East Asian consensus approach to govern­
ance, for example, (where rainbow coalitions are more common 
than elsewhere) actually may help overcome at least some of 
the problems associated with this—primarily because more 
voters feel represented by larger coalitions—each segregating 
criteria counteracts actual democracy, as segregation is based 
on exclusion, while democracy is (or at least is assumed to be) 
based on inclusion. Examples of such segregating criteria also 
developing in old democracies include several European coun­
tries (incl. France, Holland and the Nordic countries), where 
anti­immigrant parties are gaining significant support for their 
exclusion policies. In the US the view on taxes and the economy, 
and the right to speculate also in other people’s misery, e.g., 
health insurances and foreclosures, is a watershed between the 
parties, whereby economic segregation is implied.
In spite of thousands of NGOs striving to promote equality, 
they too have failed to prevent a slow re­orientation of parlia­
mentary democracy from electorate­driven to lobby­driven 
(even if lobbies have always played a role in politics), in the face 
22 of changing economic interests, global resource exploitation and 
massive migration—and the geo­political as well as cross­cultural 
conflicts that inevitably follow (Kalniņš 2011, 34–35).
Since the acid­test for democracy is not how the government is 
elected, but how the elected government deals with non­violent 
non­supporters (care or ignorance?), these problems will be dis­
cussed below by establishing a definition of the term “glocal” in a 
democracy­context, and by demonstrating the need for a struc­
tured approach to public participation—where the dialogue and 
influence that the introductory quotes by the Inter­Parliamentary 
Union (and the UN) above called for can become a reality, inter­
acting rather than competing with an updated version of today’s 
representative democracy.
Glocal democracy
Overcoming growing structural problems in a political system 
designed centuries ago, and more recently re­oriented in favour 
of economic interest at the expense of social interest, is not 
trivial. A different approach must be considered, or any changes 
will be mainly symbolic. In order to do so this publication will use 
the term glocal to describe the fusion of interests that the inter­
active Web made possible, where socio­economic interests finally 
can emphasise socio, rather than economic.
“Glocal” is a hybrid word, blending global with local (Olsen 2012, 
section 2.2). In order to understand the meaning this publication 
adheres to, it must be stressed that “local” does not only refer 
to a place or geographical space, whereby “global” counters it by 
referring to the “whole world.” Instead these terms represent a 
range of complementary meanings, without which “the other” 
would lose its depth. Examples illustrating—but not specifying—
this include:
23
“Local” “Global”
Civic space Public space
Cultural communities Politics
Geographical communities Markets
Individuals Collectives
Present traditions Future Trends
Here and There Anywhere
Now and Then Anytime
By “Meta­Local” we mean:
Ideas, opinions, trends and/
or behaviour that, although 
observed globally, are based on 
“local” (as opposed to “global”) 
premises. Such “local” prem­
ises can be shared because 
of, e.g., cultural belonging or 
nationalism, shared by non­
locals who emigrated or fled, or 
a minority equity / belonging 
of some sort. Lifestyles based 
on, e.g., religious affiliation may 
establish everyday premises 
/ behaviour that differ from 
those of neighbours with other 
faiths—but fall in line with 
people across the globe who 
have the same faith. 
Examples of other “meta­local 
communities” are diasporas, 
urban poor, SMEs and HBTs.
By “Meta­Global” we mean:
Influences that lie beyond 
the inter­action of the global 
physical / human / economic 
/ ecological community. Such 
influences include human 
relationships to spiritual, eternal 
or supernatural forces, placing 
such relationships “beyond” 
the concern of the glob­
alisation debate as it is typically 
delineated—i.e., as a socio­eco­
nomic development playing 
out in the physical / human / 
eco(logical)—eco(nomic) sphere.
By adding this “meta”­level, it 
becomes possible to engage 
in glocal interaction without 
involving these kinds of meta­
global concerns in this already 
complex debate.
Local vs Global
24 An interesting expansion of the meta-local is offered by Richard 
Gilman–Opalsky: 
Indigenous Mayans in Mexico were quite surprised in the 
1990s to discover their robust common ground and the 
profound resonance of their claims with environmentalists 
and feminists and gays and lesbians and precarious and 
rebellious people everywhere—theirs was a commonality of 
being on the losing side of power, where power is defined by 
and for capital (2011, 116).
Meta­locals can in other words include a wider range of cat­
egories that, in spite of otherwise being detached, share one or 
several conditions that exclude them from the ruling majority or 
system.
In addition to structural concerns—i.e., how the system’s design 
can at all serve its intended purposes—is a growing lack of trust 
in politicians creating legitimacy problems for public representa­
tion in politics and policy­making at large. As Charles Tilly noted,
trust [in elected representatives], in almost all of its guises 
and virtually everywhere, from the industrially advanced 
West to the remote confines of the Third World, appears to 
be in decline. This development, in turn, is thought to place 
democracy [...] at considerable peril. (Encarnación 2006, 149)
Both Kenneth Newton (2001) and Natalia Pohorila and Yuriy 
Taran (2005) agree, the latter opening their article stating: “High 
expectations of the political elite run parallel with disappoint­
ment and distrust of politicians.” And according to media there 
is no shortage of peoples’ distrust of politicians. A majority of 
the world’s citizens actually seem to consider this trust lost (cf. 
Webpages (i)–(x)). This lack of trust also calls for greater grass­
roots insight and participation in policy­making, in order for the 
“local” to gain importance vis­à­vis the “global”—throwing us 
back to the old trust and control dilemma. In this dilemma—well 
known to anyone who has tried to manage organisations, as well 
25as to those who have ever felt the frustration of being micro­
managed where greater freedom would have been preferred—it 
is the balance between delegation, based on trust, and control, 
based on distrust that Charles Handy described as follows: 
Any increase in the control exercised by the manager 
decreases the amount of trust perceived by the sub­
ordinate (control + x => trust–x). Any wish by the manager to 
increase her trust in her subordinate, i.e., to give her more 
responsibility, must be accompanied by a release of some 
control if it is to be believed (trust + x => control–x). (1993, 
332)
This also goes for elected representatives, where a decreasing 
level of trust will call for a greater level of control. People who 
used to feel trust in their representatives will demand more “con­
trol” over what their representatives do, when their level of trust 
decreases.
Further evidence for the need of an updated democratic model 
for the EU as well is that European efforts to develop multicul­
tural societies within the existing framework have failed—a 
failure that has been publicly acknowledged by both Germany’s 
Angela Merkel (Aljazeera 2010) and Britain’s David Cameron 
(Aljazeera 2011). Given the growing numbers of immigrants in 
most EU­member states, this is a potential threat to socio­polit­
ical stability, since such failures risk creating large and growing 
disenfranchised groups, not seen since the introduction of the 
European welfare state.
Hence, as representative democracy in today’s increasingly multi­
cultural environment—where meta­local and meta­global con­
cerns (see above) tend to gain enhanced importance—frequently 
fails in its intended efforts to deliver “inclusion,” and in the worst 
of cases even thrives from “exclusion,” this publication intends to 
demonstrate both (i) the need for and (ii) a possible design for a 
structured approach to participative democracy—which we will 
call the Citizen Lobby.
26 Such a Citizen Lobby, providing a structured approach to dem­
ocratic popular participation—well beyond the act of voting—
intends to upgrade the current “unstructured” participative 
approach, which suffers from several problems, including 
“ad hoc” and notably varying levels of efforts (e.g., Web com­
munities or street rallies), unreliable and often unsustainable 
funding (e.g., NGOs), insufficient management capacity (e.g., 
charities and grassroots movements), troublesome competition 
for public attention (most of them), and—as a consequence 
of these and other shortcomings—far less impact on actual 
policy­making than the accumulated resources spent by these 
“participative forces” would otherwise suggest. These short­
comings put “people issues” at loss versus those issues favoured 
by “corporate citizens” that via their lobby arms drive the 
priorities of the political establishment. In other words, if the 
un­structured forces were to act as effectively (and efficiently) 
as the institutional and well­structured corporate lobby, the 
competition for the ears and eyes of our elected politicians would 
be on an equal footing, i.e., a levelled playing­field would exist 
where human / individual concerns meet institutional / corporate 
interests.
This is not to say that the current participative approach has not 
yielded any success. The list of developments championed by 
non­elected forces, including NGOs, street rallies and charities 
(etc.) could be made very long (see, e.g., the SOPA–PIPA debate 
reviewed in Chapter 4). Nevertheless, and in spite of the many 
achievements made by these “participative forces” to date, their 
lack of success in the overall policy agenda is still disheartening.
Take, as an example, the endless processes applied to address 
global environmental concerns (launched some 20 years ago). 
These are not a sign of democracy—but of procrastination—
and Copenhagen 2009 was a clear signal that politics come well 
ahead of the general public’s concerns (Financial Times 2009). 
Nor can the tsunami wave of neo­liberal policies imposed on the 
developing world, following the demands by the International 
27Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), be said to have 
any democratic platforms. They are, in fact, based on thoroughly 
autocratic platforms, to which almost no domestic forces have 
been able to stand up (cf. Stieglitz 2002). For as long as there 
is no overall modus operandi for how they work are today’s 
participative forces easy prey for the divide and rule’ strategy 
so frequently applied by various commercially and / or cluster­
driven power structures, backed by particular interest groups—
so eloquently described already half a millennium ago by Niccolo 
Machiavelli.
The history of glocal
The term glocal is of Japanese origin (Khondker 2004, 14). First 
used by Japanese farmers adapting rice strains to local con­
ditions, it became more widely known as a term used by Japanese 
multinationals to refer to products developed for global markets, 
but modified to suit the expectations of the individual markets 
where the products were to be consumed.
In the West the term first surfaced in the 1990’s, initially in 
commerce, but eventually as a cultural term (ibid.). A typical 
application of it is the slogan “think global, act local.” The term’s 
popularisation in academia was much due to Robert Robertson’s 
(1994) work in the field of sociology. Following for one Anthony 
Giddens, Robertson argued that globalisation not only involved 
economic and political streamlining, but also methodological 
streamlining—in reality equating to methodological imperialism, 
which in sociological terms threaten local cultures’ possibilities 
of expression and eventually their outright existence. Hence 
“the local” must be recognised not only as a mere recipient of 
global influences, but also as an interpreter of the same, mixing 
such influences with its local culture (Robertson 1995; Khan 1998; 
Kraidy 1999; Raz 1999). From this follows, as Bordieu (1993) also 
suggests, that the local not only plays the role of the receiver of 
global influences, but also that of a sender, impacting the shape 
and form of global influences as they hit the local, are mixed at 
28 the local, and then continue their flows around the global, now in 
a partly modified state.
Robertson stresses that glocal does not assume global to be 
pro­active and local to be re­active, since there is mutuality in the 
relationship both will remain dependent upon the other. Critics 
of Robertson’s work, however, point to the fuzziness and fluid­
ness of the “local,” making it difficult to identify the “locals” that 
make up the “global,” in turn blurring the analysis as such (Agnew 
1997). In fact, this criticism developed into an entirely new debate 
surrounding the term “glocalism,” now focusing on “scale.” This 
debate tried to specify the exact relationship between local and 
global, and was to quite an extent conducted among “human 
geographers.”
The leading voice in that new debate was Eric Swyngedouw. To 
Swyngedouw—who had studied under Marxist geographer David 
Harvey—scales are historical constructs, mediated by social 
relations, making up the playing fields for “action” and “inaction” 
(Swyngedouw 1997a). Swyngedouw is critical to the effects of 
glocalism, noting that as long as the local (i.e., the smaller scale) 
is seen as a component of the global (the larger scale)—which 
is how the scale debate typically comes down on the local­
global relationship, often with reference to “nested scales”—the 
capacity of place (i.e., the local) will be dependent on the control 
of space (i.e., the global). By this follows that those controlling 
space (such as big business and global politics) can—and possibly 
will—also control place, reducing the local to a dependent rather 
than a contributor (Swyngedouw 1997b, 2004; Merret 2001; Amin 
2002; Collinge 2005).
In essence this view suggests that the local is subordinate to 
the global, which is quite the opposite of what Robertson et al. 
claimed when they argued that there is mutuality in the relation­
ship—one that makes both sides dependent upon each other.
Although these are the two key trajectories that have dominated 
the academic debate on “glocalism,” there are also at least two 
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and Keith Woodward (2005), can be seen as an effort to outright 
negate Swyngedouw’s scale thesis, by arguing for “human geog­
raphy without scale.” Another is the strong effort to link the term 
“glocal” to the neo­liberal agenda, putting an economic rather 
than a social or scalar emphasis on how to interpret this concept. 
Since neo­liberalism views globalisation as a primarily positive 
development, its approach is also to negate Swyngedouw’s 
arguments; the latter viewing glocalism as a threat to the “local,” 
while the former typically views it as an opportunity.
Starting with “human geography without scale,” it must be rec­
ognised that this is a niche debate, which, although it spanned 
over several years, attracted only a small number of contributors. 
In order to understand the philosophical platform of the Citizen 
Lobby, it is nevertheless important to understand the ideas 
brought forth by Marston, Jones, and Woodward. Their main 
arguments stem from what they refer to as “flat ontology” (ibid., 
422). Here they refer both to historical thinkers such as Spinoza 
and contemporary ones such as Latour, suggesting that flat 
ontologies consists of self­organising systems
where the dynamic properties of matter produce a multi­
plicity of complex relations and singularities that sometimes 
lead to the creation of new, unique events and entities, but 
more often to relatively redundant orders and practices. 
(ibid.) 
In differing from what e.g., Smith refers to as a “horizontal 
ontology of flows” (in Marston, 423), building on among other 
influences the actor­network theory, Marston, Jones and Wood­
ward argue that a flat ontology “consist of localised and non­
localised event­relations productive of event­spaces that avoid 
the predetermination of hierarchies or boundlessness” (Mar­
ston, Jones, and Woodward 2005, 424). By this they mean that 
permanent borders between binaries such as “here/there,” “us/
you,” “now/then” (etc.) are non­existent—but may appear as 
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such fixed scalar hierarchies are simply imagined. In ontological 
terms they would hence qualify as a priori. By ignoring them, they 
could just as well either turn out not to exist at all, or to have very 
different scope and content as compared to what had otherwise 
been a priori assumed, which is why it would only be possible to 
recognise their true relationships a posteriori.
As the proposed Citizen Lobby is meant to be an ongoing and, in 
terms of members, rotating advisory board to the elected parlia­
ment, a high level of fluidness (i.e., where permanent borders 
between binaries such as “here/there,” “us/you,” “now/then” (etc.) 
are non­existent—but may appear as consequences of the events 
actually taking place) is likely in the shorter term, where different 
groupings initially will view these binaries quite differently. 
Over time however—when Citizen Lobby activities become 
part of everyday life and debate—these binaries are likely to 
take a clearer shape in the eyes of the general public (elec­
torate) amongst whom the Citizen Lobby is recruited, eventually 
positioning the Citizen Lobby in “the system” where it balances its 
own interests vis­à­vis the institutional interests represented by 
the institutional lobbies, just as 50 years ago labour unions even­
tually became established speaking partners for both employers 
and politicians.
Turning to the neo­liberal take on glocalism (Courchene 2001a, 
2001b; Friedman 2005), economic advances in the local are often 
seen to be driven by smart utilisation of the global. The global 
influx, of which the local can make such smart use, is often seen 
as a part of what Storper and others refer to as “untraded inter­
dependencies” (Storper 1997). By this is meant that apart from 
traded relations (or “traded interdependencies”) such as labour, 
input materials and commodities of various types, traded in the 
open market, there are other competitive advantages that certain 
sub­national levels (e.g., regions or cities) can plug into and ben­
efit from (Taylor 2000; Brenner 2004; Sassen 2002; Van der Heiden 
2007). Such competitive advantages could include universities 
31and/or government institutions located in the same region or city 
as the actor enjoying these untraded interdependencies. It could 
also involve multilingual populations, strategic geo­location, 
good infrastructure provided by the national government, or 
particularly well­connected regional leaders.
In the dawn of the new millennium an initiative was taken by Uri 
Savir, a former Israeli diplomat then heading the Peres Center for 
Peace in Tel Aviv. This initiative led to the setting up of the Glocal 
Forum in 2001, a stakeholder­body aimed at promoting peace 
and mutual understanding, “while striving to create a new social 
and economic balance through city­to­city cooperation” (Glocal 
Forum 2004, 3). This initiative came to blend with the neo­liberal 
ideas of glocalism (see above), although the centre’s Glocalization 
Manifesto itself lacks any such ideological or academic references, 
and/or analysis. The manifesto is however based on a joint study 
by the Glocal Forum, CERFE (Centro di Ricerca e Documentazione 
Febbraio ’74) and the World Bank Institute (2003), and this study 
is full of such analysis and references—as well as of a whole range 
of recommendations.
Although its recommendations reflected high ambitions, there 
was little new to be found in terms of how all this should happen. 
Nevertheless, as the main use of this joint study turned out to 
be the Glocalization Manifesto, it is worth looking at what that 
document ordained. Unsurprisingly the manifesto’s starting point 
was this joint study’s recommendations. From here the manifesto 
took on to elaborate on these recommendations, stressing for 
example that (Glocal Forum 2004, 8–10):
1. “[C]ities and local authorities represent the focal point of 
glocalization.”
2. “Glocalization is not only to address individual cities and their 
administrations, but also […] associations such as the United 
Cities and Local Governments, the US Conference of Mayors, 
the Summit Conferences of Major Cities of the World and Sister 
Cities International.”
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the private companies involved, through exposure, public 
relations, networking and local support …”
4. “In addition to the many kinds of support that national govern­
ments could provide, perhaps the most important is the 
granting of a greater autonomy and empowerment of the cities 
and local authorities …”
For further guidance, the manifesto listed thirty areas where 
action was required. Out of these only four were specific enough 
to evaluate, all the remaining simply suggesting “promoting,” 
“supporting,” “recognising,” “exploring” and “facilitating” various 
areas of concern. Comparing the Glocalization Manifesto and its 
underlying joint study with the debate on glocalism analysed 
above, there is little doubt that the manifesto is a product of the 
neo­liberal view on glocalism, where the “local” (here specifically 
interpreted in geographical terms of a city or region) draws 
heavily on the “untraded interdependencies” that its “global” 
surrounding can offer. There is hardly any evidence in the 
manifesto that Robinson’s more social and mutually oriented 
approach to glocalism has influenced this document, since 
virtually all points of reference—and points of action—presup­
poses that the “higher” level (of whichever levels are involved) 
shall take initial action, whether in terms of facilitation, support, 
empowerment, etc. A higher level taking the cue from a lower 
level is not listed anywhere, supporting the neo­liberal view that 
the “local” stands to benefit from the “global,” if/when it re­acts 
in a smart manner, making the “global” the active party and the 
“local” the re­active one—in direct contrast to Robert Robinson 
et al. 
A study of a handful of European cities engaging in the type of 
“city diplomacy” discussed above, found that the democratic 
aspects of these activities rated far below par. In fact most of 
the decisions were made, and most of the implementation­work 
undertaken by these cities’ civil servants, not by the local parlia­
ments (if any) or their elected leaders. The international activities 
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non­earmarked funds—in summary making it almost impossible 
for the citizens to influence and/or follow­up on these activities 
(Van der Heiden 2007).
The Glocalization Manifesto can therefore be said to assume the 
neo­liberal interpretation of the term “glocalism,” which in turn 
comes out as a political statement. The Citizen Lobby, further 
explained in Chapter 7, is ideology­neutral, instead focusing 
on how the general public (or “public sphere”), can go about 
expressing / arguing in favour of whatever political opinions they 
may harbour. The Citizen Lobby builds on Robinson’s view of 
mutuality—not on the neo­liberal view of smartness.
The Cultural Formula
In Chapter 6 the so­called “Cultural Formula” will be applied 
(Olsen 2005, 56–57). This formula has been successfully used 
in two comparative cultural studies to analyse the differences 
in “reason” applied by different clusters (groups of people or 
cultures), where “reason” is framed by the “premises” that groups 
use to build their “logic” (ibid., ch. 3). The Cultural Formula 
aims at singling out the premises, from which a clearer under­
standing of that group’s internal logic can be achieved—based on 
anthropologist Melville Herskovits’ claim that “Granted the prem­
ises, the logic is inescapable” (Herskovits 1955, 361). 
The formula reads as follows:
On the Social Level:  + Cultural Values
   + Environment  
   = Cultural Application 
On the Empirical Level: + Cultural Application
   + Environment  
   = Cultural Premise  
34 On the Logical Level: + Observations  
   + Cultural Premise  
   = Cultural Conclusion 
On the Action Level:  + Cultural Conclusion 
   + Resources  
   + Resolve      
   = Cultural Behaviour  
Explained in simple English this means that the application 
of our cultural values will be shaped by the environment we 
operate in. For instance, a newly arrived Libyan immigrant 
to France may act differently in a given situation in France 
compared to what s/he would have done in Libya, not necessarily 
because of an immediate change in his/her cultural values, but 
because the French environment (in which s/he now operates) 
is notably different from the Libyan, making his/her normal 
behaviour impractical, or even unrealistic (ibid., 353). As s/he 
gains experience from operating in a new environment, this 
experience will also start to affect his/her premises (underlying 
assumptions). This means that instead of assuming a certain 
type of development based on past experiences, s/he will now 
begin to assume different types of developments, based on 
fresh experiences in the new environment, combined with the 
“old” references that s/he still retains. Armed with this new logic, 
and given whatever resources and resolve s/he has and/or can 
muster, s/he will act in whatever way s/he now finds logical. No 
doubt this is neither a linear process of development or change, 
nor one where the different steps always will reveal themselves 
as individual steps. However, all of them must be passed through 
before his/her action will change as a consequence of the new 
cultural influences s/he is exposed to. 
This process of a slowly changing logic is something we are 
all constantly exposed to. Even if immigrants are exposed to 
it in much more obvious ways (so­called “culture shocks”) are 
also changing times, circumstances and conditions (such as 
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premises, leading to revised “logic” (or “reason” as Habermas 
calls it). This “formula” will therefore be used to illustrate how 
our relationships to policy­making is likely to change over time, in 
turn building and explaining the arguments not only for why a Cit­
izen Lobby is at all required, but also for why it must be designed 
not as an independent and/or voluntary online tool, but as a 
mandatory, integrated and politically recognised tool, operating 
in harmony—and calibrated in time—with the elected parliament. 
The chapters that follow
The following chapters will dwell on a number of key concerns 
driving the design of the model for the Citizen Lobby, which will 
be this publication’s overall output. These chapters are as follows:
Chapter 2: Jürgen Habermas’ discourse on the public sphere. This 
chapter delves deeper into which actors are involved in policy­
making, and how history can help us understand the roles of 
and interaction among these actors, in the complex processes 
of representation of political will and dissemination as well as 
implementation of policy.
Chapter 3: How information and communications technology (ICT) 
has changed the political playing field by allowing almost anyone 
to access and share information and views, but also by distracting 
and obscuring the view of who is involved, who represents what, 
and which intentions underpin which action—all this not only 
facilitating, but also even further complicating the picture painted 
by Habermas. 
Chapter 4: The emerging discourse on peer­to­peer production 
as a new way to interact without having to rely on hierarchical 
organisational structures—and to which extent this mode of 
interaction is applicable for democratic processes in general and 
policy­making processes in particular.
36 Chapter 5: The existing German Liquid Democracy platform, 
and its two main software applications Liquid Feedback and 
Adhocracy. These applications are designed to allow grass­
roots participation in decision­making in general and has taken 
two directions: one focusing on deliberation and one focusing 
on delegation, both with voting as the final step. Scholars have 
done some independent research on its perceived effects on 
democracy, which also will be referenced.
Chapter 6: The building of “a model leading to the model,” where 
the previously discussed issues are fed into a multi­facetted 
chart, analysing the possible scenarios that the various players 
identified by Habermas are likely to encounter, seen over three 
time periods, being:
1. the past—but in some areas still current (the corporate era),
2. the present—but in some areas still to come (the media era), 
and
3. the future—as outlined in this publication’s referenced lit­
erature (the P2P era).
Chapter 7: The Citizen Lobby Model, its proposed format, 
function and processes, as well as its expected impact on future 
policy­making.
Hopefully this introductory chapter has adequately explained 
this publication’s ambitions and laid the foundation for further 
reading.
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Jürgen Habermas:
The public sphere and its 
communicative action
Writings by and on Jürgen Habermas are substantial. His theories 
on the public sphere and communicative action have challenged 
the academic community for 50 years—and still do. This is 
perhaps in itself the most obvious sign of quality; any scientist, 
whether in the social or natural sciences, whose work is still 
debated 50 years on must have had something to contribute.
Although Habermas debated a wide range of topics, this pub­
lication only discusses his ideas for the public sphere and 
communicative action. The reason for this is that those are 
the theories that relate directly to the topic of this publication, 
i.e., democracy in action. As this publication will explain, these 
theories are important to grasp if one is to understand this pub­
lication’s recommendations, both in terms of Habermas’ own 
thinking as well as of the critique it has generated over the years. 
The critique has in some instances been harsh, and Habermas 
himself also revised some of his ideas to better reflect the reality 
they later encountered. But it is because of their underlying 
structure that his ideas are most useful. This structure helps 
us understand both the players and the processes involved in 
38 policy­making, a structure that—in spite of its first publication 
dating back to 1962—still can be used for a constructive analysis 
of our socio­political environment.
As in so many other instances of thought analysis, it may not be 
the conclusions made that are of key importance but the useful­
ness of the steps and components that—together with more 
case­driven assumptions that may seem less relevant at later 
stages—lead the author to draw those conclusions. By feeding in 
new circumstances and new premises, the conclusions are likely 
to change, but the thought structure can still remain helpful.
Some of those debating the public sphere take its composition for 
granted, and instead focus on its role—comparing this collective’s 
identity and role to those of other collectives, such as civil 
society, citizens, commoners or policy consumers. Civil society 
indeed constitutes a part of the public sphere, since it con­
stitutes the non­state part of society. However just like the public 
sphere it crosses critical borders when organising itself, and any 
“civilian” may have interests contradicting those of civil society 
organisations, but which still risk being considered part of the 
same collective. Citizens are of course only people with a certain 
nationality, which officially puts them in a large collective that, 
nevertheless, falls into a wide range of sub­collectives—if anyone 
were to try to define its roles and/or characteristics. A commoner, 
here referred to a member of “a commons,” may be anyone who 
is acting in his/her personal capacity, not necessarily organised in 
any other way than what is needed for the purpose of inclusion—
an identity contrasting both institutional and state structures. 
Being a policy consumer is a passive role, simply mirroring one of 
all those Habermas includes in the public sphere.
The usefulness of Habermas’ public sphere concept is two­fold:
 – It structures both individuals and organisations in an 
interdependent manner, and places this structure in an 
identified relationship with the state. This structure and 
relationship can endure even if/when roles and power 
39balances change, and therefore serve as a framework within 
which different societies can be compared.
 – It allows for studies and comparisons of both communicative 
and operational flows. From this it also gains its strengths in 
the face of the critique it draws. Such critique actually uses the 
same framework as the original model did, but inserts new 
and/or different premises to argue one way or the other.
Although Habermas’ models are keys to understanding also this 
publication’s trajectories, we will here only present them in five 
summary steps, as follows:
 – The 1962 version of Jürgen Habermas’ public sphere  
(Appendix 1)
 – Summary of criticism of Habermas’ public sphere model 
(Appendix 2)
 – Summary of criticism of Habermas’ communicative action 
model (Appendix 3)
 – Three points of underhand revision of and by Jürgen 
Habermas’ public sphere and communicative action  
(Appendix 4)
 – The 1992 version of Jürgen Habermas’ public sphere and com­
municative action (Appendix 5)
Since 1992, when they were first debated in the English­speaking 
world, following a 30­year battle­of­minds in German­speaking 
academia, have these ideas been widely quoted and re­packaged. 
It is however a few conclusions drawn in 1992 that serve as the 
key reference points for this project, why the debate leading up to 
those are of particular interest here.
The 1962 version
The original version of Habermas’ public sphere was famously 
referred to as the “tea and coffee houses” where people met 
and talked, i.e., informal meeting places where people met and 
“public opinion” was shaped. The most important aspect of 
40 this is, perhaps, that people did meet, also outside the formal 
institutions of decision­making, and did discuss matters of con­
cern—and that these discussions did take on such dignity that 
their conclusions eventually affected policy­making (Calhoun 
1992, 12; Habermas 1991, 54). How could this happen?
Habermas’ analysis led to five distinct arenas. The first one 
was, quite obviously, the state itself, with its government and 
bureaucracy. That governing arena was in turn governed by the 
constitution, and operated by the parliament.
The state’s counterpart was the public sphere, which in turn fell 
into two main and four sub­arenas. One main arena was the 
public realm, which subdivided into two parts (which here, as a 
simplification of terminology, are called): the “economic realm” 
and the “intimate realm.” I will revert to these below, but in 
brief the (public) economic realm referred to the corporate and 
institutional world, while the (public) intimate realm referred to 
the media.
The second arena was the private realm, which also subdivided 
into two parts (which here, to simplify terminology, also are 
called): the economic realm and the intimate realm. Here the 
(private) economic realm referred to the capital owners and 
educated classes (in the era of the bourgeoisie sometimes called 
“men of letters”), while the (private) intimate realm referred to 
the family.
He thereby set the stage for democratic debate involving five 
parties, being (i) the state, (ii) the corporate and institutional 
world, (iii) media, (iv) capital owners and educated classes and (v) 
the family.
Habermas then identified the roles they played, and the power 
they held. This, in summary, he defined as follows:
1. The state: 
A governing role infused with political power, driven by the rule 
of law.
412. The corporate and institutional world: 
A lobbying role infused with political influence based on 
economic power, driven by institutionalised albeit biased 
interests.
3. Media: 
A communicative role infused with cultural power, driven by 
the intent to shape and communicate public interests to the 
governing realm.
4. Capital owners and educated classes: 
A role to define economic SWOTs (strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats) and formulate “public will,” infused 
with intellectual and economic powers, driven by “true 
reason.”
5. Family: 
Recipient of culture through media, infused with electoral 
power, driven by opinion.
This script and role distribution had both benefits and 
drawbacks. The advantage was that it described a circle of 
influence that, at least on paper, ensured that all parts of society 
could be involved. Its weakness was that it reinforced the elitism 
it had inherited from pre­democratic times, where an economic 
and intellectual elite controlled both “public­will” creation and the 
lobbying forces. The former in their capacity as individuals, taking 
part in the public debate (in the tea and coffee houses as well as 
the forums following that), the latter in their capacity as owners 
and managers of the corporate and institutional bodies that 
lobbied the government and bureaucracy for certain outcomes of 
the policy­making processes (Calhoun 1992, 7–8).
Habermas, however, draws his reader’s attention to the role of 
media. He argued that although media in the early days of pub­
lishing had focused on information, necessary for conducting 
economic (and religious; author’s comment) affairs, it soon 
developed in two new directions. One was fiction, targeting the 
family domain, which although often contributing to the social 
debate on issues of concern, did so in a romantic or dramatised 
42 fashion. This meant that the readers may not have been engaged 
by “reason”—by which “public will” was to be created—but by 
fiction and drama, from which less helpful “opinions” could form 
(ibid., 21).
The other new direction was advertising, which he saw as the 
start of consumerism, a trend he considered unfortunate, espe­
cially if combined with opinions rather than reason (ibid., 24).
In his 1962 version, Habermas therefore saw two competing 
flows: one from the intellectual class, via their corporate or 
institutional interests, holding the state in line with the interests 
of society via its political influence (lobbying); the other being 
media power over the electorate, where people’s increasingly 
opinion­based and consumerist lifestyles threatened the “rule of 
reason” (Habermas 1991, 23). This consumerist lifestyle, combined 
with a negotiating lobby, also increased the “demand for rights,” 
in turn creating a need for a more active state, capable of 
“delivering” (Calhoun 1992, 22).
However, there were also further issues to consider in this 
structure. One was that the private realm (whether economic or 
intimate) could only use its own power for “acclamation”—i.e., 
only show like or dislike at the ballot­box (Habermas 1991, 176). 
More specific influences on the governing realm came via the 
(institutional) lobby and the media, which is why he saw the need 
for a stronger voice of the private realm. That voice he assigned 
to the welfare state. The digital­age term “fork” could potentially 
describe how he saw that role, as compared to that of the con­
stitutional state. The welfare state was to look after the inter­
ests of the private realm in the dealings taking place between 
the public and the governing realms. This however caused some 
conflicts that required a clearer ranking, and the welfare state’s 
role was eventually specified as subordinate to that of the con­
stitutional state (ibid., 210, 232).
Another issue that concerned Habermas was that the public eco­
nomic realm (corporations and institutions) developed “public 
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but also the private realm. In this they intentionally made use of 
the media, which eventually became puppets of the public eco­
nomic realm—slowly but surely moving from informative com­
munication to manipulative communication (Calhoun 1992, 26).
All this further fuelled the decline of the intellectual and reasoned 
content of “the debate,” as the slowly growing private economic 
realm also caused “quantification” of this debate—at the expense 
of its qualities—as Habermas argued, the debate will fail if/when 
wealth outstrips education (ibid., 25). Habermas even went as 
far as lamenting that “the world fashioned by the mass media 
is a public sphere in appearance only” (Habermas 1991, 171). 
This trend was further strengthened by the development of the 
political parties’ internal agendas. In brief he argued that the 
consequence of this was that the debate became focused on their 
predefined agendas and election promises, not on the underlying 
issues that drove their agendas. This meant that the electorate 
now only were asked to consider which portfolio of ideas they 
preferred, out of several on offer, rather than how to best resolve 
the problems they wished to see resolved (ibid., 216–217).
In the private realm he could also see how the growing circle of 
inclusion (although he never specified which these new groups 
were) brought about an educational debate, which in turn gave 
way to more noncommittal group activities, partly reducing the 
private realm’s interest in policy­making. As we will see later, this 
is one of the most criticised areas of his theory, as it elegantly 
circumvents, rather than takes on, gender, class and minority 
issues. 
Habermas saw the consequences of these developments to 
be problematic. He therefore introduced a concept he called 
“inter­subjective communication.” By this he meant a much more 
sincere dialogue format—meant to counter the “manipulative 
communication” that media engaged in, with a more direct dia­
logue between the parties concerned. This format based itself on 
44 (i) clarity, (ii) attitude and (iii) truthfulness. Habermas summed 
them up as “formal pragmatics” (Habermas 1984, 330), as he 
argued they constitute three universal pillars of any speech­act 
anywhere, and therefore possible to extend to all and any type 
of communication. It could even link art and literature to science 
and law—and morality—hence holding not only communicative 
powers, but also those emancipatory (ibid., 331–334). As will be 
discussed later was this also an often criticised theory, not the 
least by his contemporary Jacques Derrida, the deconstructionist 
who was his most well­known adversary. Derrida (and others) 
claimed that language indeed is a tool of power, and therefore 
cannot be given such a generalised format and summarised in 
such general terms. But as will be argued later, there are points in 
this theory that can be highly useful in a slightly different context.
Habermas and his critics also presented some more general 
differences that affected these exchanges. One was, as indicated 
above, the role of the political party, where many defended its 
role to represent voters, rather than to engage them in debates. 
Here Habermas meant that voting alone distanced the public 
discourse from the public sphere from which it had emerged—
and by which it had to be owned (Habermas 1991, 203). As a 
market liberalist he obviously also disagreed with his Marxist 
critics, who argued that corporate power is anti­social, and must 
be controlled. He saw corporate power as the most natural of 
influences, driven by the market’s invisible hand.
Whereas critics also argued that “media” has a life of its own, 
and as such not only exists to serve but also to survive in a 
competitive environment, it needs to empower itself by making 
itself important in whatever environment it operates. This in 
turn can explain its manipulative efforts. Habermas on the other 
hand rather saw the need to protect the public sphere from the 
over­representation of biased interests that media often contrib­
utes to, and to protect the free flow of intellectual thoughts and 
critique from the “opinions” that media often channels (Garnham 
1992, 367).
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When Jürgen Habermas’ most well­known works were finally 
translated into English in the late 1980s, almost 30 years after 
they were first published in German, a totally new group of 
readers took it on. Social scientist and intellectuals from the 
English­speaking world could finally study his original works, 
and in 1992 a conference was held in the United States to dis­
cuss his theories. This conference was later summarised in the 
book Habermas and the Public Sphere, edited by Craig Calhoun. 
In this book a partly new generation of views are expressed, as 
30 years is a long time for a social theory in today’s increasingly 
fast­moving and global landscape. As will be presented below this 
conference also gave Habermas a good opportunity to update 
his theories—an update that is fundamental to how this research 
relates both to his public sphere theory and his “inter­subjective 
communication” format.
But let us start by looking at the criticism expressed by the new 
group of readers who were, nevertheless, generally speaking, 
fairly supportive of his underlying conceptual thinking, with one 
major exception. This exception was his idea of “universalism.” 
Not only did he argue that universalism was the basis for con­
sensus, he also inserted it as a premise for his inter­subjective 
communication (McCarthy 1992, 65).
Although Derrida had already long since criticised this approach, 
using his deconstruction­theory (Borradori 2003, 4–8), Thomas 
McCarthy now noted that consensus requires compromise, 
and if “moral consensus” is to be arrived at through political 
dialogue—which is what Habermas argued in favour of—such 
moral consensus will have to be limited to one’s own cultural 
sphere (1992, 65–66). Since not even philosophers can agree on 
what is morally right, efforts to elevate this concept to a general 
and universal level are difficult at best, and impossible at worst. 
This thin line between consensus and compromise is, generally 
speaking, the focus of this criticism, and in his paper from 2000 
46 (unrelated to the conference mentioned above), Bent Flyvbjerg 
(2000) went as far as openly ridiculing Habermas for thinking that 
politics and policy­making can expect to achieve consensus at 
all, as politicians are negotiators by breed, and rhetoric is used 
to obscure—while at the same time promoting—their vested 
interests.
Along the same lines as McCarthy Hohendahl (1992, 105)—with 
reference to Habermas’ reliance on historical developments as 
platform for his modern­day theory—argued that Habermas’ 
model would need to treat “new issues” (e.g., class and gender) 
as values rather than norms, as long as they are culture specific. 
This affects the level of aggregate upon which a consensus can 
be achieved, as such consensus would have to be sought among 
those who share that cultural value.
In other words, there was neither in 1992, nor is there today, 
any support for Habermas’ idea of universal consensus. This in 
turn undermines the idea of building a theory of communicative 
action on “inter­subjective communication” based on such uni­
versal consensus.
An equally persistent—but more specific—line of arguments 
related to how Habermas’ model dealt with “power.” At the said 
conference this critique fell into three categories; (i) structural 
issues, (ii) gender and class issues and (iii) minority issues.
Habermas’ public sphere was meant to be an institutional mech­
anism for rationalising political domination, by rendering states 
accountable to the citizenry and assuming an ideal and unre­
stricted rational discussion of public matters, where inequalities 
of status were to be bridged with debaters deliberating as peers. 
Nancy Fraser (1992, 112–113) however argued that “accountability” 
never found its form and, as the public sphere grew, the intended 
peer­to­peer dialogue turned into mass media and manipulation 
of public opinion, whereby the degeneration process took over. 
This view basically overlaps with Habermas’ own, although he 
saw this problem to be a communication problem that could 
47(and should) be resolved, not a structural one that was doomed 
by its own design. Fraser further pointed out that the separation 
of the public sphere’s debate (and consequent opinion­making) 
from the state’s decision­making remains a structural problem 
for as long as the state remains free to act independently from 
the collective will of the public sphere (ibid., 118). Again this was 
a matter that Habermas wanted to resolve with “communicative 
action,” something his critics did not think was permissible, given 
the difficulty of ensuring the “clarity, attitude and truthfulness” 
required.
The perhaps most re­occurring criticism in the discourse on 
power was in regards to the model’s obliviousness of gender, 
class and minorities.
Habermas had designated the public sphere an intentional arena, 
where present status distinctions were bracketed—and hence 
neutralised—meaning that (e.g.) gender, class and minority status 
are bridged by “reason.” The possibility of parallel collectives 
applying parallel reason, where women or the working class 
argued for a different “reason” than what men and capital owners 
did, was something this model did not take into consideration—
just as little as it took cultural differences into consideration. 
While Nicholas Garnham (1992, 359) noted that Habermas’ public 
sphere simply ignored the parallel “publics” of the working 
class and romanticises the bourgeois as a benevolent rather 
than profit­seeking class, Nancy Fraser (1992, 117) gave details 
by arguing that if private interests and issues are undesirable 
in the public sphere discourse (which it was in Habermas 
1962­version, filtered away by “reason”), it also refuses the 
argument that gender and care issues—for which women carry 
historical responsibilities—are not “private,” but “political.” Due 
to bracketing—i.e., grouping of concerns in aggregates—societal 
equality here is not seen to be necessary for political democracy.
A similar argument referred to minorities. Habermas’ definition 
of “participation,” where participation in a narrow political sense 
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debates in the private realm prepare for the spill­over into the 
political debate in the public realm, making it possible also for 
culturally specific and/or relevant issues to become topics for 
debate. Seyla Benhabib (1992, 85–87) however makes the point 
that such a narrow and “political” participation must be replaced 
by participation in the broader socio­political debate, a debate 
that goes on everywhere, all the time and in different ways and 
contexts. Since expanding the public sphere also will by default 
raise the “culture and traditions” agenda—not as culture and 
traditions as such, but as “problems of meaning in the present,” 
this will also allow minority agendas to be heard. Although 
Habermas would agree in principle, it seemed to clash with his 
lack of respect for what he called opinions, which in a stricter 
scenario of reasoned arguments could be how minority agendas 
were conceived, since there is no way minority views could gather 
the assumed consensus.
In the majority­minority debate, the majority’s benevolent 
solution to “difference” (i.e., a minority view as compared to the 
majority view) is “tolerance.” But, as filmmaker Pier Paolo Pasolini 
wrote:
[t]his ‘difference’ […] remains the same both with regard to 
those who have decided to tolerate him and those who have 
decided to condemn him. No majority will ever be able to 
banish from its consciousness the feeling of the ‘difference’ 
of minorities. (Warner 1992, 384–385)
This, his critics argued, Habermas had either overlooked or 
ignored.
Summary of criticism of the communicative action model
Criticism expressed over Habermas’ (original) theory for com­
municative action during the 1992 conference can be summarised 
in two blocks. One targeted his arguments regarding the relation­
ships between “public” and “reason” on one hand and “mass” and 
49“opinion” on the other. The second block was about his claims 
regarding “formal pragmatics.”
Habermas’ strong trust in “public” and “reason” had its clear 
opposite in his reserve for “mass” and “opinion.” The following 
quote captures Habermas’ concerns in this particular respect:
In a ‘public’, as we may understand the term, (1) virtually as 
many people express opinions as receive them. (2) Public 
communications are so organised that there is a chance 
immediately and effectively to answer back any opinion 
expressed in public. Opinion formed by such discussion (3) 
readily finds an outlet in effective action, even against—if 
necessary—the prevailing system of authority. And (4) 
authoritative institutions do not penetrate the public, which 
is thus more or less autonomous in its operation. Conversely, 
opinions cease to be public opinions in the proportion to 
which they are enmeshed in the communicative interchanges 
that characterise a ‘mass’: In a ‘mass’, (1) far fewer people 
express opinions than receive them, for the community of 
publics becomes an abstract collection of individuals who 
receive impressions from the mass media. (2) The com­
munications that prevail are so organised that it is difficult, or 
impossible, for the individual to answer back immediately or 
with an effect. (3) The realisation of opinion in action is con­
trolled by authorities who organise and control the channels 
of such action. The mass has no autonomy from institutions; 
on the contrary, agents of authorised institutions penetrate 
this mass, reducing any autonomy it may have in the for­
mation of opinion by discussion. (1991, 249) 
He argued that:
[w]hereas exposure to the mass media in general increased 
with a person’s position in the stratification system, this 
[with respect to the “manipulative” media] relationship 
was reversed; advertisements and radio commercials 
reached lower status groups more extensively and more 
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unconcealed class antagonism […] the public sphere itself 
was torn between the “two nations”—and thus the public 
presentation of private interests [by/of itself] took on a 
political significance. (ibid., 191)
Habermas had himself noted that Fraenkel already in 1957 
claimed that
[w]ith the help of parliamentary discussion, public opinion 
makes its desires known to the government, and the govern­
ment makes its policies known to public opinion
whereby “public opinion reigns, but does not govern” [author’s 
italic] (Fraenkel 1958 quoted in Habermas 1991, 239).
His contemporary countryman Leibholz (1952 quoted in 
Habermas 1991, 239) had however conflicted this by arguing 
that “the will of the [political] parties is identical with that of the 
active citizenry, so that the party happening to hold the majority 
represents the public opinion,” whereby “… public opinion also 
governs” [author’s italic].
Although Habermas (who felt unease over political parties hold 
on the policy­debate) was likely to prefer the former to the latter, 
he here expressed his distaste for manipulative media:
‘Opinion management’ is distinguished from advertising by 
the fact that it expressly lays claim to the public sphere as 
one that plays a role in the political realm. […] The addressee 
of public relations is “public opinion,” or the private citizens 
as the public and not directly as consumers. The sender 
of the message hides his business intentions in the role of 
someone interested in the public welfare. The influencing of 
consumers borrows its connotations from the classic idea 
of a public of private people putting their reason to use and 
exploits its legitimations for its own ends. (ibid., 193)
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agement” already in Chapter 1, we will return to this argument yet 
again in Chapter 3 when discussing how the Internet impacts the 
political playing field.
Habermas verdict was clear: “The public sphere becomes the 
court before whose public prestige can be displayed — rather 
than in which public critical debate is carried on” (ibid., 201).
Nicholas Garnham (1992, 367) noted that a problem with media’s 
role in the “reason vs opinion” debate is that media itself never 
adapted fully to the political concept of representation (based 
on reason), but remained largely trapped within the paradigm of 
direct individual face­to­face communication (reflecting opinion).
Both he and Lloyd Kramer (1992) wished to play down Habermas’ 
clear divide between the “public,” being endowed with “reason,” 
and the “masses,” being driven by opinions. Their argument is 
that it is neither possible to know if opinions are part of reason 
or not—i.e., if opinions are managed by media or based on actual 
debate within the private intimate realm (“family”)—nor if media 
is intentionally manipulating its audience, or if such manipulative 
effects are because of medias’ operational paradigm “of direct 
individual face­to­face communication.”
The second stream of critics—targeting the role of “formal 
pragmatics”—can be fairly well summarised by Benjamin Lee’s 
rhetorical question:
Can a theory of communicative action based on an 
essentially [dualistic] speaker­hearer model of speech­acts 
be adequate for the mixed, large­scale communicative 
modes characteristic of modern societies? (1992, 409)
Furthermore he noted that questions could also be raised about 
the applicability of a general theory of writing or textuality to 
mixed modes of communication, such as television and movies, 
combining visual and oral content, and whose production 
includes print­mediated processes as diverse as script­writing 
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negative, in part with reference to the argument that:
[Habermas] additional claim that all languages contain 
speech­acts that fit our [European] typologies would also not 
entail the universality of such acts but would rather point to 
the robustness of our schemes of translation. (ibid., 414) 
So not only does Lee not consider speech­acts as representative 
of all types of communication, he also doubts we can be certain 
that all languages are structured in a similar enough way as to 
ensure compatibility—a key to democratic exchange of “reason.”
Three points of underhand revision
Before we move on to the updated version of Habermas’ public 
sphere theory I will highlight three revisions he had made prior 
to the 1992 conference referenced here, which prompted him to 
make a more thorough update.
The first one is regarding the role of the welfare state, following 
the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union. His original 
stance had been that the welfare state’s legal and administrative 
functions can overrule market mechanisms successfully, whereby 
the political sphere becomes an “adjunct for a legislator,” as the 
welfare state’s political format is already set. His revised stance 
reflected the events: “[T]he bankruptcy of state socialism has 
shown that the legal­administrative mode of regulating [the state 
is] inappropriate” (Habermas 1992, 443).
The second revision was his view on the capacity of the non­elite 
to represent itself. Here his original stance had been that a losing 
communication battle was being fought by the “weak institutions” 
[e.g., workers, minorities] against those organised powers that 
communicate with the ambition to “influence the decisions of 
consumers, voters and clients,” why the welfare state must 
intervene to secure the interests of these “weak institutions.” 
With reference to his altered view on the welfare state itself, his 
53revised stance argued that neither the borders between “high” 
and “low” culture, nor between “culture” and “politics,” may be 
so sharply defined after all, nor may the voice of such “weak 
institutions” be so weak after all—making interventions by the 
welfare state less critical (ibid, 436–439). 
The third revision mentioned here (although others also had been 
made) is a revision of the above criticised structure of the public 
sphere, where he originally argued that the degree of power­
infusion is measured by the extent to which informal, non­public 
opinions are fed into the circuit of formal, quasi­public opinion­
making by the media—that the state and economy are trying 
to influence—in essence arguing that this could be controlled. 
His new stance was that discursively accomplished formation 
of opinion and will is a “veiled version” of majority power, not a 
medium for the potential rationalisation of power altogether—
from which one may deduce that this was not possible to control, 
if only the numbers where big enough (ibid., 439–441).
These three revisions pointed towards a greater sympathy for, 
and trust in, ordinary people, lessening their need for a state­
actor to look after them in the face of an elite­driven media and 
other undemocratic forces. All the above constitute the outset 
from which we below outline Habermas’ 1992 version of his public 
sphere theory. It is from that we take the cue for several of the 
arguments underpinning the Citizen Lobby outlined in Chapter 7.
The 1992 version
Habermas’ 1992­version of his public sphere and com­
municative action theory has the same basic structure as its 1962 
predecessor. We shall be grateful for that, since that is the key 
that unlocks the relationships within, which in turn help analyse 
the power structures that always will decide the outcome of 
political action. It is interesting that the very fact that Habermas 
himself showed notably little interest in power in the 1960s seems 
to have helped to revive the debate around his earlier works, 
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a key topic for public debate. By adding this concern to his then 
existing model, a new dimension appeared, creating a new level 
of interest.
Still analysing the public sphere in two main and four sub­arenas, 
all four interacting one way or another not only with each other, 
but also with the fifth arena, the state; the key difference is 
that the private economic realm is now far bigger than it had 
been earlier. Not only does this reflect Habermas own mental 
expansion of this realm, from an intellectual and economic 
elite of “white, educated and landowning men” (which was the 
bourgeois starting­point) to the full spectra of social classes and 
collectives engaged in socio­economic life. But it also reflects 
the changing times—during which the borderline between our 
private lives and work has become much more blurred, making 
such stratification significantly more difficult to do (ibid, 448 and 
453–454).
The roles the different participants play are however mod­
ified. Although the role of the state is the same, Habermas 
now introduced a new term to help describe the roles of the 
public realm. That term is “generalised particularism” (ibid., 
445). This term, condensing his view on what he earlier termed 
“manipulative opinion management,” expresses in a peculiar 
way how biased interests are “packaged,” in order to seem 
equally important to all of us—although they in fact are far more 
important to those “packaging” them than they are to the rest of 
us. Habermas argues that the lobby, i.e., those representing the 
corporations and institutions constituting the public economic 
realm, actually lobby in favour of their respective institutional 
cultures’ generalised particularism. By this we can understand 
that they try hard to make all of us believe that what is good for 
them is good also for us. The power this realm holds is also driven 
by this ability. The better they argue in terms of general benefits 
arising from their particular interests, the more impact they will 
leverage, both politically and economically.
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branding has become a “must do” in marketing. Since branding 
means we relate more to the corporate “value” the company 
both controls and profits from, than to the product we actually 
use, brands can generalise particular interests in ways that make 
people believe they also benefit, whether they actually do so or 
not. It also allows for corporate lip service to common agendas, 
such as oil­ and gas­ exploration companies investing a marginal 
slice of their profits into “alternative energy” in order to secure 
the rights to expand their traditional businesses in, from a bio­
diversity point of view, often sensitive environments. By high­
profile promotion of their “alternative energy investment” while 
keeping a low profile for their traditional business—apart from in 
their IR (investor relations)—they can generalise their particular 
interests in ways that allows our elected politicians to feel com­
fortable with their demands.
Habermas also noted that media actually represent and co­opt 
with this kind of “generalised particularism,” as they often write 
about these interests as if they were common interests, by which 
they also tend to counter the “tyranny­of­the­majority,” which 
would mean to always let the largest number of voices decide. 
This is in theory an argument Habermas would have agreed to, 
i.e., that reason (quality) should outweigh opinion (quantity), but 
as long as media are involved in manipulative communication this 
is doubtful—possibly even counter­productive (1992, 447).
As for the roles of the private realm, Habermas now saw the 
members of the private economic realm as citizen­stakeholders 
in a collective intellectual and economic debate, while we as 
members of the private intimate realm participate in a cultural 
and opinion­based debate in the capacity of clients of the welfare 
state (ibid., 445).
The changes here are not significant from his earlier version, 
but reflect the mental expansion of the public sphere, as well 
as his less troubled view on “mass” and “opinion” as compared 
56 to “public” and “reason.” His focus on “citizens” on one hand—
who also can be interpreted as stakeholders—and “clients” on 
the other, indicate the two different roles we actually have as 
individuals; one being a member of a collective with a “right” to 
demand and claim, the other being a recipient with individual 
rights to receive the fruits of that collective’s efforts.
It is to this structure that his reference to “deliberative 
democracy” refers. The deliberation taking place in the private 
realm coupled with the representation of the “generalised 
particulars” in the public realm, creates the framework for public 
debate, and hence legitimisation of public will. Importantly, 
Habermas’ previously so problematic view on universal con­
sensus has been rephrased, and now stresses “[a] legitimate 
decision does not represent the will of all, but is one that results 
from the deliberation of all” (ibid., 446).
He nevertheless adds a few criteria necessary for his “deliberative 
democracy” to work (ibid., 446–448):
 – The state must take responsibility for ensuring that all 
members of the society can participate, and that all topics can 
be debated.
 – Social conflicts must remain open to “rational regulation,” i.e., 
here reason rather than opinion must prevail.
 – Public sphere influence over the governing realm must be 
limited to procurement and/or withdrawal of legitimacy.
 – Communicative power cannot substitute the inner (systematic) 
logic of the public and state bureaucracy.
 – It is up to the citizens themselves to critically investigate which 
mechanisms function to alienate them from the political 
process (and hence counteract such developments).
 – The public discourse cannot govern, but can impact the 
governing realm in a “siege­like” manner.
As for the communicative aspect of his updated theory, his 
role­distribution can be summarised as “who” provides and 
“who” receives legitimacy. Obviously the governing realm, being 
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of legitimacy. The public economic realm provides legitimacy of 
power on the “generalised particularism” level, while the private 
economic realm provides the same on the various socio­eco­
nomic collectives’ level. The private intimate realm provides 
legitimacy on the individual level through the ballot box.
Media’s role here becomes to apply its communicative powers to 
drive compliance, demand and loyalty; by Kramer described as 
“opinion management”—by Habermas as “manipulative.”
Also for this communicative interaction Habermas (1992, 448–
452) added a few criteria to observe:
 – The state must provide institutional guarantees for both par­
ticipation and access.
 – The public realm shall provide and help maintain supportive 
patterns of socialisation.
 – The private realm shall provide and help maintain supportive 
cultural traditions.
 – The populace shall be accustomed to freedom (or the above 
will not suffice).
The vehicles he proposed for achieving this last set of criteria 
included voluntary unions as opinion­forming associations, 
e.g., labour unions, and political parties serving as direct links 
between the public sphere and the governing realm, where 
media (in spite of its manipulative tendencies) remains the (his) 
vehicle of choice for communicating social, economic and political 
interests.
Nevertheless, assuming all the above is in place, he still raised 
a few red flags. Importantly he noted that corporations and 
institutions acted as “economic invaders” of public space, just 
as political parties acted as “political invaders” of public space 
(ibid., 455). He also maintained his original point, i.e., that media 
has the power to manipulate public space, both as an agent of 
“economic and political invaders” and in its own right (promoting 
its own role and interests)—by which he summed up the 
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“generalised particularism” against which the private sphere in 
general—and its intimate realm in particular—have to provide a 
counter­balance.
Since it is the private intimate realm (the individuals) that actually 
holds values, prioritises topics and creates reason (even if this 
happens also in other arenas than the family itself), they must 
be offered—by the state—an organisational format for inter­
change and public discourse where they can balance the above 
economic, political and manipulative invasion of the social 
public space. This is therefore what the Citizen Lobby is meant 
to provide: an organisational format where public discourse 
and will­formation can meet, balance and counter, corporate, 
institutional, medial and political invasions of public space.
[ 3 ]
Information and 
computer technology: 
How is ICT changing the 
political playing field?
This chapter looks into the promises, experiences and potentials 
of using ICT as a means to improve and enhance democracy 
in our societies in general, and in more IT­savvy societies in 
particular. Since the overall label of the project under which this 
publication is authored is Digital Democracy, this may seem 
like a key chapter. But as the term “digital democracy” has been 
used in such a variety of ways, its exact meaning is hard to tell. 
It can nevertheless be noted that this term is commonly used to 
describe “e­governance”­related activities, i.e., approaches where 
incumbents seek input from the commoners, rather than where 
authority is challenged by the electorate. Here the impact is hard 
to assess in democracy­terms, as it typically relates more to 
administrative issues than to real decision­making.
Although extensively elaborated upon below, this chapter’s 
overall conclusion is that digital democracy needs to emphasise 
“democracy” more than “digital,” since the success of this devel­
opment relies more on the social than on the technical.
60 Trying to frame this fairly complex problem I start out by quoting 
Matthew Hindman, whose book from 2009 reflects this dilemma 
right in its title The Myth of Digital Democracy:
[I]f the successes of Internet politics are increasingly obvious, 
they have also tempted us to draw the wrong conclusions. 
If we want to understand the fate of politics in the Inter­
net age, we also need to acknowledge new and different 
types of exclusivity that shape online politics. In a host of 
areas, from political news to blogging to issue advocacy, [it] 
shows that online speech follows winners­take­all patterns. 
Paradoxically, the extreme “openness” of the Internet 
has fuelled the creation of new political elites. The Inter­
net’s successes at democratising politics are real. Yet the 
medium’s failures in this regard are less acknowledged and 
ultimately just as profound. (Hindman 2009, 4)
For instance, Zafiropoulos, Vagianos and Vrana, in their paper 
Influential Greek Political Blogs: What Are They Talking About? agree. 
They write that
[t]hrough a sampling procedure, 127 Greek political blogs 
[were] recorded. Four indexes of influence and one overall 
influence index [were] calculated for each one of them to 
record their influence. Furthermore, content analysis of 
the blogs reveals how many of them discuss eParticipation 
topics. Analysis shows that eParticipation topic­discussion is 
a property of the influential political blogs. (2013, 41)
Again, new elites are being established, here among bloggers.
This is indeed an issue that many observers and authors keep 
returning to and to which we will pay a significant amount of 
attention in Chapter 4, where meritocracy is paralleled with 
democracy.
61Eight case studies
In order to better cover the debate we will below quote four cases 
where ICT is deemed a clear contributor to the democratisation 
process, and four more where reasonable doubts for this are 
being raised. From here we will discuss how ICT can contribute 
to the public sphere theory in general and Habermas’ theories in 
particular. We nevertheless start out by looking at this devel­
opment’s success­side, i.e., where ICT clearly contributes to more 
democratic societies.
Case 1
Evika Karamagioli, discussing “open government” in her paper 
Transparency in the Open Government Era: Friends or Foes? confirms 
that:
The decline in citizen engagement in the public sphere has 
long been one of the main challenges of modern govern­
ment. Issues of trust, openness, and transparency are being 
frequently and intensely discussed as the public manifests 
lack of confidence in public servants and governmental 
institutions. The advent and development of Information 
and Communication Technologies (ICTs) is gradually 
revolutionizing this situation. “Open government” is an 
innovative strategy for changing how government works, 
helping to increase government transparency and account­
ability at every level. By using network technology to connect 
the public to government and to one another informed by 
open data, governments ask for help with solving problems. 
The end result is more effective institutions and more robust 
democracy. […] Socioeconomic variables govern the level and 
quality of eParticipation. Educational issues, motivational 
reasons, and specific political conditions are likely to affect 
citizens “input.” We share Coleman’s (Coleman & Blumler, 
2009) analysis that [for] democratic participation to have a 
meaningful impact upon political outcomes there is a need 
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a space for consequential interaction between citizens and 
their elected representatives. Internet has the potential 
to revitalize political communication by enhancing and 
updating the relation between governments and governed, 
but it order to be achieved policy interventions need to be 
designed or redesigned in a way to capitalize opportunities 
that are provided by the internet. [W]ith suitable policies and 
institutional support [can] some of the emancipator potential 
on Internet [...] be realized and democracy reinvigorated. 
(Karamagioli 2013, 7)
Case 2
Christiana Karayianni, in Facebook as a Tool for Enhancing 
Alternative / Counter-Public Spheres in Cyprus, on the uses and 
impacts of different forms/media of communication on bi­com­
munal relations there, presents a case­study of bi­communal 
communication through Facebook groups that took place 
between 2007 and 2010, which identifies the ways in which 
certain Facebook groups facilitate bi­communal communication, 
explaining why they can be considered part of a “counter­public 
sphere.” Her analysis suggests that:
[G]roups whose voices or discourses are excluded from 
the public domain/sphere can find through the use of tools 
like Facebook groups alternative forms of organising and 
debate, which places them—at least as far as this medium is 
concerned—on an equal footing with discourses sanctioned 
by power and hegemonic institutions, such as the press and 
broadcast media. (2013, 131)
This would certainly be a democratic gain for those involved, if/
when it could connect otherwise isolated voices and give them 
strength enough to make themselves heard.
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Merlyna Lim describes in Lost in Transition? The Internet and the 
Reformasi in Indonesia, how Indonesians bypassed authoritarian 
rule through the use of Internet cafés, serving as both physical 
and virtual meeting places in a society where both public and 
private spheres otherwise were micro­managed by the state. 
Lim here refers to Internet cafés as “civic spaces,” to denote a 
place where “civil society can engage in its daily practices.” Since 
Indonesia’s then ruling family Suharto had instituted what she 
calls a panopticon (with reference to both the giant Panoptes in 
Greek mythology who had a hundred eyes and thus was known 
to be a very effective watchman and the thusly named prison 
design that allows a watchman to observe [-opticon] all [pan-] 
inmates without them being able to tell whether they are being 
watched or not), these integrated physical places cum virtual 
spaces provided access to both information from and about the 
outside world (i.e., the global), and to real people with whom 
this information could be shared and debated (i.e., the local). 
One without the other would not have sufficed to build the kind 
of social resistance that eventually helped oust an authoritarian 
ruler and his notorious “cronies” (2006, 85–106).
Case 4
In The Civil Internet Diplomacy and China’s Countermeasures, 
Shumin Su and Mark Xu argue that
[t]he Internet Civil Diplomacy is a major revolution and an 
emerging trend witnessed in the information age. It poses 
a significant impact on foreign affairs and official diplomacy 
due to its unique characteristics—freedom, equality, individ­
uality, real­time, convenience and low­cost. (2013, 134)
They suggest that “this has developed significantly in recent 
years, and in multiple forms, including Web forums, website 
signatures and event­driven purpose­build foreign affairs sites.” 
They examine two types of impact of the civil Internet diplomacy; 
64 the “expansion effect” and the “resonance effect,” both which 
they claim
can inspire the audience sentiment, bring enormous public 
opinion and political pressure to a government and thus 
pose significant impact on foreign affairs. […] In conclusion, 
China’s civil Internet diplomacy has emerged as an influential 
force that affects traditional diplomacy policy, although the 
development is still in its infancy with individual Web users 
as the main actors. (ibid., 139)
Contrary to these four cases, where ICT clearly contributed to a 
positive development, other developments described below send 
mixed—or even opposite—signals.
Case 5
Hale, Musso and Weare concluded in their study Developing digital 
democracy: evidence from Californian municipal web pages that
the internet is likely to support only incremental mod­
ifications to the democratic system, not the more 
fundamental changes identified by proponents of dem­
ocratic revitalisation (1999, 98)
and that:
[M]unicipal use of telecommunications technologies 
concentrates primarily on information provision, not the 
communication linkages that might improve the quality of 
democratic discourse. These results are particularly discour­
aging, given that municipal governments are close to the 
people and have been argued to be the training ground for 
democracy. (ibid.)
In summary, they write:
The results of this study are not encouraging. We have 
identified three impediments to democratic participation: 
lack of civic education, citizen apathy, and the disconnection 
65between citizens and their representatives. Democratic 
theorists and political reformers have suggested a number 
of reforms to address these ills. Some reforms call for 
incremental changes to pluralistic democracy, whilst others 
call for a more fundamental development of participative 
democratic processes. We argue that internet technologies 
clearly have the potential to foster incremental changes to 
existing pluralistic institutions. In contrast, we contend that 
it is far less certain that the internet will nurture the rich net­
work of social relations and discourse required to develop 
Barber’s vision of a strong democracy. […] The evidence from 
California indicates that an important feature of the inter­
net is rarely used in ways that can reasonably be thought to 
lead to incremental reform, let alone democratic renewal. 
In general, information provision is patchy and the level of 
interactivity supported does not improve significantly on the 
telephone. (ibid., 115–116)
Case 6
Shalin Hai–Jew notes in the article Interpreting “You” and “Me”: 
Personal Voices, PII, Biometrics, and Imperfect/Perfect Electronic 
Memory in a Democracy that:
Over a billion people are said to use the www and Internet, 
with 1 in 6 humans on earth accessing these technological 
systems. Many of these users have created their own per­
sonal profiles online, and all also have “silent information” 
about them that may be accessed on a variety of connected 
databases (including many on the Deep, Hidden, or Invisible 
Web). People use the www and Internet with a semblance of 
anonymity, but in fact, most interactions online are trackable 
to Personally Identifiable Information (PII), which allows for 
the revealing of the individual behind the photo, the video, 
the information, or other elements. Internet profiles may be 
coalesced into actual identities, even with inaccuracies, and 
such information may be kept in perfect electronic memory 
66 into perpetuity. This current reality has implications for 
citizens’ peace­of­mind and degrees of freedom in decision­
making. (2013, viii)
Although this case is non­specific, the recent revelations by 
WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden regarding the US’s surveillance 
in general, and NSA’s spying on anything from your own e­mail to 
Angela Merkel’s mobile phone in particular, easily come to mind. 
Here technology is used to pry on people, in the name of national 
security.
Case 7
Along similar lines Theodosios Tsiakis, in his paper The Role 
of Information Security and Cryptography in Digital Democracy: 
(Human) Rights and Freedom, makes a strong case for the often 
neglected “human factor” of ICT. Tsiakis stresses that:
Information technology is rapidly changing, is inherently 
complex, and complexity kills security. There is an ongoing 
technical race to maintain security that does not take into 
account the human factors. The new technological infra­
structure affects the degree of anonymity and confidentiality 
in mass­market computer­based systems and basically 
determines the evolution of democratic­political culture. 
Thus, in examining the issue of security, cryptography, 
privacy in the use of computers and Internet, forms the 
primary interest from the moral side of view, about what is 
the right and wrong thing to do, rather than in a legal frame, 
about what is legal and illegal. Security and privacy are not 
ethical or moral issues. They are fundamental human rights. 
In this societal change, the challenges of the information 
society are many, but foremost is the protection of human 
rights. Addressing the critical question of how technological 
trends are both helping and hindering the advancement of 
human rights is essential in the specific digital environment. 
The democratic key concept is the efficient use of digital 
67resources. We do not only need a culture of security (infor­
mation), we further need to ensure the security of cultures, 
meaning that everyone should be able to freely exercise their 
constitutional rights. (2013, x)
Tsiakis hereby wishes “to bring to the surface the rights (human) 
implications of ICT and the information society,” arguing that
ICT enlightens the technical community, which designs, 
implements, and secures information and communication 
systems, with an understanding of human rights principles 
and foundational underpinnings. (ibid., 160)
Case 8
In Communicating Islamic Fundamentalism as Global Citizenship 
Lina Khatib (2003) describes how Islamic fundamentalism uses 
the Internet to serve its quite undemocratic agenda. Quoting 
Stuart Hall she defines the process of globalisation as 
those processes, operating on a global scale, which cut 
across national boundaries, integrating and connecting com­
munities and organizations in new space­time combinations, 
making the world in reality and in experience more intercon­
nected. (Hall 1992, 299, quoted in Khatib 2003, 390)
Khatib argues that Islamic fundamentalism is “experienced 
locally, but at the same time as a global movement,” something 
Manuel Castells sees as a conflict between “the Net and the Self” 
(Castells 1997, 3, quoted in Khatib 2003, 405), and Hall views 
as a “tension between tradition and translation,” or between 
“ethnicity and global homogenization” (Hall 1992, 312, quoted in 
Khatib 2003, 391). In this publication’s context it however falls well 
within the meta­local domain, see Chapter 1, for which the Inter­
net is an important—if not necessary—means of interaction.
Khatib notes that:
68 The use of the Internet by Islamic fundamentalist groups 
reflects an outward vision combined with a global target 
audience while also paying attention to local issues. The 
Internet has many uses for such groups. It is used to post 
messages about the groups’ mission statements. It is used 
to relay photographs and audio and video messages and 
footage about the groups’ activities. It is often used to post 
the latest news related to the groups and their affiliates. It 
acts as a convenient way for collecting monetary donations. 
It allows groups members and supporters to find out about 
the groups’ latest actions. It also allows them to com­
municate via email and chat rooms. The Internet is also used 
by the groups to sell books, tapes, CDs, and other materials. 
The groups can also use the Internet to respond to current 
political situations. (2003, 396–397)
In other words, what can be done for the benefit of society can, 
as this story tells, also be done for the benefit of a select few who 
constitute a threat to another part of society—in this particular 
case by recruiting both fighters and funds for an armed struggle 
against Christians in the Indonesian island of Moluccas (Khatib 
2003).
These eight cases are presented with the intention of indicating 
the range of issues, good, not so good, and bad, that intersect ICT 
and democracy. In summary, this is not “either good or bad.” It is 
both.
ICT and the public sphere
Let us now turn to the more specific link between ICT and the 
public sphere—which also is where this publication eventually 
is taking us in the form of a Citizen Lobby “model.” Although this 
discussion transcends this particular chapter (being reviewed 
from different angles in different chapters throughout this pub­
lication), we will now look at how Zizi Papacharissi views this 
connection.
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public sphere theories in quite some depth, noting that:
As a concept, [the public sphere] sets a standard for civic 
involvement within representative democracy. It also 
presents a primal form of human civic instinct, expressed 
through the need to convene and confer within democratic 
contexts. Conceptualised formally by Jürgen Habermas […], 
the public sphere has always served as the domain of social 
life where public opinion is expressed by means of rational 
public discourse and debate. Based on Kantian emphasis on 
the use of reason in public debate, it is where citizens go to 
analyse, discuss, or argue about public affairs. (2010, 113)
As Papacharissi considers a vigorous public sphere important 
for citizens to “remain plugged into the daily routines of dem­
ocratic governance and public affairs,” she thinks that “several 
civic uses of the Internet develop in yearning for a long­lost public 
sphere” (ibid., 114). This observation is a vital key to the Internet’s 
political role. That, however, doesn’t prove that the Internet has a 
political role. As indicated in the above eight quotes, it is in young, 
or simply lip­serving democracies (like China and Suharto’s 
Indonesia) where more dramatic effects may be expected 
from the introduction of an interactive Web, and/or where 
truly “political” developments have been recorded from online 
activities—as was the case during the Arab Spring (although the 
results there were unwanted turmoil rather than wanted sta­
bility). In more mature democracies, however, (many of which are 
well past their “best­before­date”) heavily engrained systems are 
driving also the young Web­generation’s views on what can be 
expected.
A critical reading of (e.g.) Mossberger, Tolbert, and McNeal’s book 
Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Society, and Participation suggests 
fairly modest expectations of how the interactive Web may 
change our political landscape. They conclude that 
70 [i]n summary, the use of online political news, chat rooms, 
and e­mails is associated with increased voting in […] 
elections. The results indicate that the Internet is related 
to the increased likelihood of voting through its ability to 
facilitate discussion, mobilize participation via e­mail, and 
provide for a greater variety of sources of information. (2008, 
83)
They go on to specify that:
[D]igital citizenship supports the achievement of equal 
opportunity in the liberal tradition, and civic engagement 
and political participation in the republican tradition. The 
effects of Internet use are substantial for wages, especially 
for minorities and less­educated workers. The effects are 
considerable for civic engagement and voting as well, even 
surpassing the influence of more traditional media. More­
over, the increases in civic engagement are clearest for the 
young, who tend to be among those who are least likely 
to participate or be knowledgeable. The Internet not only 
exercises an independent effect on economic opportunity 
and political engagement but it also affects those for whom 
changes will make the most difference—disadvantaged 
workers and the youngest citizens. (ibid., 89)
These effects are no doubt beneficial, if/when they materialise. 
However, they still assume that “engagement” is a voluntary 
act, one that is easier to do with the Internet than without it. 
It also assumes that political “action” equals voting. But if our 
societies are to become truly democratic, and we are to exploit 
the real opportunities that an interactive Web can offer, these 
assumptions are too limiting. We must rather assume that socio­
political engagement is a duty to ourselves and our society, well 
in line with socio­economic engagement. We must also assume 
that such political engagement goes beyond e­chatting and 
voting—voting being (as discussed elsewhere in this publication) 
both a passive and a pacifying type of engagement designed 
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overall ambition is to outline what that could and would entail.
Coming back to Papacharissi’s take on the Internet as the new 
public sphere, she also writes:
Because, according to Habermas, the public sphere has been 
compromised to the point where its actual existence is in 
doubt, it is best understood as a metaphor. It is also possible 
for political activity or discussion to carry civic merit, but 
exist outside the conceptual locus of the public sphere. I 
emphasise this point, for, as we examine political tendencies 
online, it becomes apparent that, while some aspire to the 
public sphere ideal, several contribute civically, but via a 
modus operandi [that is] conceptually divorced from the 
public sphere ideal. (2010, 115)
By this she flags a possible difference between the public sphere 
and the Internet’s more civic sphere orientation, where individual 
rather than collective views are shaped and expressed.
This flag is raised even further by her claim that:
[I]n contemporary representative models of democracy, 
politicians, opinion leaders, and the media frequently rely 
on aggregations of public opinion obtained through polls, as 
opposed to the rational exchange of opinions fostered by the 
public sphere. Thus, deliberation of public affairs within the 
public sphere is postponed as citizens [instead] are called 
upon to express agreement or disagreement with prescribed 
options. (ibid., 116)
There is however—in spite of its deliberative shortcomings—
often strong support for the kind of “aggregations of public 
opinion,” which Papacharissi and others view as insufficient. Its 
supporters trust such aggregates truly reflect the view of the 
citizenry. One such example is referenced in Chapter 4 below 
(Surowiecki’s The Wisdom of the Crowds), another is found in a 
report by the American Association for Public Opinion Research, 
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Opinion and Leadership, from September, 2013, stating:
This report argues that there is an important need for 
leaders to be able to find public opinion data, judge its 
quality, and then integrate and summarize it into com­
prehensible conclusions—whatever their feelings about 
how much these data should be used as the basis for their 
decision­making. (AAPOR 2013, 4–5)
In short this report suggests that an existing institution (AAPOR) 
shall continuously poll and analyse public opinion, using selected 
experts, and deliver this qualitative information to the political 
establishment for their reference. No doubt this report’s authors, 
at the same time, recognise the obstacles—one being timeliness:
A challenge here is the fast­moving pace of public opinion 
research on any given topic. AAPOR­sponsored analyses or 
reviews of the “state of knowledge” on a topic could take a 
long time to get through the review process, and by the time 
they were published could be out of date, given the torrent of 
new research that pours forth on many topics. (ibid., 8)
However, they also see a role for a more “free” debate, but again 
only among a selected few.
AAPOR could encourage the development of an online wiki­
type community in which—in open source fashion—inter­
ested or qualified participants would be invited to build an 
ongoing summary of public opinion on key topic areas. This 
idea would most likely involve a “restricted” wiki process, in 
which only qualified individuals (including as one possibility 
AAPOR members or perhaps a vetted subset of AAPOR 
members) would be allowed to contribute. The contrib­
utors could add new data, put in their interpretation of the 
data, and in general comment on, elucidate, expand on, 
and summarize public opinion data on specific topics. The 
73wiki­community would be made available to the general 
public. (ibid., 8)
Although this report goes at length to detect “the will of 
people,” it suggests that “people” are not qualified to contribute 
anything but a simple answer to a simple survey question. This 
is what Papacharissi (among others) laments, with reference to 
Habermas’ far more deliberative ambitions.
Following Papacharissi’s argument that most observers tend 
to assess the democratising potential of online convergent 
technologies against three criteria, being (i) access to information, 
(ii) reciprocity of communication and (iii) commercialisation of 
online space, she concludes that: 
[s]cholarly examinations of the Internet as a public sphere all 
point to the conclusion that online digital technologies create 
a public space, but do not inevitably enable a public sphere. 
[author’s italics] (Papacharissi 2010, 124)
Another piece of research, conducted by Katharina Große at the 
German Zeppelin University adds to Habermas’ position. Already 
in her introductory paragraph she writes:
Based on critical reflections about the expectations that are 
currently placed upon it, it is shown that e­participation is 
not the right tool to mobilise citizen engagement in politics. 
Further, grounded in an expert survey, it is discovered that 
in Germany, e­participation plays a role in forming the public 
opinion and improving political decision making. It cannot 
however, create higher acceptance for political decisions by 
providing throughput legitimacy. (2013, 45)
The report continues:
In order for e­participation to actually fulfil [an] intelligence­
function, it must i) indeed generate new information 
or knowledge, and ii) these must be incorporated by 
politicians. Otherwise, there would be no improvement in 
74 the decision­quality. Furthermore, it is relevant who partic­
ipates. If e­participation is only used by a certain group of 
citizens, not all possibly relevant information or knowledge 
will be contributed. Additionally, it is important to determine 
the degree of institutionalisation of e­participation. If it is 
only applied in certain projects, it is only a marginal devel­
opment of the traditional system. The change would be more 
significant, if it were established as an ongoing process in 
addition to traditional channels. Thereby, truly intelligent 
structures would be established. (ibid., 48)
A further problem she identifies with e­participation is that:
[R]epresentatives can hold back information or manipulate 
it and thus, the citizens’ decision to keep a representative 
in office or not is not an informed decision—something 
more and more people become aware of. Still, they have 
no means to change this. Thus, the perceived legitimacy of 
the representatives’ decisions decreases. As e­participation 
is not legally institutionalised and does not create binding 
decisions, it is no alternative means of input legitimacy. 
(ibid., 50)
Just as most other studies conclude, Große notes that:
Currently, e­participation is only used irregularly. However, 
the experts concur that in the foreseeable future, it will 
become more frequent. While some do indeed think that 
e­participation will become political standard, the majority 
of experts agree that it will [be] routinely applied for certain 
projects only. It can hence be concluded that e­participation 
will have a defined space in the political process, but will not 
be a new standard of decision­preparation that might […] 
replace representative democracy. (ibid., 52)
The concern here is that:
[A]s there will always be disregarded information and 
knowledge due to the non­representative user group, there 
75can only be partial intelligence. In accordance with the 
project­based degree of institutionalisation, e­participation 
[therefore] has the role of project­based elite consultation. 
Consultation hints at the fact that because e­participation 
will only be used for some projects, citizens will not have the 
possibility to identify problems or set topics themselves. Elite 
refers to the fact that only a small part of engaged citizens 
will participate. (ibid., 54)
When it comes to the voting aspect of our democratic systems, 
she notes that
[g]aining votes lies at the core of the maintenance of political 
power in a democracy and is thus essential for every 
politician. In order for e­participation to be the right tool for 
this task it [also] has to solve the problem [of] non­voters. 
(ibid., 48)
With reference to those whom Emmer, Vowe, and Wolling (2011) 
call the “bequeme Moderne” (quoted in Große 2013, 49)—a tech­
affine non­voting community unlikely to change their offline 
behaviour because of their online activities, which constitute over 
15% of the German electorate—she argues that
[i]n summary, e­participation is not [a] suitable tool to 
mobilise non­voters, [as] e­participation cannot fulfil a 
mobilising­function. All expectations to this effect will 
unavoidably fail and thus should be reconsidered. (Große 
2013, 49)
The best way to activate this group as voters would hence be to 
digitalise parliamentary voting—an issue of significant technical 
and/or integrity concern, it itself complicated—and beyond the 
scope of this publication.
Finally Große argues that:
[T]he results of this study have implications for non­e­
policies [as well]. It is important that politicians reconsider 
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that they placed their hopes on [i.e., e­participation] is not 
suitable. There is a need for strategies that foster partic­
ipation regardless of social status. (ibid., 57)
Große’s colleague Alexander Hoose formulates these doubts 
even more clearly:
By using modern web technologies to create apps and visu­
alizations, it would be possible to make data easier [and] 
understandable for the many citizens and also use Open 
Data to create new business models and increase public 
value. Schönberger & Zappia in part challenge these utterly 
optimistic views of a new dawn of democracy and trans­
parency since their assumption is that the broader public 
does not use these new possibilities of participation, while 
the already well­connected actors in the political arena gain 
new channels of influence. This leads to the creation of new 
intermediaries in public discourse, which are able to shape 
the public perception in their interest. Their argument is 
derived from observations that similar projects have also 
failed to deliver their broad aim of democratizing the political 
discourse. Such cases were the e­rulemaking initiative by the 
Clinton administration, which aimed at allowing the public 
to take part in the rulemaking process, and the blogging 
movement, which promised to create citizen journalism. In 
both of these examples [these] authors conclude that elite 
groups dominate the discourse. In the rulemaking initiative 
interest groups and companies were the main participants of 
the participation process and in the blogosphere it [was the] 
professional bloggers [who] centralized [or] gather[ed] most 
viewers onto their blogs. (2012, 9)
Große’s, Hoose’s and Papacharissi’s conclusions all are at the 
core of the debate this publication engages in. The Web is indeed 
a “public space,” like a city park, allowing visitors to engage in 
any lawful activities they wish. Those who make the effort to go 
77there are indeed open to the eyes and ears of all other visitors, 
as well as to whatever legal and semi­legal (and even illegal) 
surveillance this “public space” is under. They are however not 
exposed to the views of those who choose to go elsewhere, which 
is why all expectations of coordination, deliberation and/or log­
ical conclusions based on either the full or a fully representative 
population coming out of this participation must remain modest, 
since the input in this debate to a non­negligible extent (which 
among others Papacharissi, Große and Hoose have pointed out) 
risks being either elitist or overly spontaneous.
Jürgen Habermas’ public sphere, acknowledged by most 
scholars as being a highly relevant (and perhaps the most 
generally accepted) description of how “public will” is formed, 
is however more than any of this. It is in essence an ongoing 
public debate about socio­political matters of concern to the 
general public, aiming at a conclusion, which can be forwarded to 
the incumbent—specifically meant to influence their decisions. 
Habermas’ initial version of a well­functioning public sphere 
assumed such conclusions to be based on actual consensus. 
Later versions however departed from this ambition, recognising 
the diversity of today’s global environment, making far­reaching 
consensus virtually impossible. Although the Web may be the 
best tool to date for (re­)creating a well­functioning public sphere, 
it does not equal the public sphere in its own right. For this we 
need to add a common modus operandi.
To further this viewpoint, it is worth noting the observation Dean, 
Anderson, and Lovink make: 
[As] political commitment [in the information­age] can be 
demonstrated with a word, a signature, a click […] this makes 
it difficult to distinguish it from apathy. (2006, xv–xvi)
The claim is that people now can be seemingly active, without 
making any real commitment. Although signing an online petition, 
forwarding a link or posting something on a blog may seem like 
a commitment, it requires nothing but a “click,” making doing 
78 so more like an everyday social media activity than a matter of 
taking a serious stance in a case of reason or injustice.
Given the trend towards what Dean, Anderson, and Lovink call 
“reputation management” (see Chapter 1), this type of “click­
your­political­commitment” can be more a matter of a passive 
repetition of an opinion, than of participating in a reasoned 
debate. Apparently strong support or backing of one opinion 
or the other may in fact turn out to be unsupported, or unsus­
tainable, once the actual consequences of the promoted 
(presumably “great”) opinion become clearer. As discussed at 
length in Chapter 4, this is partly a consequence of the so­called 
long­tail power distribution, where visibility helps an active 
minority to drive a more passive majority.
Countering this tendency of self­created “stardom,” Dean, 
Anderson, and Lovink suggest a stronger focus on what they call 
dot­orgs, by which they mean civil society organisations (CSOs) 
that use the Web to engage and debate. Here, they argue, the 
role of the CSO is to balance the debate towards a more reasoned 
one, where opinions are not only expressed and repeated, but 
also challenged and scrutinised—very much along the same line 
that Habermas’ promoted.
Governmentality
The manner in which ICT in general and the Internet in particular 
is changing not only the ways we interact socially (where social 
media is replacing much of our traditional means of person­to­
person interaction) but also how we go about influencing both 
processes and others’ views (through online special interest 
networks) is not limited to socio­technical aspects. On a deeper 
eco­political level these changes also alter the way we organise 
ourselves—both for commercial and political ends—where 
horizontal meritocracies are replacing our traditionally vertical 
command­structures. These developments are not mundane, as 
they carry important consequences for the “good governance” 
79approach that has been dominating since the late 1980s—heavily 
promoted by the neoliberal movement—where accountability 
and transparency have been the resolute line of defence for 
streamlining “representation” to the point where real term par­
ticipation by electorates (voluntary or not) in socio­/politico­/eco­
nomic decision­making is reduced to that of receiving pre­coded 
information—as and when provided by an executive elite—and 
possibly, eventually, vote for a predefined alternative.
Saskia Sassen nevertheless points out that going online may not 
be all that democratising after all, as “network openness does not 
necessarily produce equality in the resulting distribution” (2006, 
viii), taking “global finance” as a disturbing example of a very 
opposite development (ibid., ix). Sassen writes: 
“Finance made it clear – already in the 1980s – that […] net­
worked technologies had the capacity to assemble, dis­
assemble, and reassemble in novel configurations” (ibid.), 
suggesting that this development also highlighted the “problem­
atic character of strongly held notions of democratizing out­
comes at a time when there was little if any critical input,” where 
“the mix of openness and choice produces something akin to a 
winner­takes­all­pattern” (ibid., ix–x). This must indeed be seen as 
an urge for caution against similar mis­representations, when it 
comes to the rethinking of our democratic systems.
“Governmentality”—a term introduced by Michel Foucault—, inter­
preted by Thomas Lemke as one that
[allows] us to call attention to the constitution of new 
political forms and levels of the state such as the 
introduction of systems negotiation, mechanisms of self­
organisation, and empowerment strategies (Lemke 2003, 176, 
quoted in Dean, Anderson, and Lovink 2006, xvi),
is seen by Dean, Anderson, and Lovink as offering a way out of 
this dilemma (ibid., xvi). This is because a particular aspect of 
Foucault’s “governmentality,” according to Lemke, is its emphasis 
80 on indirect techniques for leading, directing and controlling 
political processes—rather than simply contrasting freedom and 
coercion. Since what Dean, Anderson, and Lovink call “networked 
politics” assumes the distribution of political responsibilities—
across different levels as well as different domains, (similar 
to how glocalism interacts across traditional boundaries, see 
Chapter 1)—they consider this concept useful for understanding 
the field in which CSOs form and operate. Here traditional “good 
governance” concepts like representation, accountability and 
legitimacy are challenged by “new” concepts like subsidiary, 
expertise, multistakeholderism and (as noted above) reputation 
management. It is precisely this challenge that—they argue—calls 
for new approaches to democracy, which actually embrace these 
new relationships and new types of interaction.
Subsidiarity refers to decisions being brought to the lowest pos­
sible hierarchical level, which in glocal terminology means to 
the local level. Those directly affected by the decisions shall be 
those taking them, rather than giving the highest hierarchical 
level the right to decide because of its hierarchical superiority. 
The objective here is to identify the natural level for where a 
decision could or should be taken and rely on whatever expertise 
is required to resolve the problem in question (Dean, Anderson, 
and Lovink 2006, xxiii). (The role of real or perceived expertise is 
further discussed in Chapter 4, where P2P and meritocracy are 
discussed vis­à­vis democracy.) Here the relativity of “expertise” 
is an issue (ibid., xxiv). Is expertise always a matter of technical 
knowledge, or can what is true for one hierarchical level be 
untrue on another? Should a superior hierarchical level respect 
a decision by a lower level if it negatively affects the totality? 
Although this is a debate that utilitarianism conducted for 
centuries, it can also be seen as a key to glocalism, where local 
and global concerns constantly are tested against each other, and 
where an ongoing exchange of premises and priorities negotiates 
parallel rather than conflicting positions.
81The idea of multistakeholderism is similar, but one aimed at 
breaking up overly large collectives whose smallest common 
denominators are hard to identify, promote or potentially 
achieve to the satisfaction of the collective. By breaking up such 
collectives into stakeholder­groups, these groups can enter a 
dialogue aimed at a compromise, by which a more satisfactory 
outcome can be achieved for at least a majority of those con­
cerned. This can, e.g., refer to sub­national levels, where national 
levels otherwise would take all decisions, or corporate executive 
levels where the board or shareholders otherwise would do so. 
Here the objective is to highlight the often conflicting interests at 
stake, and let them represent themselves in a dialogue leading to 
a negotiated compromise, rather than using expertise to devise 
a solution (ibid., xxiii). In this we can see a link to the concept of 
“meta­local,” where commonality is driven not by geographical 
proximity or some kind of “truth,” but by cultural, religious or 
socio­economic, etc. causes.
The UN’s World Summit of the Information Society (WSIS) 
attempted to actually combine more traditional good governance 
ideals with these more novel kinds of interactive relationships. 
Dean, Anderson, and Lovink noted two important aspects of 
network societies (and the world of NGOs) revealed here. CSOs, 
representing relatively speaking more left­leaning communities 
based on collectivistic and/or solidarity platforms, showed—at 
least as compared to relatively speaking more right­leaning 
communities based on “particular interest”­platforms, typically 
represented by the corporate lobby—a much greater tendency 
to maintain burdening overheads, and an inability to shape and 
operate the type of more nimble organisations needed to deal 
with these new types of interactive relationships. In short—Dean, 
Anderson, and Lovink claim—CSOs are well behind corporate­
linked NGOs in knowing how to manage people issues, i.e., how 
to interact with the collective that CSOs claim to represent. 
The corporate lobby, representing Habermas’ generalised 
particularism—i.e., those particular interests that are deliberately 
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gain traction—is in fact better at understanding how to generate 
“following” than most CSOs are. To a large extent they ascribe this 
shortcoming to CSO’s struggle for funding, where they are in the 
hands of governmental or institutional bodies, or donations from 
the general public, all of which have high expectations when it 
comes to the recipient’s internal “good governance.” This makes it 
a struggle on two fronts: to be big and formal enough to meet all 
sponsor expectations and small and nimble enough to channel all 
of the funds to “the cause,” rather than spending them internally 
(ibid., xiv). Little wonder then that, e.g., environmental CSOs are 
weaker lobbyists than, e.g., the automotive/oil/gas lobby, putting 
corporate interests ahead of the environmental in the minds of 
politicians.
This particular chapter’s conclusion—also permeating this pub­
lication’s overall message—is hence that although ICTs certainly 
make it possible, it is people who make it happen. Although 
“digital” can support “democracy,” the opposite outcome is also a 
potential risk.
Although next chapter will look at how emerging peer­to­peer 
modes of production impact our democratic systems, we will 
return to the area of ICTs in Chapter 5, where we will take a look 
at the German concept of “Liquid Democracy” in general, and the 
software “Adhocracy” in particular. Although “Liquid Democracy” 
is best known for how the German Pirate Party applies it in their 
Liquid Feedback software—largely as an internal system for 
vote­delegation—the fork “Adhocracy” is being used in a more 
far­reaching range of applications, mainly in order to foster 
debate and shape public opinion. A special test version of the 
Adhocracy software was also tailored for the German Parliament 
(the “Bundestag”)—its independent project evaluation we also 
will take a closer look at.
[ 4 ]
Peer-to-peer:
Is P2P the future mode 
of democratic action?
Peer­to­peer, or P2P for short, has been touted by Michel 
Bauwens (2005) as “a new mode of production.” With this state­
ment he marked that to him (as to many others) this is a matter 
of an economic activity, and with his chosen phrasing he wished 
to draw a parallel to the significant socio­economic consequences 
that the transition from manual production to industrial 
production brought, suggesting P2P may, over time, bring about 
changes of a similar magnitude. But, as Bauwens pointed out, 
financing of these kinds of activities is still a problem, largely 
failing to attract peers who are in search of income.
In this section I will look at some of the particulars of the peer­to­
peer mode of production, as compared to the corporate mode 
of production, and try to single out some key differences and 
issues of concern that may affect such developments. I will also 
try to shift the focus of P2P from sheer “production” to more 
“interaction,” since policy­making (which this publication is all 
about) is not “productive” in the same sense as, e.g., software 
programming, music/video recording or distribution, fact and 
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and deliberation.
A closely related area of debate is that of the commons. If P2P 
in “production­terms” is taken to be the generator of the profit 
and loss account (= net income), the commons would constitute 
a part of the balance sheet (= production resources). Whether 
grazing land, air, water, view, tranquillity, cultural heritage, jointly 
developed intellectual property, the Internet or any other asset 
that we define as common, these are assets we may need when 
we produce something. Whoever controls the distribution of 
those assets also holds power over production, whether con­
ducted in corporate or a peer­to­peer fashion. As P2P currently 
is disadvantaged vis­à­vis corporate production, when it comes 
to financing its operations, all charges linked to the use of the 
commons will hamper the P2P world more than the corporate 
world.
For this reason Garret Hardin’s “tragedy of the commons” (1968) 
is also a key concern to peer­to­peer production—a tragedy to 
which Nobel Prize­winner Elinor Ostrom dedicated much of her 
research to disprove. Most essays in the Bollier­ and Helfrich­
edited anthology The Wealth of the Commons (2012) also down­
plays Hardin’s tragedy, arguing it is not the truism that Hardin 
claims it to be. I will discuss, but not exhaust (because of this 
publication’s focus and scope­limitations), several of these issues 
in the below.
Bankrolling P2P
Starting with the financing of P2P, when viewed as a mode of 
production, Bauwens clearly recognised this problem, noting 
that:
At present, peer production offers no solution to the 
material survival of its participants. Therefore, many people 
inspired by the egalitarian ethos will resort to cooperative 
production, the social economy, and other schemes from 
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honouring their values. (2005, sec. P2P and the Gift Economy)
Clay Shirky, in his book Here Comes Everybody: The Power of 
Organizing Without Organization, points out that P2P is based on a 
shared focus—not on profitability. In fact, he argues that for P2P 
to succeed:
– activities must be “amateurish”; the wish to do it is strong 
enough to make it happen (2008, 60)
– costs must be negligible; under the “Coasean floor” (ibid., 44)
Although P2P may be a new term, the concept is as old as social 
interaction. People have done things together without charging 
each other for as long as humans have existed. As I will dis­
cuss later, Alan Fiske has dedicated significant efforts to map 
out four different modes of interaction, where “market pricing” 
is just one. But that does not mean that what Bauwens calls a 
“new mode of production” is not just that—i.e., a new mode of 
production. But what is new is the tool, being the Internet, and 
his stated objective, being to challenge the currently dominating 
corporate mode of managed production. But the idea of ‘for 
free’ and user­based contributions, from a reputation­driven 
and non­representative meritocracy, is not new. The Internet 
however allows people to engage in whatever they like doing—at 
a truly negligible cost. And as proven over and again the Internet 
is a place where amateurs blend seamlessly with professionals1, 
where interests rather than level of skills decide who is engaged 
and who is not. In those parts of the Internet where openness 
rather than restricted access prevail, it is in other words the par­
ticipants who decide whether to get and/or stay engaged, rather 
than them being chosen to participate, following some kind of 
qualification process.
1  See, e.g., Tapscott and Williams’ Wikinomics (2006) and MacroWikinomics 
(2010)
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unmanaged—since software is pre­programmed to function in 
a certain manner—a quite loosely managed environment, and 
therefore ‘amateurish’ (the wish to do it is strong enough to make 
it happen). Although it may be conducted for social reasons (i.e., 
for fun) or for the challenge (i.e., for testing and developing one’s 
own abilities without risk or cost), it is typically not conducted in 
return for the salary which constitutes the normal driving force 
in a managed organisational environment, where organisational 
rather than social priorities prevail. In online P2P interaction, 
professionals become amateurs, which is the very opposite to 
how corporate logic works.
These activities, however, require that no competitive advantages 
result from managerial oversight, i.e., there is no need for an 
overhead structure to manage them—a structure that in turn 
can be shrunk in order to make the activities more (financially) 
competitive. Without the need for an overhead structure the core 
production will be the only cost, a cost that these participants 
themselves are willing to carry in terms of their time spent. If 
production is driven by amateurs (whether by true amateurs or 
professionals by trade)—i.e., the wish to do it is enough to get 
it done (rather than money being the driving force, in exchange 
for which people are willing to do “whatever”)—and there is no 
economy of managed scale, there is no need for an organisational 
structure accumulating surpluses either (Shirky 2008, 45). Below 
I will call these groups “networked organisations” to differentiate 
them from “managed organisations” with traditionally appointed 
hierarchies.
This is where P2P projects can be competitive.
The long tail
A P2P project must nevertheless offer something else than salary 
to its contributors. Shirky (2008, 260) summarises this “something 
else” in three levels:
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attracts people’s interest
– Provide good enough tools for ‘the amateurs’ to use, i.e., free­
of­charge, easy/fun­to­use 
– State the bargain, i.e., lay down the rules clearly enough to 
guide the input/output cycle
Another key difference between managed and networked 
organisations is that in the former, everyone is expected to per­
form his/her role with diligence—or the totality will suffer, since 
s/he has a “unique” role to play in the process to which s/he has 
been assigned, and for which s/he is remunerated with money 
and other personal benefits. In a networked organisation most 
members will make minor contributions, and even those who 
cease to contribute can remain part of the group, since nobody 
appoints anybody to a unique role. Unique roles are instead 
self­distributed, to those who contribute the most, based on 
meritocracy—as experienced by the peers. 
Shirky points out that in such networks the 80/20 power­law 
distribution will prevail (ibid., 123–124), where around 80% of the 
input is contributed by around 20% of the members—and the 
average contribution is higher than the median one, while the 
mode is even smaller than the median. This is also known as the 
“long tail.”
This would not be acceptable in a managed organisation where—
although members may have different roles, which from another 
perspective could be weighed against each other in terms of 
importance—everybody is expected to do (relatively speaking) 
equally much, which could mean, e.g., that everybody must 
dedicate all the time for which s/he is employed, must perform 
any given number of activities during any given period of time, 
generate a predefined level of return, or the like. If 80% of the 
staff members contributed only 20% of the relative output in 
such terms, those managing them would either have to replace 
the 80%, or be themselves replaced. This is because a managed 
88 organisation displaying this pattern—i.e., 80% of its staff con­
tributing only 20% of the relative output (whether or not the end­
product’s net value was generated this way)—would be seen as 
inefficient and, in a financially competitive world, uncompetitive. 
It would, therefore, most probably go out of business very soon. 
Performance­based activities assumingly display the bell­shaped 
curve, where most members (typically 60–80%) deliver average 
performances, while some (typically 10–20%) deliver more/better 
and some (typically 10–20%) deliver less/worse.
However, a networked organisation not only can but typically also 
does work like that. Here any contribution is valuable—based on 
the premise that the “cost” (even if it is only in terms of the con­
tributor’s time) is generated per contribution, not per contributor. 
A long­tail power distribution—rather than the traditional bell­
shaped distribution—is to be expected.
Sarnoff, Metcalfe and Reed
As Bauwens, Mendoza, and Iacomella (2012) argue in their study 
Synthetic Overview of the Collaborative Economy, the interactive 
Internet—Web 2.0—has changed interaction in profound ways. 
Whereas “portals” (used to develop what they call an “intention 
economy”) are driven by Sarnoff’s law, which states that the 
value of a broadcast network is directly proportional to the 
number of viewers, “platforms” (used to develop what they call an 
“attention economy”) are driven by Metcalfe’s law, which states 
that the value of a communication network is proportional to 
the square of the number of connected users of the system (n2). 
Nevertheless, as if this was not enough, the collaborative world 
of “protocols” (developing what they call an “ethical economy”) 
rests on Reed’s law, which states that the number of possible 
subgroups of network participants is 2N, meaning that it scales 
even faster than Metcalfe’s law’s pair connections (ibid., 23–24, 
54). These multiples make a huge difference, and may indeed be 
the key reason for why the Internet seems to be so democratic. 
I will revert to Bauwens, Mendoza, and Iacomella’s “portals,” 
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action later, but I will already note here that although this hugely 
increases the number of access points, it may not resolve the 
democratic deficit. One reason for this doubt is that the Internet 
is governed by the long­tail power­law distribution, which is, as I 
will argue in greater detail below, quite opposite to the 50/50 dis­
tribution that democracy is based upon.
Metcalfe’s and Reed’s laws’ for networks, however, makes the 
peer­to­peer mode of production effective, although it may not 
necessarily be equally efficient; whereas, efficiency refers to how 
well you do something and effectiveness refers to how useful it 
is. Furthermore, since P2P communities typically do not develop 
in order to create financial profits, but create other types of 
benefits valued by the community, they can be both long­lived 
and successful. They can in other words be successful without 
being efficient. Whereas hierarchically managed organisations 
must be efficient in order to be successful—and/or in order to be 
long­lived —, this is not the case for networked organisations. 
The latter can, as Shirky argues based on several case studies, 
survive for a very long time without being what we normally 
would consider successful (delivering a by third party appreciated 
output), and be long­lived simply because of the social “for­fun” 
aspect experienced by its members. This in turn means that such 
P2P communities, through trial­and­error, also can come up with 
output that is even better than what a managed organisation can 
do, since its testing costs are below the “Coasean floor,” which 
not even the most R&D­driven corporations can match. Managed 
organisations must, because they pay people for their time, filter 
all the ideas before they are tested, in order to exclude ideas that 
are less likely to generate success. This aims to minimise risk, but 
will also limit the options, in turn reducing the chances of coming 
across new ways of resolving problems. Networked organisations 
do not suffer from this negative spiral, but can test any ideas that 
inspire its members (Shirky 2008, 235–236).
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efficiency­driven, whose members give up their time and 
freedom in exchange for a salary; whereas, a networked 
organisation is meritocracy­, idea­ and effectiveness­driven, 
whose members give up their time and salary in exchange for fun 
and freedom—and typically also for group recognition.
According to Shirky, this is also how online P2P communities can 
avoid the “tragedy of the commons.” The peer­group’s shared 
objective (whether for fun or for the challenge), and its equally 
shared focus on effectiveness, rather than efficiency, will help 
ensure the group fends off “vandals.” The leading example of this 
is Wikipedia, where the editorial community erases fraudulent 
input and corrects faulty information within minutes. And as the 
output is meant to be free for all, over­use and/or similar abuse 
is non­threatening. That nevertheless assumes that no physical 
assets—having limited quantities—are invested or consumed in 
the process.
This last assumption also helps us pinpoint yet another criterion 
for how to define P2P; it is more a matter of a process than of a 
final result (ibid., 139). The result can be anything or nothing—and 
all/any peers can use whatever result they can see evolving, at 
any stage of the process and in any way they want. And as we 
know from both Wikipedia and Linux, the process may never end, 
even if the originally stated objectives have long been achieved.
The challenge for the P2P mode of production is, as Bauwens 
hinted at, to ensure that the community members do not “starve 
to death” while enjoying their fun and freedom.
Social capital
What do these processes offer, apart from whatever (often 
uncertain) results the undertaken processes deliver? If they 
are not profitable, why do people engage in them? The answer 
is social capital (Putnam 2000). Since all networks are based 
on informal involvement where peers share with peers, and 
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recruiting B based on A’s control and B’s formal qualifications—in 
return for which A gives B some kind of compensation—they also 
tend to serve as amplifiers of what the network likes, and filters 
for what the network does not like (ibid., 222).
Social capital is typically defined in two categories: “bonding” cap­
ital and “bridging” capital. Bonding capital often works to amplify 
“likes” and filter the “dislikes.” Bonding social capital refers to the 
depth of interaction, i.e., how much interaction is taking place. 
This social capital tends to be exclusive, centring on dedicated 
“nerds.” Bridging social capital is nevertheless far more inclusive, 
as it targets the breadth—i.e., how many interact.
Here, Shirky points to interesting research conducted by Ronald 
Burts of the University of Chicago, who concluded that “good 
ideas,” in the sense that they can benefit the entire collective 
rather than only the sub­collective from which the idea 
originated, tend to be the result of bridging social capital, rather 
than bonding social capital (ibid., 229–232). This is possibly one 
of the most fundamental keys to the ideas that this publication 
advocates. By increasing the breadth of participating voices in 
policy­making processes, novel and useful ideas are more likely 
to emerge, which otherwise will not. Politicians debating policy­
making among themselves creates—in this respect—much more 
“bonding” (social) capital than bridging capital.
One of Sun Microsystems’ founders once said: “No matter who 
you are, most of the smart people work for someone else” (ibid., 
254). This truism goes for any country’s parliament too.
P2P’s 80/20 vs democracy’s 50/50
As noted above, the typical P2P community is driven by the 80/20 
power­law distribution, i.e., the number of highly active members 
driving the processes are few as compared to the total tally of 
members—the majority forming a “long tail.” This works well, as 
peer­contributions are assessed by quality (meritocracy), not by 
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suitable for democracy efforts. This is an important difference 
that in itself calls into question the notions that voluntary, Web­
based communities shall be the way to challenge our established 
and aging democratic systems—whether the communities are 
called Facebook, Twitter, Reddit or something else.
In democracy, 50/50 is bound to be the inevitable format 
because (as most free and fair elections throughout the world 
show) most citizenries typically find themselves divided over 
issues and candidates in blocks of around half “for” and around 
half “against.” This is of course not always the case, but voting 
behaviour typically shows a majority of between 1% and 10% in 
favour of either of two alternatives. An 80+ % vote in favour of a 
candidate or option would normally make people suspicious of 
fraud, and is a typical outcome of elections in military­backed 
dictatorships, where election rigging is the norm. When large 
parts of eligible voters believe their preferred candidate or 
option has no chance of winning, the response is likely to be 
voter non­participation. Only if voters believe that their preferred 
candidate or option has at least a 50% chance to win, will voters 
feel motivated to vote.
So while the typical format for P2P is 80/20, which may be both 
fair and effective in those communities, the required format for 
democracy is 50/50. From this starting point it will be up to the 
contenders to argue their case, trying to tip the outcome in their 
favour.
But as the 50/50 format requires either full (100%) or a truly 
representative participation in order to deliver democratic out­
comes, incentives must be created that ensures either of these 
two alternatives. Creating incentives that ensure 100% partic­
ipation is—at best—difficult.
The Citizen Lobby model that this publication argues in favour 
of therefore focuses on creating incentives that establish a truly 
representative participation in the policy­making process. As 
93also noted elsewhere in this publication, elected politicians can 
not be considered truly “representative,” since they, throughout 
their mandate period, work closer to their party leaderships/col­
leagues and institutional lobbies (i.e., bonding social capital), than 
with those who elected them (i.e., bridging social capital). Their 
assessments underpinning policy are therefore biased in favour 
of political partisanship and the institutional interests for which 
they are lobbied, not in favour of those individuals who voted for 
them in the most recent election.
A truly representative community would be a permanent (in 
the sense of “always”), rotating (in the sense of “changing”) and 
randomly (in the sense of “unplanned”) selected community of 
say a quarter of a per cent of a country’s eligible voters. If each 
randomly selected member were engaged for a 4–6 week period, 
once or twice during his/her lifetime, the likelihood of this com­
munity representing the population at large would be significant.
This rotating and randomly selected Citizen Lobby would balance 
both partisan interests and the interests of the institutional 
lobby, since a Citizen Lobby is constituted by a notably large 
number, but randomly picked, people who in addition to lobbying 
also will cast their votes in the next election—which the corporate 
citizens constituting the institutional lobby cannot. Assuming the 
views of the Citizen Lobby are reported by media in general, and/
or debated in social media in particular, the likelihood of elected 
politicians ignoring its views is small. For a good example of 
elected US politicians’ inability to resist popular views over time, 
see the SOPA–PIPA debate, briefly summarised in Appendix 6.
Elected politicians will still need to make decisions—as they can 
only take responsibility for decisions they themselves have made 
and implemented—and if they are certain about the need for 
and/or righteousness of a decision opposing that of the Citizen 
Lobby’s majority view, they probably both should and will both 
defend it and persist. However, if such decisions prove wrong 
over time, the judgment of those parliamentarians who argue 
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tioned by the electorate in general and the Citizen Lobby in 
particular—inturn their re­election would become far less likely. 
Re­election would thus become the focus for elected parlia­
mentarians, giving them a clear and strong incentive to com­
municate with the voters throughout their mandate periods—not 
only during their election campaigns.
The task hence becomes to establish, populate and maintain 
such a Citizen Lobby, thus it is worthwhile coming back to Shirky’s 
three­point list of what is needed to form a P2P network:
– A viable offer, i.e., an offer stating what is going ‘to be’ that 
attracts people’s interest
– Provide good enough tools for ‘amateurs’ to use, i.e., free­of­
charge, easy/fun­to­use 
– State the bargain, i.e., lay down the rules clearly enough to 
guide the input/output formula
The reason for coming back to this list, in spite of the differences 
between the 80/20 format of P2P and the 50/50 format of 
democracy, is that the Citizen Lobby in several other aspects will 
emulate peer­to­peer networks (see also Chapter 1). One such 
aspect is that contributions need to be encouraged across smaller 
networks linked by “connectors,” to ensure that as much relevant 
input as possible actually enters the debate. Another criterion 
(supporting the first) is the focus on bridging social capital, 
compensating for the bonding effect of the individual networks 
(including that of the elected politicians themselves)—in favour 
of ideas serving the broader community, based on bridging social 
capital.
Another similarity is that members cannot be given unique tasks 
and responsibilities (as they are in managed organisations but 
not in P2P communities), since the serving time is so short and 
the process cannot be dependent on individual performances. 
To the contrary, the output—just as in the case of a P2P com­
munity—must here be seen as an ongoing process, whether or 
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met. That the process is constantly ongoing, albeit with rotating 
and hence constantly changing members, is the most important 
feature. Even if the Citizen Lobby initially may act irrationally, and 
make recommendations the parliamentarians neither want nor 
will vote in favour of, the mere presence of this lobby will not only 
(i) heighten the awareness of the importance of policy­making 
among voters (all of whom are called to serve with a 12 month 
notice), but also (ii) heighten the awareness of the importance for 
the elected politicians to pay attention to what the electorate may 
think about the issues that they routinely debate in parliament.
For these reasons and others, Shirky’s above­mentioned three­
point list is equally useful when forming a Citizen Lobby as when 
trying to form a P2P community, whereby the three points could 
be translated into the following:
a)  A viable offer, i.e., an offer stating what is going ‘to be’ that 
attracts people’s interest: Help influence policy in your 
preferred field, challenging vested interests with deep 
pockets.
b)  Provide good enough tools for ‘the amateurs’ to use, 
i.e., free­of­charge, easy/fun­to­use: Both learning and 
implementation processes, as well as digital tools, are 
freely available.
c)  State the bargain, i.e., lay down the rules clearly enough 
to guide the input/output formula: Remunerated time is 
provided, as your participation is a societal obligation 
regulated by law.
The third point is critical. At least initially, it may be difficult 
for others than those already interested in politics to see how 
engaging in a Citizen Lobby offers “fun and freedom”—and 
possibly group recognition (i.e., the second point) —, thus other 
incentives must be offered to the broader public. This is also 
critical, since most people certainly live under time constraints 
(if not stress) whereby they must make personal priorities and 
postpone less important activities. If the average voters were 
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very few (if any) members would attend. But if everybody was 
obliged by law to attend and a reasonable compensation (e.g., 
sick­leave pay) was provided (again under law), neither financial 
nor competitive disadvantages need stop randomly appointed 
members from participation.
Nevertheless, since most people may not consider partisan party 
politics problematic from a democracy point of view, a brief dis­
cussion of this may be helpful. Although the common view still is 
what one of Habermas’ reference quotes (Leibholz, from the late 
1950s) noted, i.e., that
[…] the will of the [political] parties is identical with that of 
the active citizenry, so that the party happening to hold the 
majority represents the public opinion’, whereby ‘public 
opinion also governs (Leibholz 1952, quoted in Habermas 
1991, 239), 
this view is indeed a grave generalisation of the situation at hand. 
An interesting analysis indeed of the role of political parties is 
made by Anthony Judge, who argues that political parties are in 
fact “value managers,” acting in the same way as financial fund 
managers ( Judge 2006, Olsen 2010, 119–120). Fund managers 
minimise risk by spreading their investments across a range of 
assets that not only have differing risk profiles (i.e., some higher 
and some lower) but also across assets that will balance each 
other: should one fall in value due to circumstances over which 
the manager has no control, another may benefit from that very 
same development, ensuring that the fund as a whole does 
not suffer. That does not, however, mean that each one of the 
fund’s clients enjoys the same balance. Most fund managers will 
package their offerings to have a profile of some sort, attracting 
certain types of clients. One may be industry­related; another 
service­related, one may have a green or a fair-trade profile, while 
another has a high­tech profile. Clients may therefore suffer 
individually when their chosen orientation drops in value due to 
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to regain from other assets what they lose from those that have 
dropped in value. At the end of the day, the fund normally “beats 
the index” in one way or another, giving themselves an oppor­
tunity to claim victory, even if/when their clients lose money.
According to Judge, political parties act similarly. They package 
their offerings to different segments of the electorate with 
different profiles. Typically political messages aimed at families 
are differently profiled than those targeting retirees, he argues, 
and these again differ from those targeting the corporate 
sector and the labour unions respectively, and so on. From 
each segment they will try to secure some support, which—as 
they hope and assume—later can be directly or indirectly con­
verted to votes. Once in a position to execute some level of 
political power—either in the role of government or in the role 
of opposition—they will however act strategically, since political 
influence is a matter of staying with the majority rather than 
acting faithfully to the offerings they previously packaged (which 
anyway is difficult, considering the range of different profiles 
they simultaneously offered). So even if some, or even many, of 
the previous offerings fail to materialise, the party can always 
point to those that did, and so claim victorious—even if some (or 
even scores of) voters feel let down. To the political party, this is 
a matter of carefully balancing interests close to the party’s own 
core interests (whatever they may be), while at the same time 
reaching out to as many remote corners of the political landscape 
as possible to attract a maximum number of marginal voters 
(ibid.).
Having taken note of Anthony Judge’s parallel—whether fully 
convincing or not—it is easy to see the difficulty for individual 
politicians to be true to both the party and the constituency. A 
trade­off is always necessary, and is not made any easier by the 
influences both s/he and the party constantly are exposed to 
from the institutional lobby—representing what Habermas in 
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ests framed and phrased as if they were of public concern.
When discussing peer­to­peer and a Citizen Lobby, one should 
not overlook the debate on what Surowiecki (2004) calls “the 
wisdom of crowds.” In brief this refers to the fact that crowds of 
people can predict outcomes or results more accurately than 
experts if/when the average of the crowd’s predictions is taken 
as the crowd’s collective wisdom, i.e., prediction. In practice this 
means that if a crowd of people is asked for an answer to a ques­
tion (to which the answer either is or will prove to be either right 
or wrong), the crowd’s “average” is more likely to be correct (or 
at least closer to the correct answer) than what any individual 
expert would offer—if one excludes sheer luck on the expert’s 
behalf. This, however, neither suggests the crowd is full of wise 
people, nor that the crowd behaves in a wise or logical manner, 
but rather that the likelihood of a larger number of people 
generating an average result that is correct (or almost correct) is 
higher than that of an individual expert being able to make the 
correct prediction.
This argument, which Surowiecki supports with a wide range 
of examples in his book entitled The Wisdom of Crowds: Why the 
Many Are Smarter Than the Few and How Collective Wisdom Shapes 
Business, Economies, Societies and Nations, would indeed support 
the argument that bridging social capital is better at generating 
good ideas than bonding social capital is, which here would refer 
to those experts whom the crowd can outdo. It should be noted 
though that the wisdom he talks about is not wisdom generated 
through experience and/or deliberation, but wisdom established 
by some kind of statistical laws, where a large enough number of 
guesses—some qualified, some sheerly random—will establish 
a good enough average to predict the outcome. This has caused 
some (Surowiecki himself being one) to argue that this “law” only 
applies under certain conditions. Surowiecki argues that the 
required criteria are that (i) there must be a diversity of opinions 
represented in the crowd—even if some of them are based on 
99eccentric interpretations of the facts presented —, (ii) that the 
views represented are independent, and free from influence 
from others, that (iii) the crowd is decentralised rather than 
centralised (without a central authority that causes “following”) 
and (iv) that there is some kind of aggregating function, allowing 
disparate views to be translated into an average of some sort 
(Surowiecki 2004, 10). Jaron Lanier (2006) went even further in 
his provocatively entitled piece Digital Maoism: The Hazards of 
the New Online Collectivism by adding his own restriction of the 
truthfulness of Surowiecki’s claim, limiting it to those cases where 
(v) the crowd is not also defining the question it is to answer, (vi) 
the answer’s correctness can be assessed by a simple result (like 
a number, a yes or a no) and (vii) that the information fed to the 
crowd is controlled by some kind of “human factor.”
Social participation according to A.P. Fiske
When considering the relationship between a Citizen Lobby 
and the elected parliament, the Citizen Lobby’s original label 
“reference parliament” actually makes this quite clear. As noted 
already in my book Good Governance in the New Millennium, the 
Citizen Lobby is not—just as little as the institutional lobby is—a 
decision­making body, but a source of input to the legitimate 
parliamentary process that the elected parliamentarians engage 
in on an ongoing basis (Olsen 2010, 140). As also noted elsewhere 
in this publication, this relationship is the key to retaining rather 
than replacing representative democracy, at the same time as 
a strong dose of direct democracy is institutionalised. Elected 
politicians must retain the right to take political decisions and 
implement them, otherwise they cannot be held responsible 
for them. If they cannot be held responsible, the entire system 
of legitimate political action will fall apart. But by taking such 
decisions while being in direct dialogue with those who elected 
them, and who may or may not re­elect them, means they will 
ensure they either act in line with the consituency’s wishes and 
not those of the institutional lobby or external pressure, or they 
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the Citizen Lobby’s recommendation.
This brings us to the type of relationship between the electorate 
and those elected that evolves from the forming of Citizen 
Lobbies, as compared to the type of relationship that currently 
exists. Here Fiske’s relationship model theory (RMT) is very 
helpful. His theory, discussed and applied across a wide range of 
social science disciplines, and seen by many as robust (in spite 
of its relative youth as a theory), and in spite of no shortage of 
competing models (Parson’s, Triandis’ and Levinson’s, just to 
mention a few), claims that we all have four types of relationships 
we live by, which we mix and match depending on who we inter­
act with and which situation we are in. These four are “communal 
sharing,” “equality matching,” “authority ranking” and “market 
pricing,” in most texts abbreviated CS, EM, AR and MP (Fiske 1991, 
2013).
Quoting Fiske, CS is “a relationship in which people treat some 
dyad or group as equivalent and undifferentiated with respect 
to the social domain in question” (Fiske 2013). Examples include 
people using a commons, people intensely in love, and people 
who kill any member of an enemy group indiscriminately in retali­
ation for an attack.
In EM relationships, Fiske explains
people keep track of the balance or difference among partic­
ipants and know what would be required to restore balance. 
Common manifestations are turn­taking, one­person one­
vote elections, equal share distributions, and vengeance 
based on an­eye­for­an­eye, a­tooth­for­a­tooth. (ibid.)
Examples include sports and games and restitution in­kind (with 
respect to righting a wrong).
AR, Fiske continues, are relationships
101based on perceptions of legitimate asymmetries, not 
coercive power; they are not inherently exploitative 
(although they may involve power or cause harm).
In AR relationships people:
have asymmetric positions in a linear hierarchy in which sub­
ordinates defer, respect, and (perhaps) obey, while superiors 
take precedence and take pastoral responsibility for sub­
ordinates. (ibid.)
Examples are military hierarchies, ancestor worship, 
monotheistic religions’ moralities, social status systems such as 
class or ethnic rankings, or other rankings (such as sports team 
standings).
Finally, MP relationships are, according to Fiske: 
oriented to socially meaningful ratios or rates such as prices, 
wages, interest, rents, tithes, or cost­benefit analyses. Money 
need not be the medium, and MP relationships need not 
be selfish, competitive, maximising, or materialistic. MP 
relationships are not necessarily individualistic; a family may 
be the CS or AR unit running a business that operates in an 
MP mode with respect to other enterprises. (ibid.)
Examples are property that can be bought, sold or treated as 
investment capital, prostitution, bureaucratic cost­effectiveness 
standards, utilitarian judgments about the greatest good for the 
greatest number, or standards of equity in judging entitlements 
in proportion to contributions, considerations of “spending time” 
efficiently, and estimates of expected kill ratios.
In terms of these categories, it can be said that by 
institutionalising Citizen Lobbies, the relationship between 
the electorate and those elected would move from AR to EM. 
In the current AR relationship, the elected have authority over 
those electing them, based on a hierarchical system of who 
holds political power over whom. With parties (not individual 
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elections being an exception), whose candidates may or may not 
be known by the electorate, the parties’ leaderships can control 
the distribution of roles during the mandate period, through 
which they can also control the outcome of their party’s parlia­
mentary vote. This gives very little room for the electorate to 
impact policy­making through their local MP, who—in today’s AR­
relationship system—is the referred contact person for individual 
constituency members. In the potential EM relationship a new 
balance would develop where—although politicians retain the 
right to decide and implement “as they see fit”—the electorate 
can with a significant level of precision reward politicians who 
act in its interests, and punish politicians who side with forces 
countering their interests.
Since this potentially new EM relationship would be the first 
time the politicians actually knew the reasoned views of the 
electorate, not only in politically philosophical terms (such as 
higher taxes and more benefits or lower taxes and less benefits, 
upon which they go for election) but also on those policy issues 
they actually debate and vote on in parliament, this new relation­
ship would balance the equality between electorate and those 
elected significantly, creating a levelled playing field in the area of 
policy­making.
Equality matching is also the type of relationship that, e.g., 
Bauwens claims, is the basis for peer­to­peer interaction—
although disputed by some (Ronfeldt 2013). This can be consid­
ered true in the sense that in P2P everybody is welcome to join, 
because it holds a large portion of equality, but can be countered 
by the fact that P2P displays the power­law distribution curve, i.e., 
the 80/20 distribution that is clearly non­democratic in the sense 
that a minority holds power over the majority. However—and this 
is important—this power is mostly “well earned” in the eyes of 
the peers, based on meritocracy, not a power based on political, 
financial or military might.
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of the balance or difference among participants and know what 
would be required to restore balance” [author’s italics] is indeed a 
good way to explain why meritocracy can at all work as a maxim 
for cooperation. Even if one is not one of those “in power,” it is 
obvious why; either s/he is not capable of impacting those with 
more knowledge or ability in the field in question, or s/he simply 
does not spend enough time to gain the leverage that results in 
“power.” As both of these shortcomings can be remedied if one 
makes them a priority, the situation can feel fair enough even if 
one is not part of the 20% driving the process.
A valuable lesson can nevertheless be learned from the Web­
community “Black & White Maniacs,” an online photo club for 
members to post and comment on each other’s black and white 
photos2. Initially no particular rules regulated the commentary, 
which is why many members posted their own photos but hardly 
ever commented on those of others—still waiting for their own 
photos to be commented upon (Shirky 2008, 276). The club then 
introduced a rule that for every photo they posted, they had to 
comment on two others, posted by other members, before they 
could post another one. The result was a harangue of standard 
but non­committal comments like “nice” or “good,” still failing to 
offer the quality ranking that the site was established for. A new 
rule was then introduced that such non­committal comments 
would not qualify as the type of comment required for allowing 
a new posting of one’s own picture, eventually raising both the 
quantity and the quality of comments to a level where “equality 
matching” actually was achieved, i.e., a meritocracy could take 
shape.
The lesson here is that EM requires incentives to members for 
them to remain as active as possible, and that it is not enough 
to provide input (in whatever shape or form is expected), but 
2 For further information see https://www.flickr.com/groups/
blackandwhitemaniacs/.
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contribute, and offer quality feedback in order to make the 
interaction a mutual one. In Citizen Lobby­terms this means that 
members must not only contribute their own views and ideas, 
but also engage in a debate that refines some ideas and discards 
others, in a process aiming at—if not Habermas’ consensus—a 
reasoned compromise or a qualified majority at least. A Citizen 
Lobby that constantly delivers 51/49­votes will not provide any 
useful guidance to the elected parliamentarians.
Shirky argues that a general trend in networked societies is as 
new groups not only can form quickly, easily and almost uncon­
trollably, and also do so—although far from the potential number 
of groups that according to Reed’s law could form based on the 
number of people who are networked —, governments can no 
longer rely on “prevention.” They simply cannot prevent people 
from getting together and do unexpected things, as the power of 
networked creativity is well beyond what any governing body can 
predict. Instead “reaction” will have to become the key to govern­
ance, where unwanted action is responded to in prohibitive ways, 
curbing further (to governments) negative developments (ibid., 
308). This argument much reminds us of the shift from large 
military action, where the largest arsenal wins, to fast­moving 
hit­and­run guerrilla attacks, to which institutional, heavy and 
hierarchical military formations have little time to respond, and 
even less ability to prevent.
From “prosumers” to “produsers”
Coming back to the paper Synthetic Overview of the Collaborative 
Economy by Bauwens, Mendoza, and Iacomella (2012, 48), which 
although it—as its title suggests—has a focus on economic rather 
than political activities, has several valuable ideas to be con­
sidered when reflecting on how P2P policy­making processes 
can develop. In a chapter on “Community­Centric Models” five 
different types of joint activities are described as follows:
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essarily set the parameters, and the prosumer [i.e., the 
co­producer cum consumer] is an equal partner in the 
development of new products. An example is the model used 
by adventure sports communities and studied by Eric von 
Hippel in his book Democratizing Innovation. However, [here] 
the [hierarchy] controls the value chain.
2. Sharing communities: The community creates the value, 
using Web 2.0 proprietary platforms, without much inter­
vention of the owners of the platforms. However, owners 
control the parameters of the platforms, and control its 
design—and monetise the “attention capital” which has been 
created by the users (e.g., through sales of advertising­space 
on Facebook).
3. Peer production proper: Communities create the value, 
using a Commons, with assistance from [hierarchies] 
attempting to create derivative streams of value. Linux is the 
paradigmatic example.
4. Peer production with cooperative production: Peer producers 
create their own vehicles for [collective] monetisation. The 
OS Alliance in Austria and GCoop in Argentina, are examples 
of this type of process.
5. Peer production communities or sharing communities: 
They place themselves explicitly outside of the monetary 
economy. Many smaller FLOSS (Free/Libre and Open Source 
Software) communities adhere to this model. (ibid.)
The Citizen Lobby would as an institution—given these five 
levels—best fit the “peer production proper” level, where com­
munities create the value (here; policy recommendations), using 
a commons (here: the “institution” Citizen Lobby), with the assis­
tance from a hierarchy (here: an elected parliament’s incumbent 
parliamentarians) that attempts to create derivative streams of 
value (here: political support and eventual re­election).
106 However, if one instead considers the role of the Citizen Lobby’s 
individual participants, “co­creation” would be a more appropriate 
level, being the level where the hierarchy may not be setting the 
parameters (i.e., the ideas and options to debate, which partic­
ipating individuals can influence), and where s/he as a “prosumer” 
(i.e., a co­producer cum consumer) and an equal partner in the 
development of new products (here: both an equal partner in 
developing new policy and a consumer of that same policy). Fur­
thermore, at this co­creation level the hierarchy is in control of 
the value chain in the sense that the elected politicians both take 
the formal decisions and implement them in the way they see fit.
It is therefore relevant to consider the Citizen Lobby concept a 
part of the peer­to­peer family, although individual members may 
qualify less than the collective proper as the “peer” of the elected 
parliamentarian. This will be further reflected in the ensuing 
Citizen Lobby model (as proposed in Chapter 7), since although 
this yet to be established institution needs to be considered a 
grassroots’ trickle­up vehicle under the 50/50 format, individual 
members are not expected to participate on an ad­hoc basis, 
coming and going as they wish. Instead they are to be randomly 
called to serve a given term, during which they will both expect, 
and be expected, to participate on equal terms.
[ 5 ]
Liquid Democracy:
The term, the systems, 
supporters and critics
In the following we will assume that the Citizen Lobby will use 
the “Adhocracy” (or an equivalent) software for its online and 
coordinating activities, as will be further elaborated on in Chapter 
7. This software is part and parcel of the Liquid Democracy 
“school”—perhaps better known for its Liquid Feedback fork, the 
vote­delegation software used by the German Pirate Party. This 
chapter looks into the ideas underpinning this school of ideas.
A ready­to­consume description of the concept for Liquid 
Democracy at large includes the following paragraphs (Global 
Freedom Movement 2011):
Liquid Democracy is a collective term for different 
approaches to making democracy more liquid, more trans­
parent and more flexible. What all [its] approaches have in 
common is the concept of delegating your vote for certain 
subject areas or subjects. This makes it possible to choose to 
actively participate in some subject areas and delegate your 
vote to someone else for others.
108 Organisations and informal groups can use Liquid 
Democracy to collaboratively develop their goals, strategies, 
internal rules or positions and to make binding decisions 
about them. Groups and organisations can involve their 
members in developing solutions to their problems and thus 
make better decisions. [The] web platform implements the two 
key concepts of Liquid Democracy: structured discourse and del-
egated voting [author’s emphasis].
Technological progress of the last few years has made global 
communication a lot easier and faster. These new pos­
sibilities have yet to be fully utilized for society. Citizens are 
involved with organisations, informal groups and networks 
of all kinds. At the same time, many people feel they are 
lacking the opportunity to effectively and collaboratively 
campaign for the issues they are concerned about. This is the 
problem that Liquid Democracy focuses on.
A community wiki with the same name also offers a wide range 
of background information—especially to those readers who are 
looking for commentary and video clips (Community Wiki).
Liquid Feedback
Interestingly enough, already in the 1990s Habermas wrote: 
Indeed, a minority of private people already are members 
of the parties and special­interest associations under public 
law. To the extent that these organizations permit an inter­
nal public sphere not merely at the level of functionaries 
and managers but at all levels, there exists the possibility of 
a mutual correspondence between the political opinions of the 
private people and that kind of quasi-public opinion. [author’s 
italics] (1991, 248)
He however noted that “[t]his state of affairs may stand for a 
tendency that for the time being is on the whole insignificant.” 
[author’s italics] (ibid.)
109Fast­forwarding Habermas’ now 20­year­old comment to our 
current­day scenario, where this “state of affairs” seems to be 
within reach, the key to actually understanding the difference 
between Liquid Democracy’s two forks Liquid Feedback and 
Adhocracy, is the above quoted statement: “the two key concepts 
of Liquid Democracy [are] structured discourse and delegated voting” 
(Global Freedom Movement 2011). The Liquid Feedback approach 
puts the emphasis on delegated voting, while Adhocracy puts its 
emphasis on the structured discourse. Although both forks can 
offer both functions, the functions are applied in different ways, 
so the representatives of both forks confirm that the underlying 
needs must be recognised if one is to sympathise with these 
differences. Voting and delegated voting is the key in the case 
of Liquid Feedback, which—apart from being firmly anchored 
in the German Pirate Party as a decision­making tool—is used 
in the northwestern German province of Friesland to gauge the 
electorates’ views on the provincial government’s ideas and 
activities. The debate function in Friesland’s case, although used, 
is not emphasised. In the Pirate Party’s use, the debate function 
is virtually marginalised, as most party debate takes place in 
forums parallel to, or altogether separated from, the Liquid 
Feedback software proper.
Although both these two parallel uses are of general interest to 
the democratic process—in the Pirate Party case because it has 
generated a significant increase in terms of party member par­
ticipation, and in the Friesland case because it has created a body 
of lay and non­partisan participants in local politics—which must 
be seen as a novelty—the level to which it has effected policy­
making is at large still modest. The Pirate Party is a small and 
relatively lightweight player in German politics. In Friesland only 
a very small part of the constituency is registered as members of 
the system, a voluntary registration that nevertheless is required 
for anyone wishing to use this system for political participation.
These applications’ emphasis on voting also reminds us of the 
discussion in Chapter 3, where the act of voting, or otherwise 
110 responding to predefined alternatives, by some commentators 
were seen as bordering on either the passive or the insufficient—
unless proper deliberation preceded it. If/when such deliberation 
takes place, parallel to or outside the Liquid Feedback system 
itself, this may not be seen as a problem, but if/when voting 
or delegation takes place without much prior deliberation, the 
democratic effects are—with reference to most of the research 
referred to and quoted in this publication—not necessarily all 
that significant.
Those developing the Liquid Feedback fork however explain it like 
this:
[It b]uilds a chain from direct to representative democracy by 
introducing a web­based proxy system, where every member 
can decide who from time to time shall represent “me.” 
Sometimes I will do it myself (direct democracy), sometimes I 
will delegate my vote to somebody else in the network who I 
trust—who in turn can delegate it on to somebody he trusts. 
I can recall my delegation whenever I want and next time 
either vote myself or delegate it to someone else. (Nitsche 
2013)
No doubt the German Pirate Party’s by now fairly well­known use 
of Liquid Feedback has inspired others to pick up on this idea. 
There are nowadays many similar initiatives across Europe and 
North America, and in Italy several political parties with seats in 
the parliament have embraced it. In one case, an initiative by a 
Democratic Party PM has seen over a dozen PMs from different 
parties join a common launch, and in another the populist Five 
Star Movement has launched its own version. Liquid Feedback, 
however, does not seem to be the first of its kind. On the Web, 
one can find a range of similar ideas, including these two of pre­
Liquid Feedback dates (or at least equally “old”):
111 – Abdul–Rahman Lomax argues on his website that
Liquid democracy is pretty close to the concepts I’ve been 
working on for about twenty years. Those concepts have 
boiled down to two: Free Associations and Delegable Proxy. 
(Lomax 2014)
 – Smári McCarthy’s blog promoted already in 2008 
A new type of voting system [:…] When voting, a voter is 
presented with two functions: vote for one of the options, 
or don’t vote. I suggest we add a third: forward your vote 
to a third party. This is the essence of “representative 
democracy,” but I’m talking about expanding it—in 
representative democracies everybody forwards their 
vote to a predefined subset of the people, and each 
representative has an equal weight in subjects. Here I’m 
saying anybody can forward their vote to anybody, and for­
warding votes increases the weight of that individual’s vote. 
The three functions of the vote: Abstention, Direct vote, 
Elected proxy. (McCarthy 2008)
Two other examples of similar initiatives are in fact closer to the 
overall Liquid Democracy school of thought, where consultation 
is just as much a key as is voting and vote delegation.
Lobbi is an innovative and unique method of engaging the 
electorate to become re­enthused and involved with politics 
on a long­term basis. This is created through the ever­
growing power of social media, with a Facebook/Twitter­
esque interactive forum and information portal. […] Lobbi 
provides the voting public with the means to discover current 
issues that affect them – instantly – via their smart phone, 
tablet or computer. In addition, they can get their own views 
across in the same way as they’d post on Facebook or Twitter. 
But more than this, it ’s a two­way street, as politicians and 
elected representatives also interact, giving them a vital link 
to the public mood on a “real­time” basis. (Wilcox 2013)
112 With reference to the AAPOR­report referenced in Chapter 3, the 
task force behind it also suggested a US model they call “Citizen 
Cabinet,” explained as follows:
a […] standing panel comprised of a representative sample 
of the American public, to be consulted on current issues, 
using new online interactive tools to give voice to the people 
on an unprecedented scale; [… m]aking [the] same online 
resources available to all Americans, so they can get better 
informed and more effectively communicate their views to 
their representatives. […] made up of 275 citizens in every 
congressional district – 120,000 nationwide – scientifically 
selected to accurately reflect the American people, and 
connected through an online interface. Each Citizen Cabinet 
member will serve for 9 – 12 months. (Kull et al. 2013)
Adhocracy
From the Citizen Cabinet, the step to the Adhocracy platform 
is not far, although this platform is designed for open and free 
participation rather than selected and restricted as in AAPOR’s 
Citizen Cabinet above.
The Adhocracy website presents this software as a “platform 
enabling a democratic, transparent, open and focused dialogue” 
[author’s translation] (Liquid Democracy e.V. 2013) that not only 
provides organisations and interest groups with a way to open 
up to democratic participation, but also an opportunity for “all 
citizens” to contribute views and ideas in order to actually create 
a discussion and help shape the decisions.
This system is designed to offer “everybody the opportunity to be 
independently represented, at a time and in an area of expertise 
that suits the individual, allowing them to satisfactorily contribute 
their own ideas and concerns to the debate.” [author’s trans­
lation] (ibid.) Be it a simple approval or rejection of a proposal or 
project, or by incorporating their ideas and suggestions in either, 
or by participating in the editing of a representative text. Every 
113participant can here, him­/herself, decide to which extent s/he 
wants to be involved—and how and/or to which extent—s/he 
would like to be involved in the decision­making.
All “users,” the organisations, political parties, companies, NGOs 
and/or other interest groups operating their respective plat­
forms, and these respective user platforms’ individual members, 
must register a user profile, consequently enabling them to 
verify their authenticity. Although a range of organisations 
have designed and launched their own platforms, the most 
relevant case for this publication to study is the platform that 
the German Parliament (Bundestag) trialled for a few years. 
Between February 2011 and January 2013, the Committee of 
Enquiry of the German Bundestag on Internet and Digital Society 
collected knowledge, ideas and expertise for policy­making, 
using this platform, to which ideas, suggestions and opinions on 
the future of digital society where contributed and shared. This 
study group project then incorporated these discussions and 
suggestions directly into the Study Commissions’ ongoing work 
(Gollatz, Herweg, and Hofmann 2013). Although the Bundestag 
also formally evaluated this trial, and as I write is contemplating 
whether and/or how to proceed, an independent evaluation by 
Alexander Hoose is also at hand. This analysis is indeed helpful in 
understanding the workings of these types of e­platforms. Hoose 
describes his analytical method as follows:
Unlike usual methods of social network analysis that analyse 
and visualize the direct relation between actors, in this paper 
a two­mode network analysis will be used that analyses the 
relation between two different types of actors or technical 
terms nodes. In the case of enquetebeteiligung.de [i.e., Study 
Commission] the relation that will be focused on, is the con­
nection between users and the proposal. This connection 
is documented through the act of voting for or against the 
proposal or by being the author of the proposal. The idea 
behind this approach is that every user is connected to other 
114 users through the event of voting on the same proposal. 
(2012, 11) 
For the German Bundestag it is specified that an “Enquete 
Commission” can be established if a quarter of the Bundestag 
votes for it, after which time it will remain active until the end of 
the legislative period. The members’ appointments are either 
based on an agreement between the parties in parliament or 
on each party’s corresponding representation in parliament. 
Such commissions are usually composed of parliamentarians 
and experts from various fields. By inviting an NGO (Liquid 
Democracy e.V.) to provide, tailor and operate the platform (i.e., 
the Adhocracy software), this project also gained a direct channel 
to the general public, which hence was invited to participate, 
together with the political parties’ appointed members and 
experts.
This e­platform only had a consulting function however, since 
the content generated by it only served as an additional input for 
regular Commission members. Therefore the Commission could 
decide on issues without taking the users’ voting results into 
account.
Evaluating the Enquete Commission
Alexander Hoose’s findings are interesting in the face of the 
above:
One important finding in the survey was the education 
background of the Adhocracy users, which shows a large 
percentage of highly educated people among the user 
population. [P]eople with a university degree, Abitur 
and Phd make up 89% of the total user population, thus 
showing a clear picture. One important insight that can 
be taken from these numbers is that the participation on 
enquetebeteiligung.de seems to have high requirements 
concerning the capabilities and knowledge of the user. 
One reason could be that the topics often require expert 
115knowledge in certain areas in order to be fully understood, 
therefore alienating people with a lower education back­
ground. (ibid., 7)
Another important statistic concerns the intensity of use 
and shows that only [a] small percentage of the users is 
participating regularly on [the platform]. This finding makes 
immediate sense if one thinks of the typical argument 
brought up for the representative democracy and its profes­
sional politicians. The argument is that such [a] constant 
political work requires a large amount of time and profes­
sionalization in order to be successful on a varied field of 
political issues. In contrast normal citizens often do not have 
the time and interest to work into every topic that is on the 
political agenda, therefore they often only choose topics that 
are of interest to them. This again leads to the problem of 
professional interest groups using this circumstance to their 
advantage when trying to manipulate such participation plat­
form[s] as they often have more resources to participate on 
timely fashion. This is supported by the large percentage of 
irregular […] user, since this seems to promote the idea that 
many users are being mobilized by organizations in order to 
lobby for single issues. (ibid. 7–8)
Finally the political engagement is of interest, since one of 
the main goals of the platform is to mobilize the citizens 
[who] are alienated from the political business. [Findings] 
show that [it is] not the apolitical citizen [that] uses [...] the 
Adhocracy platform, but mostly citizens that have already 
engaged themselves in other political formats. (ibid., 8)
Judging from the user profiles presented […], that shows 
high political engagement and a small group of highly active 
users, it is highly likely that minorities and interest groups 
are mobilizing their followers to shape the discussions on the 
[platform]. (ibid., 10)
116 Quoting another study (Klug et al. 2010), Hoose therefore argues 
that
[i]t is thinkable that interest groups […] not only dominate 
the discourse by mobilizing their members, but also [by] 
creating a self­reinforcement cycle that leads other users to 
ignore smaller discussion [threads] and unconsciously agree 
with users from such interest group as they predefine the 
discussion. (Hoose 2012, 10–11)
In summary, Hoose raises three major hypotheses, which he 
eventually answers as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Power users are able to act as intermediaries 
[…] by placing and leveraging topics through their own 
importance in the network. Power users are understood as 
users connected to a large number of proposals. […] [This] 
hypothesis can be dismissed, which is […] surprising, as the 
power user argument is commonly used in the e­partic­
ipation discussion. (ibid., 11, 18)
Hypothesis 2: Interest groups dominate the discourse 
[…] by mobilizing their members to vote on their topics. 
Interest groups are defined by having created proposals 
with a homogeneous user group, which is not connected 
to proposals in other parts of the network or by being 
presented by an official organization account. […] [The 
research provides a] strong confirmation of [this] hypothesis, 
since [the] results show that interest groups […] can mobilize 
many new users for their topic and by this crowd out weaker 
proposal that do not have organized groups as a backing. 
(ibid.)
Hypothesis 3: Proposals that do not exceed a critical mass or 
do not have well connected users are not able to generate 
the attention of other users on the platform. […] [This final] 
hypothesis […] can neither be […] confirmed nor denied, as 
the results show that generating attention from the overall 
117network is way less important than securing a core sup­
porter group. (ibid.)
In summary, Hoose’s report clearly does dovetail with most of 
the research findings reported on in Chapters 3 and 4. With this 
in mind, the Citizen Lobby, when using the Adhocracy software 
(equivalent), will make special efforts to neutralise the tendencies 
that interest groups take control over/dominate the public debate 
through “smart” utilisation of interactive platforms, and/or 
discreet mobilisation of supporting networks. This will however 
be elaborated further in this publication’s final chapter.

[ 6 ]
Evolving relationships: 
The model leading to the 
model
This chapter intends to link the backgrounds, status reports and 
developments presented and discussed in the above chapters 
into a flow, showing what the aggregate of all the referenced 
research suggests about the longer term. It is our hope that 
based on this chapter—although it requires a more rigorous than 
usual attention from its readers—the reasons for, and the format 
of, the Citizen Lobby can be better understood and recognised. 
It shall nevertheless be noted that neither this chapter, nor this 
publication in general, attempts to make a full­fledged SWOT 
analysis of a digitalisation of our current democratic processes. 
That would be a task beyond the scope of this publication given 
the many technical aspects that a more complete analysis also 
would have to include—something this publication falls short of. 
The research conducted here prioritises the human aspects of 
digital democracy above the in­depth technical ones.
This chapter builds to a large extent on two theories: Habermas’ 
public sphere theory, as laid out in Chapter 2, and the cultural 
formula, as presented in Chapter 1. By using the actors and 
roles identified by Habermas and the process of slowly changing 
120 cultural logics, identified in the “Cultural Formula,” we will here 
draft a scenario for change. The time factor is obviously a matter 
for debate. Are we in the process of leaving an era of capitalism 
based on an industrial mode of production, or have we already 
left that behind? Are we now in an information era, based on 
e­platforms, or are we still only heading there? Are we already 
touching upon a knowledge era, driven by computer protocols, 
or is that simply a vision? Different observers will have different 
answers to these questions. This chapter simply talks about “the 
past” (also called the corporate era), “the present” (also called 
the media era) and “the future” (also called the P2P era). The 
past is what we are inevitably moving out of, whether we are still 
there or not. The present is the era which almost all referenced 
research agrees upon is actually happening—whether it is in its 
infancy or an already generally accepted way of life. The future is 
what most observers argue is coming, whether it is around the 
corner or in a more distant future.
The need for a new take on democracy is nevertheless the same. 
Either we need to get it right before it is too late, or—if the change 
is already more progressed than some experience it—there is 
no time to lose. The argument this publication wishes to stress is 
that now is the time to revamp our democratic models, as it is just 
a matter of time until they are so obsolete they will do more harm 
than good. Democratic models firmly anchored in the past—when 
living in the “present” or the “future”—will not prove very helpful 
to societies at large.
The developments discussed in this chapter are structured in 
a such a way that a critical reader him­/herself shall be able to 
question and test assumed outcomes by changing parameters 
s/he disagrees with, in order for him­/herself to see which con­
sequences such changes possibly could entail. If—for instance—a 
reader disagrees with the assumption that what Habermas refers 
to as the private intimate realm (i.e., private individuals) in the 
long term (i.e., in “the future”) is heading towards a type of reality 
where “collective experience underpinning their views, concerns and 
121general positions in the debate” typically are “intention-based, where 
information-search replaces information-feed as main ‘flow’ to build 
experience,” s/he can alter this statement, and see how it affects 
the overall outcome. In the version of events charted below, 
the outcome is assumed to be that people “will engage, since it 
concerns me and my near and dear”—making a Citizen Lobby a 
useful tool. A contrasting outcome could be that s/he “will not 
engage, since there is no reward in sight”—which consequently 
would make a Citizen Lobby unnecessary. The hereby­attained 
responsiveness of this model is of course intentional. Without 
such responsiveness the model could be seen to fail, simply 
because one assumption upon which its design relies turns out 
untrue, such as if new legislation cracks down on Internet access, 
or if the peer­to­peer mode of production fails to develop on the 
larger scale—beyond cultural production.
For the above reasons all claims are collected and presented in 
charts below, rather than in ordinary text. To some readers this 
may seem less reader­friendly. This type of presentation however 
allows for the kind of flow analysis that ordinary text is less suit­
able for. The first chart describes how Habermas’ public sphere is 
likely to be populated over time, and how roles can be expected 
to change. However, in this chart (but only in this) are Habermas’ 
spheres/realms slightly reorganised, in order to also reflect the 
glocal aspect. Here the public economic (= corporate) and public 
intimate (= media) spheres are merged, and a supra­national 
level is added. Chart 2 nevertheless reflects Habermas’ original 
role­distribution.
Comparing levels C and E in Chart 1 reveals the real process of 
change that the referenced research suggests. The “past” is here 
represented by the private intimate realm’s focus on eligibility 
and voting in general election, the governing realm’s focus on 
legitimacy and party­to­party negotiations, the economic realm’s 
focus on rationality, using arguments, support and sponsorship, 
with a supra­governing realm focusing on strategy and economic 
cum military power.
122 The “future” (i.e., level E) is understood, on the other hand, to 
have—in addition to the above—a private­intimate­realm focus 
on “on­/offline engagement” and “voting on policy creation,” 
a governing­realm focus on “on­/offline representation” and 
“negotiating policy creation,” an economic­realm focus on “on­/
offline manoeuvring” and “influencing policy creation,” with a 
supra­governing­realm focus on “discreet manipulative control” 
and “manipulating policy creation.” Studying Chart 1 in closer 
detail reveals these developments more recognisably.
Charts 2a–c show how the research presented in this publication 
assumes that each of Habermas’ realms may change over time. 
Chart 2a shows the past, here referred to as “the corporate era,” 
Chart 2b shows the present, referred to as “the media era” and 
Chart 2c the future, here referred to as “the P2P era.”
These charts allow readers to see the assumed development for 
each respective realm, era by era. Here the “cultural behaviour” 
of the private intimate realm moves from “electorate” in the 
past, via “electorate + Web­active” in the present, to “electorate 
+ lobby” in the future. For the private economic realm the 
“cultural behaviour” changes from “petitioner” in the past, via 
“spokesperson” in the present, to “kingmaker” in the future. 
For the public economic realm, the transition is assumed to be 
from “institutional lobby” in the past, via “corporate citizen + 
institutional lobby” in the present, to “queenmaker” in the future. 
“Queenmaker” means a force influencing the processes from 
inside, rather than—as kingmakers do—introduce and/or support 
candidates for the leading roles (compare here the old proverb 
“behind every successful man stands a strong woman”). Finally, 
for the public intimate realm, a transition from “kingmaker” in the 
past, via “lobby channel” in the present to that of a “broker” (of 
views, opportunities and threats) in the future, is assumed.
Chart 3 is a more condensed and admittedly more speculative 
summary of how the roles may change over time. Its content is 
nevertheless derived directly from Charts 1 and 2.
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te
 O
p
in
io
n
­b
as
ed
; 
co
or
di
na
te
d 
in
fo
r­
m
at
io
n
­fl
o
w
s 
fe
ed
 
pe
op
le
 w
it
h 
w
ha
t t
o 
th
in
k 
 M
on
ey
 m
ak
es
 c
on
­
ne
ct
io
ns
 a
nd
 c
on
­
ne
ct
io
ns
 m
ak
e 
m
on
ey
 M
ar
ke
ts
 c
an
 b
e 
m
an
ag
ed
 
an
d 
ne
w
 m
ar
ke
ts
 fo
un
d
 Tr
u
st
ed
; c
o
n
fi
d
en
t b
u
t 
ar
ro
ga
nt
 
= 
pr
em
is
e:
Th
e 
ov
er
ar
ch
in
g 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r 
re
sp
on
se
 a
nd
 a
ct
io
n
 I c
an
no
t, 
w
hy
 I 
w
ill
 a
w
ai
t 
ad
vi
ce
 I c
an
, w
hy
 I 
w
ill
 a
ct
 
in
de
pe
nd
en
tl
y
 W
e 
ca
n 
­ i
f/
w
h
en
 w
e 
tr
y
 W
e 
ar
e 
in
 fu
ll 
co
nt
ro
l
C
h
ar
t 
2a
 (p
ar
t 1
)
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Th
e 
P
u
b
li
c 
Sp
h
er
e
P
ri
va
te
 R
ea
lm
P
u
b
li
c 
R
ea
lm
Tr
a
d
it
io
n
al
ly
/C
o
rp
o
ra
te
 E
ra
In
ti
m
at
e
Ec
on
om
ic
Ec
on
om
ic
In
ti
m
at
e
Th
e l
o
g
ic
a
l l
ev
el
+ 
o
b
se
r
Va
ti
o
n
:
P
o
lic
y­
m
ak
in
g 
tr
en
d
s 
w
e 
ca
n 
ob
se
rv
e 
an
d 
bu
ild
 o
n
 Po
lic
y 
is
 m
ad
e 
by
 
po
lit
ic
ia
ns
 Po
lic
y 
is
 in
flu
en
ce
d 
b
y 
po
w
er
 Po
lic
y 
w
ill
 b
e 
in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 u
s
 Po
lic
y 
ca
n
’t 
bu
ild
 o
r 
sp
re
ad
 w
it
ho
ut
 u
s
= 
co
n
c
lu
si
o
n
:
H
ow
 w
ill
 I 
re
sp
on
d 
to
 th
is
 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n,
 g
iv
en
 th
e 
pr
em
is
e 
no
te
d 
ab
ov
e
 I w
ill
 n
ot
 e
ng
ag
e,
 s
in
ce
 
th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
re
w
ar
d 
in
 
si
gh
t
 I w
ill
 u
se
 m
y 
po
w
er
 if
 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 r
ew
ar
d 
in
 s
ig
ht
 W
e 
en
ga
ge
 if
 w
e 
ne
ed
 to
 
pr
ev
ai
l
 W
e 
ca
n 
cu
lt
ur
al
ly
 
m
an
ip
ul
at
e 
bo
th
 p
eo
pl
e 
an
d 
po
lic
y
Th
e a
c
Ti
o
n
 l
ev
el
+ 
r
es
o
u
rc
es
:
W
ha
t t
yp
e 
of
 d
ig
it
al
 to
ol
s 
ca
n 
I 
us
e 
if 
ta
ki
ng
 a
ct
io
n 
 Po
rt
al
s,
 d
ri
ve
n 
by
 it
s 
or
ig
in
at
or
s
 Po
rt
al
s,
 d
ri
ve
n 
by
 it
s 
or
ig
in
at
or
s
 Po
rt
al
s,
 d
ri
ve
n 
by
 it
s 
or
ig
in
at
or
s
 Po
rt
al
s,
 d
ri
ve
n 
by
 it
s 
or
ig
in
at
or
s
+ 
r
es
o
lV
e:
Th
e 
ty
p
e 
o
f e
ff
o
rt
 n
ee
d
ed
 
 Co
n
­/
P
ro
su
m
er
 Pr
of
es
si
on
al
 Pa
rt
ic
ul
ar
 Pr
oa
ct
iv
e
= 
b
eh
aV
io
u
r
:
M
y 
ro
le
 in
 p
o
lic
y­
m
ak
in
g
 El
ec
to
ra
te
 Pe
ti
ti
on
er
 In
st
it
ut
io
na
l L
ob
by
 “K
in
g­
m
ak
er
”
C
h
ar
t 
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Th
e 
P
u
b
li
c 
Sp
h
er
e
P
ri
va
te
 R
ea
lm
P
u
b
li
c 
R
ea
lm
M
ed
iu
m
 T
er
m
/M
ed
ia
 E
ra
In
ti
m
at
e
Ec
on
om
ic
Ec
on
om
ic
In
ti
m
at
e
Th
e S
o
ci
a
l l
ev
el
+ 
Va
lu
es
: 
C
o
re
 v
al
u
e­
p
la
tf
o
rm
 f
o
r 
th
e 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
de
sc
ri
be
d.
Va
lu
es
 d
iff
er
 f
ro
m
 p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s,
 
op
in
io
ns
, e
tc
., 
by
 b
ei
ng
 
pe
rm
ea
ti
ng
 a
nd
 s
ta
bl
e 
ov
er
 
lo
ng
er
 ti
m
es
 
M
et
a­
lo
ca
l, 
w
h
er
e 
o
n
e’
s 
pe
er
s,
 b
ot
h 
in
si
de
 a
nd
 
ou
ts
id
e 
on
e’
s 
lo
ca
l 
co
m
m
un
it
y,
 a
re
 k
ey
 
va
lu
e­
d
ri
ve
rs
 
Re
co
gn
it
io
n;
 fa
m
e 
an
d 
ex
p
o
su
re
 ­ 
w
h
et
h
er
 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 r
ew
ar
de
d 
in
 
m
on
ey
 o
r 
no
t
G
lo
ba
l, 
w
he
re
 tr
en
ds
 
m
ak
e 
us
 a
cc
ep
t a
 le
ad
er
 
vs
. f
ol
lo
w
er
 p
la
tf
or
m
N
ew
s,
 a
ss
um
in
g 
th
e 
tr
ut
h 
is
 w
ha
t c
an
 b
e 
ob
se
rv
ed
, a
nd
 th
at
 th
is
 
m
u
st
 b
e 
o
ff
er
ed
+ 
en
Vi
ro
n
m
en
t:
 
Th
e 
ov
er
al
l s
et
ti
ng
, c
on
di
ti
on
s 
an
d 
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
 w
it
hi
n 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
ty
pi
ca
lly
 
liv
es
 a
nd
 o
pe
ra
te
s
M
ed
iu
m
 im
pa
ct
, 
w
h
er
e 
gr
o
u
p
­e
ff
o
rt
s 
to
 in
flu
en
ce
 c
an
 
p
ay
 o
ff
 if
 s
m
ar
t o
r 
w
el
l­
co
o
rd
in
at
ed
W
in
n
er
­t
ak
es
­a
ll,
 s
h
ar
in
g 
is
 fo
rc
ed
 a
nd
 d
ev
ia
nc
es
 
ar
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 a
bn
or
m
al
 
bu
t “
to
le
ra
te
d
”
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
po
w
er
, 
d
ri
ve
n 
b
y 
co
st
­ a
n
d 
ta
x­
 m
in
im
is
at
io
n
Fa
st
­m
o
vi
n
g,
 b
o
th
 in
 
te
rm
s 
of
 te
ch
ni
ca
l a
nd
 
p
o
w
er
­s
tr
u
ct
u
re
s
= 
a
pp
li
c
at
io
n
:
H
ow
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
va
lu
es
 a
re
 
ty
pi
ca
lly
 a
pp
lie
d 
in
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t
A
ct
iv
e,
 i.
e.
 lo
o
k 
fo
r 
op
po
rt
un
it
ie
s
Pr
oa
ct
iv
e;
 c
oa
ch
ed
 
re
al
it
y
Pr
oa
ct
iv
e,
 t
ar
ge
ti
ng
 c
us
­
to
m
er
 lo
ya
lt
y
C
o
n
te
n
t;
 q
u
an
ti
ty
 b
ea
ts
 
q
u
al
it
y
Th
e e
m
pi
r
ic
a
l l
ev
el
+ 
ex
pe
r
ie
n
c
e:
Co
lle
ct
iv
e 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
s 
un
de
rp
in
ni
ng
 o
ur
 v
ie
w
s,
 c
on
­
ce
rn
s 
an
d 
ge
ne
ra
l p
os
it
io
ns
 in
 
th
e 
de
ba
te
Sh
ar
in
g­
b
as
ed
; s
el
f­
m
ad
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
­fl
o
w
s 
co
m
pe
te
 w
it
h 
th
os
e 
ex
te
rn
al
ly
 c
oo
rd
in
at
ed
Re
co
gn
it
io
n 
m
ak
es
 
co
nn
ec
ti
on
s 
an
d 
co
n
­
ne
ct
io
ns
 m
ak
e 
m
on
ey
Co
st
s 
ca
n 
be
 m
an
ag
ed
 
an
d 
ne
w
 s
ou
rc
es
 fo
un
d
Co
m
pe
ti
ti
ve
; e
xp
re
ss
iv
e 
bu
t n
oi
sy
= 
pr
em
is
e:
 
Th
e 
ov
er
ar
ch
in
g 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r 
re
sp
on
se
 a
nd
 a
ct
io
n
 I c
an
, w
hy
 I 
w
ill
 c
om
pa
re
 
op
ti
on
s
 I m
ay
, w
hy
 I 
w
ill
 a
ct
 
sp
ec
ul
at
iv
el
y 
 Pr
ac
ti
ce
 m
ak
es
 p
er
fe
ct
 W
e 
st
ru
gg
le
 to
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ee
p 
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nt
ro
l
C
h
ar
t 
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 (p
ar
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Th
e 
P
u
b
li
c 
Sp
h
er
e
P
ri
va
te
 R
ea
lm
P
u
b
li
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R
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M
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iu
m
 T
er
m
/M
ed
ia
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ra
In
ti
m
at
e
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on
om
ic
Ec
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ic
In
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m
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e
Th
e l
o
g
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a
l l
ev
el
+ 
o
b
se
r
Va
ti
o
n
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P
o
lic
y­
m
ak
in
g 
tr
en
d
s 
w
e 
ca
n 
ob
se
rv
e 
an
d 
bu
ild
 o
n
 Po
lic
y 
ca
n 
b
e 
in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 u
s
 Po
lic
y 
is
 in
flu
en
ce
d 
b
y 
po
w
er
 Po
lic
y 
ca
n 
b
e 
in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 u
s
 Po
lic
y 
ca
n 
bu
ild
 o
r 
sp
re
ad
 w
it
ho
ut
 u
s
= 
co
n
c
lu
si
o
n
: 
H
ow
 w
ill
 I 
re
sp
on
d 
to
 th
is
 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n,
 g
iv
en
 th
e 
pr
em
is
e 
no
te
d 
ab
ov
e
 I m
ay
 e
ng
ag
e,
 if
 o
ve
ra
ll 
pr
io
ri
ti
es
 p
er
m
it 
th
e 
eff
o
rt
 I w
ill
 b
ac
k 
th
e 
po
w
er
 th
at
 
m
ay
 b
en
efi
t m
e 
m
o
re
 W
e 
en
ga
ge
 to
 g
ai
n 
in
flu
en
ce
 W
e 
m
us
t d
ef
en
d 
ou
r 
co
n
­
tr
ol
 o
ve
r 
cu
lt
ur
al
 p
ow
er
Th
e a
c
Ti
o
n
 l
ev
el
+ 
r
es
o
u
rc
es
: 
W
ha
t t
yp
e 
of
 d
ig
it
al
 to
ol
s 
ca
n 
I 
us
e 
if 
ta
ki
ng
 a
ct
io
n
 Pl
at
fo
rm
s,
 d
ri
ve
n 
by
 it
s 
us
er
s
 Pl
at
fo
rm
s,
 d
ri
ve
n 
by
 it
s 
us
er
s
 Pl
at
fo
rm
s,
 d
ri
ve
n 
by
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s 
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er
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rm
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 d
ri
ve
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by
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er
s
+ 
r
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o
lV
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ty
p
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o
f e
ff
o
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ee
d
ed
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os
um
er
/U
se
r
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al
 b
ra
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g
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bl
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iv
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= 
b
eh
aV
io
u
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 in
 p
o
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g
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 +
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w
w
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te
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Th
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u
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Sp
h
er
e
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ri
va
te
 R
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R
ea
lm
Lo
n
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/P
2P
 E
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In
ti
m
at
e
Ec
on
om
ic
Ec
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om
ic
In
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m
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e
Th
e S
o
ci
a
l l
ev
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+ 
Va
lu
es
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C
o
re
 v
al
u
e­
p
la
tf
o
rm
 f
o
r 
th
e 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
de
sc
ri
be
d.
Va
lu
es
 d
iff
er
 f
ro
m
 p
re
fe
re
n
ce
s,
 
op
in
io
ns
, e
tc
., 
by
 b
ei
ng
 
pe
rm
ea
ti
ng
 a
nd
 s
ta
bl
e 
ov
er
 
lo
ng
er
 ti
m
es
 G
lo
ca
l, 
w
he
re
 lo
ca
l, 
m
et
a­
lo
ca
l a
n
d 
gl
o
b
al
 
in
flu
en
ce
s 
m
ee
t i
n 
an
 
o
n
­g
o
in
g 
p
ro
ce
ss
 o
f 
va
lu
e­
ex
ch
an
ge
 Po
si
ti
on
in
g;
 c
or
e/
ce
nt
re
/
p
er
ip
h
er
al
 ­ 
w
h
et
h
er
 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 r
ew
ar
de
d 
in
 
m
on
ey
 o
r 
no
t 
 G
lo
ca
l, 
w
he
re
 lo
ca
l, 
m
et
a­
lo
ca
l a
n
d 
gl
o
b
al
 
va
lu
es
 m
ix
 a
nd
 c
oe
xi
st
 Ev
en
ts
, a
ss
um
in
g 
th
e 
tr
ut
h 
is
 w
ha
t p
eo
pl
e 
m
ak
e 
ou
t o
f w
ha
t t
he
y 
ar
e 
b
ei
n
g 
o
ff
er
ed
+ 
en
Vi
ro
n
m
en
t:
Th
e 
ov
er
al
l s
et
ti
ng
, c
on
di
ti
on
s 
an
d 
re
st
ri
ct
io
ns
 w
it
hi
n 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
de
sc
ri
be
d 
co
lle
ct
iv
e 
ty
pi
ca
lly
 
liv
es
 a
nd
 o
pe
ra
te
s
 H
ig
h 
im
pa
ct
, w
he
re
 th
e 
ge
ne
ra
l p
ub
lic
 d
ri
ve
s 
th
e 
p
ro
ce
ss
es
 ­ 
im
p
le
m
en
te
d 
by
 e
lit
es
 N
et
w
or
ke
d 
so
ci
et
ie
s 
w
it
h 
co
n
st
an
t s
h
if
ts
 in
 n
o
d
e­
st
ru
ct
ur
es
 a
nd
 s
ph
er
es
 
of
 p
ow
er
 Cr
ea
ti
ve
 p
ow
er
, d
ri
ve
n 
by
 
ab
ili
ty
 to
 u
ti
lis
e 
di
st
ri
b
­
ut
ed
 r
es
ou
rc
es
 U
ne
xp
ec
te
d,
 b
ot
h 
in
 
te
rm
s 
of
 te
ch
ni
ca
l a
nd
 
p
o
w
er
­s
tr
u
ct
u
re
s
= 
a
pp
li
c
at
io
n
:
H
ow
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
va
lu
es
 a
re
 
ty
pi
ca
lly
 a
pp
lie
d 
in
 th
e 
ab
ov
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t
 Pr
oa
ct
iv
e,
 i.
e.
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ee
p 
th
e 
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it
ia
ti
ve
 Re
ac
ti
ve
; r
es
po
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iv
e 
re
al
it
y
 Fl
ex
ib
le
, t
ar
ge
ti
n
g 
w
h
at
 
is
 p
ol
it
ic
al
ly
 c
or
re
ct
 Co
nt
ex
t;
 p
re
se
nc
e 
be
at
s 
q
u
al
it
y
Th
e e
m
pi
r
ic
a
l l
ev
el
+ 
ex
pe
r
ie
n
c
e:
Co
lle
ct
iv
e 
ex
pe
ri
en
ce
s 
un
de
rp
in
ni
ng
 o
ur
 v
ie
w
s,
 c
on
­
ce
rn
s 
an
d 
ge
ne
ra
l p
os
it
io
ns
 in
 
th
e 
de
ba
te
 In
te
n
ti
o
n
­b
as
ed
, w
h
er
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
­s
ea
rc
h 
re
p
la
ce
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in
fo
rm
at
io
n
­
fe
ed
 a
s 
m
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n 
“fl
o
w
” t
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 e
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er
ie
nc
e
 N
et
w
or
ki
ng
 m
ak
es
 
co
nn
ec
ti
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s 
an
d 
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n
­
ne
ct
io
ns
 m
ak
e 
m
on
ey
 Pe
op
le
 c
an
no
t b
e 
m
an
ag
ed
 b
ut
 n
ew
 
te
ch
no
lo
gi
es
 c
an
 b
e 
fo
un
d
 Th
re
at
en
ed
; a
ct
iv
e 
bu
t 
le
ss
 s
tr
uc
tu
re
d
= 
pr
em
is
e:
 
Th
e 
ov
er
ar
ch
in
g 
as
su
m
pt
io
n 
fo
r 
re
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on
se
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nd
 a
ct
io
n
 I w
ill
, w
hy
 I 
m
us
t a
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re
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si
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y
 I m
us
t, 
w
hy
 I 
w
ill
 a
ct
 
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y
 W
e 
w
ill
 n
ev
er
 s
to
p 
tr
yi
ng
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e
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Va
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P
o
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m
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n 
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bu
ild
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n
 Po
lic
y 
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n 
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 m
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r 
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 Po
lic
y 
is
 in
flu
en
ce
d 
b
y 
po
w
er
 Po
lic
y 
m
ay
 b
e 
in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 u
s
 Po
lic
y 
do
es
 b
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ld
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r 
sp
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ad
 w
it
ho
ut
 u
s
= 
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n
c
lu
si
o
n
: 
H
ow
 w
ill
 I 
re
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to
 th
is
 
ob
se
rv
at
io
n,
 g
iv
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e 
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em
is
e 
no
te
d 
ab
ov
e
 I w
ill
 e
ng
ag
e,
 a
s 
it 
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n
­
ce
rn
s 
m
e 
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d 
m
y 
“n
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r 
an
d 
de
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”
 I w
ill
 h
el
p 
b
ro
ke
r 
p
o
w
er
 ­ 
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t k
ee
p 
“a
ll 
do
or
s 
op
en
”
 W
e 
en
ga
ge
 n
ot
 to
 b
e 
le
ft
 
be
hi
nd
 
 W
e 
m
us
t s
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ur
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a 
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ak
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 c
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en
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Th
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c
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+ 
r
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o
u
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W
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 d
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 Pr
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 d
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d
e
 Pr
ot
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 d
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 d
ri
ve
n 
by
 
(h
id
d
en
) c
o
d
e
 Pr
ot
oc
ol
s,
 d
ri
ve
n 
by
 
(h
id
d
en
) c
o
d
e
+ 
r
es
o
lV
e:
 
Th
e 
ty
p
e 
o
f e
ff
o
rt
 n
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w
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Role Corporate Era: 
Electorate
Media Era: 
Electorate  
+ Web-active
P2P Era: 
Electorate  
+ Citizen Lobby
Voter’s incentive Human right Human right Human right
Pillar of 
democracy
Pillar of 
democracy
Pillar of 
democracy
Citizen 
responsibility
Citizen 
responsibility
Citizen 
responsibility
Decide who 
decides
Decide who 
decides
Decide who 
decides
­ ­ Learn about 
society
­ ­ Learn about 
politics
­ ­ During working 
hours
­ ­ Get paid for 
engaging
­ Share your view 
with others
Share your view 
with others
­ ­ Debate with 
others offline
­ Debate with 
others online
Debate with 
others online
­ May influence 
policy 
Will influence 
policy 
Elect’s incentive Political party­loyalty 
Political 
party­loyalty 
­
­ ­ Voter­loyalty
Election focus Election focus Re­election focus
­ Willing listen to 
voter
Willing listen to 
voter
­ ­ Willing debate 
with voter 
Chart 3 
What sets a P2P­era “Citizen Lobby” apart from the Corporate­era’s and Media­era’s 
voter­ and Web­active focus in terms of Policy­making?
133
Role Corporate Era: 
Electorate
Media Era: 
Electorate  
+ Web-active
P2P Era: 
Electorate  
+ Citizen Lobby
Democratic effect Political party rule
Political party 
rule
Political party 
decide
­ ­ Citizen lobby 
impact
Institutional 
lobby impact
Institutional 
lobby impact
Institutional 
lobby impact
­ “Movement”­
influence
­
Low risk for 
populism
High risk for 
populism
Low risk for 
populism
­ Policy debated 
online
Policy debated 
online
­ ­ Policy debated 
offline
Low 
feedback­level
Modest 
feedback­level
High 
feedback­level
Policy beyond 
citizens
Policy beyond 
online 
Policy beyond 
nobody
­ ­ Policy = 
citizen­driven
Parliament/
Government 
responsible
Parliament/
Government 
responsible
Parliament/
Government 
responsible

[ 7 ]
The Citizen Lobby: The 
model, the process and 
the costs
As can be concluded from this publication’s previous chapters, 
we distinguish between two, philosophically speaking, different 
approaches to citizens’ influence over politicians.
One is where elected politicians seek the input from the 
electorate. Although the more recent version of this includes 
e­governance, it starts out from the election itself, the run­up to 
which candidates make election promises for what they shall do 
if elected, where each vote received can be seen as confirmation 
that those promises reflect voters’ expectations. Another level 
of this approach is surveys, where statistically relevant numbers 
of people (normally around a thousand +) are asked to answer 
“yes” or “no” (or similar) to one or several given alternatives. The 
ultimate survey level is the referendum—a level of enquiry that 
nevertheless is very rare outside Switzerland. Neither of these 
levels is however legally binding for elected politicians who, 
nevertheless, may feel inclined to use the information (and/or 
confirmation when applicable) provided through these processes 
as “guidance.”
136 The more advanced version of this approach is e­governance. 
Using a variety of Web­based tools, with varying levels of inter­
activity, politicians here try to capture the attention of the 
electorate, asking for their views and opinions, encouraging ques­
tions and dialogue. E­governance is, however, just as elections, 
surveys and referendums are, based on information and/or 
alternatives provided by the incumbent. E­governance typically 
targets administrative concerns, i.e., practical issues within the 
scope of already established policy, structures and principles. 
E­governance is also, as has been quoted and noted in previous 
chapters, often unevenly distributed, both geographically and 
thematically, where the politicians in charge of the geographical 
and/or thematic area for which the electorate is supposed to 
be e­governed may or may not be as interactive as s/he would 
need to be if e­governance were to serve the electorate the way 
it possibly could. But the main problem with e­governance in 
democracy­terms is that it is, just like surveys and referendums 
are, basically a top­down approach, where incumbents seek input 
from or wish to communicate with the electorate as and when 
(and to whatever extent) they feel it is necessary.
The other approach to citizens’ influence over policy­making is 
a bottom­up model. Here the electorate decides what to request 
from their politicians, based on dialogues among members of the 
electorate which are not initiated and/or guided by the politicians’ 
perceived need for information and/or confirmation—but on the 
electorates’ perceived need for political action and policy­devel­
opment. Although the Web is full of sites where such dialogues 
are taking place in one shape or another, from Politico.com and 
CNET to Techdirt and Reddit ( just to name a few), these are often 
full of spontaneous and fairly unstructured voicing of opinions. 
Many debates here have short life spans compared to politics—
which is a permanently ongoing process. Many of these sites 
offer a fascinating mix of anything and everything, from serious 
to ludicrous. This makes many of these debates gain instant and 
hard currency—as they offer something to relate to for almost 
137any Web surfer. This currency, however, tends to pass equally 
fast, since it (again, relatively speaking, as compared to the 
political processes and policy­making) soon fades in favour of 
new topics.
An often quoted example of the online community’s victory over 
the establishment through this kind of Web activism is the SOPA­
PIPA debate in the US, which is also referenced in this publication 
(and briefly summarised in Appendix 6). Since this debate was 
about the intellectual rights guiding the use of the Internet, it 
struck the very core of the online community’s area of interests 
and concerns, making it keep its focus both longer and harder 
than otherwise.
Apart from these types of closely Web­related issues, which in 
fact constitute only a small part of the overall political process, 
most policy­making will take much longer time than the typical 
online community has the longevity to match. More often one 
debate in one forum is replaced by another debate in another 
forum, whereby initially strong focus runs the significant risk 
of getting lost in favour of more general opinion sharing. More 
specific demands targeting elected politicians, emanating from 
these debates, are hence not as likely to materialise as the 
overall, very high, level of Web activism would suggest. Although 
these processes may give both the electorate and the elected 
politicians a feeling of “democracy at work,” this type of vol­
untary engagement often falls short of presenting the kind of 
reasoned challenges to the incumbents—by the electorate—that 
Habermas’ communicative action was in search of. In the end 
this gives the politicians the upper hand in choosing whom to 
eventually satisfy: the electorate who voted for them or the 
institutional lobby that can help pave the way for their re­election 
campaign.
A more powerful version of this second approach would there­
fore organise the efforts of the electorate in a way that both 
generates those reasoned arguments that Habermas’ quite 
138 correctly pointed out differ from mere opinions, and deliver them 
to the elected politicians in a manner they can neither refuse nor 
ignore. This is what the Citizen Lobby intends to do.
The model
Before digging into details, it is important to note that the Cit­
izen Lobby is not intended to be a decision­making body—only 
a consultative body; informing and recommending the elected 
parliament of its collective view. Its design shall ensure that spe­
cial­interest groups are not what drive the voiced views of, and 
recommendations by, the Citizen Lobby, but that it reflects the 
reasoned view of the electorate, based on statistically secured, 
large enough, numbers.
Another key to the Citizen Lobby is that its role is not to 
replace, but to balance, the voice of the institutional lobby. The 
institutional lobby is well organised and well funded, and has 
the incentive to view lobbying as an investment. There is neither 
reason to believe, nor reason to suggest, that this will or should 
change. But a balance must be put in place, and this balance must 
have an equal opportunity not only to make itself heard, but also 
to prepare a collective view—reasonable enough to stand up 
against the ultimately pecuniary special interests that typically 
drive the institutional lobby in general, and the corporate lobby in 
particular.
Finally, it must be made obvious what power the Citizen Lobby 
can wield, at least over time. All politicians are dependent on 
being both elected and re­elected. In today’s system being 
elected is the key. Once elected, re­election is a matter of 
strategy; both party internal and voter oriented. Re­election is 
currently driven more by re­election promises than by scrutiny of 
his/her past performance, since individual politicians can blame 
failed efforts and never delivered election promises on political 
circumstances. Also, today’s electorate do not have the time or 
opportunity to follow policy­making at the level of detail required 
139to know which politician represents one’s own view and/or who 
is more driven by the institutional lobby’s demands—and/or 
demands by groups or individuals with views notably different 
from one’s own. With a Citizen Lobby that, on an ongoing basis, 
closely interacts with the elected parliament and MPs, giving the 
electorate both time and opportunity to review the efforts made 
by individual politicians (in debates as well as in the votes they 
cast), PMs who consistently fail to respond to the Citizen Lobby’s 
recommendations, or behave erratically, can be identified and 
potentially voted out of parliament next election. Thus the 
incentive to be re­elected will eventually become paramount, 
since re­election now will become much more a matter of 
assessing the PMs’ past performance record than listening to 
renewed promises. With such a scrutiny system in place, it is 
unlikely that those planning to stand for re­election could ignore 
the public will, represented by the Citizen Lobby, unless they 
have—and dare to openly declare—good reasons for doing so. 
Such “good reasons” may or may not impress the electorate, 
forcing elected PMs to think twice before backing, and/or acting 
on, conflicting standpoints.
The Citizen Lobby proposed here is meant to serve as a combined 
physical and virtual meeting place for a (by computer) randomly 
selected representation of the electorate. Each batch of partic­
ipants of this rotating lobby collective is suggested to constitute 
0.25% of the electorate, and serve for a total of five weeks: one 
for training and preparation and four for active duty. Partic­
ipation in the Citizen Lobby shall be (and needs to be, in order 
to avoid the 80/20 power­law distribution discussed in Chapter 
4) mandatory by law (at least once during every permanent res­
ident’s lifetime), compensated by the state with the equivalent 
of each participating individual’s sick­leave compensation. The 
Citizen Lobby can, as a comparison, be seen as some kind of jury 
duty, similar to what US courts call American citizens to serve on.
The following aspects are of key importance for the design of the 
Citizen Lobby:
140 1. Given the research findings presented in this publication, a 
virtual­only meeting place is not considered enough to ensure 
serious and fully motivated participation. In spite of the 
physical participation being limited to the first and the last 
day of the four weeks of active duty, it is meant to strengthen 
the commitment of the randomly selected incumbent Citizen 
Lobby. Details of how these days shall be spent follow below.
2. Every Lobby member—having been given a first call for service 
12 months prior (and again 6 and 3 months, as well as 1 week, 
prior to start)—shall him­/herself select an area of interest 
within which s/he wishes to serve. This area shall correspond 
to an existing ministry or sub­ministry of the incumbent 
government, allowing him/her to focus his/her attention on 
deliberating issues that relate to his/her chosen ministry (or 
sub­ministry). The individual participant will hence be part of, 
and interact with, a group of people who have the same area 
of interest as oneself—even if views and priorities are both 
intended and expected to vary.
3. All lobby participants will (based on their residential 
addresses) be linked to a geographical hub, equalling their 
nearest university (equivalent). This is where the two days of 
physical presence shall take place, and where they throughout 
the five­week period can go for face­to­face interaction, should 
they wish to do so. If a lobby participant for some reason 
would like to join a different geographical hub than the one 
assigned, such requests shall always be granted, although it 
shall not qualify for any further financial/travel compensation.
4. Out of the altogether five weeks of service, the first week shall 
be used for training purposes only, since, which has been 
noted throughout this publication, knowledge is a crucial 
aspect of policy­making. This includes knowledge not only 
about the topics debated, but also about the political policy­
making process in general, and the Citizen Lobby process in 
particular.
5. The 0.25% of the electorate, equalling between 10,000 and 
100,000 participants per call, depending on the overall size 
141of the electorate, is assumed to operate in groups of around 
50–100 persons per group, based on the assumption that each 
(European) country has around 10–15 ministries/sub­minis­
tries, and one university per (approx.) 5–700,000 inhabitants. 
This equals 10–50 geographical hubs depending on which 
European country is in question.
6. Citizen Lobby hosts shall be appointed for each group of 
50–100 participants. On the mandatory days for presence 
(first and last day of active duty) this host shall be a senior civil 
servant from the ministry (local or central­governmental) to 
which the group is linked by its chosen area of interest. For 
the remaining days it shall be a member of the university staff 
(with a minimum of a master’s degree) from the same faculty 
that developed the training module delivered during the 
training week’s day 3–4 (see below).
7. A “CL Internal Database” shall be set up to which documents, 
videos and links can be uploaded by active Citizen Lobby 
members, making them available to the Citizen Lobby at large. 
A special sub­section of this database shall also be open for 
non­active members, to which they can contribute if/when 
they feel an ongoing debate concerns a topic to which they 
wish to contribute. This database will be parallel to—rather 
than integrated with—the Adhocracy software.
The process
Once organised into 10–15 groups (corresponding to the minis­
tries/sub­ministries) with 50–100 rotating members serving one 
plus four weeks each at 10–50 geographical hubs (depending on 
the size of the country), adding up to a rotating collective of 0.25% 
of the electorate referred to as the Citizen Lobby, the modus 
operandi is suggested to be as follows:
 – During the training and preparation week (week 1) each batch 
will receive online training:
 – two days in Citizen Lobby participation/techniques (based on 
the Adhocracy software)
142  – two days in the chosen subject area’s topic areas (as developed 
by the university’s faculty)
 – one day of interaction with outgoing Citizen Lobby members 
(last day for previous batch)
For the first and the last day of the four­week period of active 
service (i.e., Monday, week 2 and Friday, week 5) mandatory 
physical presence shall be required at the geographical hub. 
A fixed travel allowance will be paid for these days, based on 
the distance between his/her residential address and the geo­
graphical hub to which s/he was originally automatically allo­
cated. Physical presence during remaining days is optional, and 
travel allowance will be paid only if such presence is confirmed by 
an assigned lobby host.
Week 1: Introduction and training (online, assisted by 
help-desk/resource persons)
Day 1–2: Learning the game
 – Intro/training re the policy­making process, Adhocracy and 
accompanying software
Day 3–4: Learning the trade
 – Intro/training re the chosen topic­hub/­area (provided by the 
university’s faculty)
Day 5: Relay day
 – follow the final day of the outgoing batch’s debate and voting 
activities (online)
 – pose questions to, and discuss with, outgoing batch (online)
 – query/discuss the standpoints formulated by outgoing batch 
(online) 
 – learn “their lesson” via a collective blog (online) 
143Week 2–4: Active duty
Week 2, Day 1: Joint session for new batch at geographical hub (uni-
versity/equivalent) for
 – registration/identification (by host)
 – meeting the people in one’s selected/allocated sub­hub 
(organised by host)
 – receiving a summary of debate/fork/voting status from pre­
vious batch (by host)
 – getting access to existing documentation and debate/voting 
history (by host)
 – logging on to first live parliamentary debate and “trial” Citizen 
Lobby debate (online)
 – asking questions and ensure own ability to participate online 
(assisted by host)
Week 2, Day 2–5 and week 3–4: Online from home (at geographical 
hub when preferred) to
 – log on to the Adhocracy platform and learn which debates are 
on­going in opted field
 – review documentation available from parliament (e.g., http://
offenesparlament.de) 
 – review PMs’ blogs (e.g., http://www.petra­ernstberger.de/
transparenz/initiativen­fuer­hochfranken/) 
 – review documentation from CL­Internal Database, re ongoing/
previous CL­debates 
 – review how other geographical hubs, also debating your own 
selected topics, argue 
 – give priority to debates with a shorter deadline over those with 
a longer deadline
 – learn about and pose questions regarding, and debate the 
full scope of, issues at hand, before targeting more detailed 
arguments and more specific terminology
 – once familiar with the topic, identify the key arguments and 
concerns to which you wish to contribute, and study other’s 
already posted input before submitting your own
144  – formulate your input, supporting or criticising previous input, 
and/or adding your own
 – check for support or criticism of your own input, while 
following the debate at large
 – amend or defend your stated view, if/when appropriate
 – contribute to your batch’s draft statements using Adhocracy’s 
paragraph­edit feature
 – initiate new fork drafts when you cannot support what is 
developing (rather than keep challenging/re­editing state­
ments that are already gaining broader support), and make 
your own open call for support for this fork, to compete with 
the one you prefer not to support  
 – keep updated on relevant documentation available from 
Parliament, PMs’ blogs and the CL Internal Database; com­
municate directly with PMs if/when required/possible 
 – contribute a minimum number of activities per day (traceable 
by the Adhocracy software), or you will be listed as absent 
on—and therefore not paid for—that day 
 – help formulate one, or several alternative, collective “final” 
standpoints for your batch, starting at least one week before 
the listed date for CL voting on any particular issue
 – participate in the vote (digitally with real ID or pseudonym, or 
by ballot) on the listed issue on the date given for CL voting
Week 5: Active duty (cont’d)
Day 1–4: Online from home (and/or at geographical hub for those 
who prefer)
 – help formulate one, or several alternative, collective stand­
points on issues debated, but not scheduled for final CL voting 
during one’s own active CL duty period
 – keep updated on relevant documentation available from 
parliament, PMs’ blogs and the CL Internal Database; com­
municate directly with PMs if/when required/possible 
145 – communicate with other geographical hubs also debating your 
own selected topics, while formulating your collective’s final 
standpoints/forks; sharing ideas with them 
Day 5: Relay day: Joint/final session at geographical hub (university/
equivalent)
 – participate (digitally with real ID or pseudonym, or by ballot) in 
own batch’s final statement(s) re all still ongoing debates (for 
which a final vote has not yet been made)
 – introduce/provide summary of debate/voting status to 
upcoming batch (online) 
 – de­register as Citizen Lobby member and register as past Cit­
izen Lobby member
Beyond the mandatory Citizen Lobby service called for (and 
remunerated by the state), voluntary contributions shall not be 
discouraged. Individuals with strong interests in certain issues 
under debate may wish to contribute input—even if they are 
not listed for service during that time period. Such non­active 
individuals shall be free to contribute input to the CL­Internal 
Database, under the heading “Special Interest Contributions,” 
which active CL members are called to continuously review and 
consider. Active Citizen Lobby members who find these con­
tributions important can add them to the debate as their own 
input, which non­active Citizen Lobby members cannot, since all 
debate taking place on the Adhocracy platform, and all eventual 
voting that follows, shall be exclusively for active members.
The Citizen Lobby Adhocracy, etc. software shall, in summary, 
include the following:
 – Lists of ongoing debates in parliament; per subject­hub, topic 
and voting­date respectively
 – Lists of/access to documents submitted by voice recordings of 
elected PMs’ submissions
 – Lists of/access to voice recordings of interpellations by elected 
PMs (if any)
146  – Timeline: when Citizen Lobby debates start/started, and when 
CL voting is to take place
 – Debate fork, visualising the debate’s overall development and 
priorities (see Appendix 7)
 – Comments by/discussions among CL members (equivalent to a 
wiki with “history”)
 – CL­Internal Database, to which CL members can download 
their reference material (etc.)
 – History of all final wiki­versions of comments/discussions, and 
of all votes of past debates
The costs
Throughout the work with this Citizen Lobby model, I have met 
the argument that it will be too expensive. This is a comment 
that reveals a view on policy­making that sits at the core of the 
neo­liberal model. As noted in Chapter 1 the neo­liberal model is 
based on a hands­off attitude when it comes to the citizenries’ 
direct involvement in democratic processes—all policy­making 
being handled by elected representatives, working under 
influence from an institutional lobby with a strong corporate 
profile.
But if we reconsider our respective roles, it is the citizenry that 
makes up the core of society, and hence would need to have at 
least an “equal” say in how it is managed. So let us compare what 
this equal say would cost, as compared to other expenses our 
societies willingly take on. Take Sweden as an example; here is 
an estimate of the average cost for the lobby member, multiplied 
by participant number plus administration and transportation 
allowances:
147
Average cost for Lobby Member: 3,000 €
Number of Lobby Members/batch: 15,000
Number of Lobby Members/year: 135,000 
(9 batches/year, equal to 
parliament’s calendar)
Remuneration cost / year: 405 m. €
Admin and travel compensation: 45 m. €
Total cost per year: 450 m. €
Although this may sound like a huge amount of money to many, 
it must be compared to what else has similar amounts allo­
cated in the state budget. The comparable amount in SEK (the 
Swedish currency krona) is around 3.75 billion. Taking a look at 
the 2014 budget published by the Swedish Ministry of Finance, the 
following budget line items are of a similar magnitude:
Community planning, housing programmes 
and consumer policies: 
 
1.23 bn. SEK
International cooperation (excluding bilateral 
and multilateral aid): 
 
2.02 bn. SEK
Energy: 2.83 bn. SEK
Regional development: 2.97 bn. SEK
Environment and nature­protection (general): 5.16 bn. SEK
Corporate sector: 5.59 bn. SEK
All these items are, in terms of amounts, at the very bottom 
of the expenditure list. For further comparison, the following 
budget lines can be of some relevance:
Integration and equality: 12.43 bn. SEK
Culture, media, religions and leisure: 12.88 bn. SEK
Governing of the state: 12.90 bn. SEK
Net loan from government’s debt office: 13.82 bn. SEK
148 Reaching significantly higher amount levels, we find, e.g., the 
following:
Bilateral and multilateral aid: 31.83 bn. SEK
Fees to the EU: 37.70 bn. SEK
The Swedish government’s budget for 2014 totals at approx­
imately 870 bn. SEK, which means that the suggested Citizen 
Lobby would add less than half a percent (0,43%) to this. Also, 
considering the estimated cost is only 12% of the fees Sweden is 
paying to the EU, the amounts involved for getting a truly dem­
ocratic state must be considered very modest indeed.
This publication therefore dismisses the argument that the 
proposed Citizen Lobby would cost too much. To the contrary, 
it argues that its existence would make our societies more 
relevant to their members, an outcome to which a price tag is 
almost impossible to allocate. It can furthermore be assumed 
that the learning curve—through which each and every Citizen 
Lobby participant would go—would benefit not only him/her, 
but also our societies at large; nationally, locally, regionally and 
internationally. From this, this publication argues, a truly glocal 
democracy could eventually emerge.
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152 Appendix 2: Summary of Criticism of  
Habermas’ Public Sphere model
Universalism
Habermas’ position:
The formation of consensus based on universal morals ­ 
expressed and communicated through Habermas’ “formal 
pragmatics,” ensuring that civil society actually could cross­
communicate “uninhibited by inequalities of status and 
power” (cf. Habermas 1984, 330, Lee 1992, 415).
Critique 1:
Purely philosophical objections to universalism and bound­
less consensus exist, most famously from lifelong antagonist 
Derrida, who argued that de­construction always proves this 
false and/or unattainable (cf. Borradori 2003, 4­8).
Critique 2:
McCarthy, for example, criticised this in straightforward, but 
still friendly terms, while Hohendahl, for instance, tried to 
explain why it is unrealistic. Others, like Flyvbjerg, are ironic 
in regard to all/any such assumptions (cf. McCarthy 1992, 
65­66, Hohendahl 1992, 105, Flyvbjerg 2000).
Power: Public Sphere Structure
Habermas’ position:
Habermas’ public sphere being an institutional mechanism 
for rationalising political domination by rendering states 
accountable to the citizenry and assuming an ideal and unre­
stricted rational discussion of public matters where inequal­
ities of status were to be bridged with debaters deliberating 
as peers (cf. Calhoun 1992).
153Critique 1:
According to Fraser, accountability never found its form and, 
as the public sphere grew, the peer­to­peer turned into mass 
media, and manipulation of public opinion, whereby the 
degeneration­process took over (cf. 1992, 112­113).
Critique 2:
The separation of debate/discourse/opinion­making on one 
hand (in the public sphere), and the decision­making (the 
state) on the other, is problematic, if the state remains free 
to act independently from the collective will of the public 
sphere (e.g. Fraser) (cf. 1992, 118).
Power: Gender and Class
Habermas’ position:
Habermas designated the public sphere as an intentional 
arena where extant status distinctions are bracketed and 
neutralized, meaning that e.g. gender, class and minority­
status is bridged by “reason” (cf. Calhoun 1992, 115).
Critique 1:
Garnham states that Habermas’ public sphere simply ignores 
the working classes’ parallel “publics,” and romanticises the 
bourgeois as a benevolent rather than profit­seeking class 
(cf. 1992, 359).
Critique 2:
Fraser argues that, while private interests/issues are 
undesirable in the public sphere discourse, she refuses the 
argument that gender­ and care­issues, for which women 
carry historical responsibilities, are not “private,” but “politi­
cal.” Due to bracketing is societal equality not seen necessary 
for political democracy (cf. 1992, 117).
154 Power: Minorities
Habermas’ position:
Habermas’ definition of participation, where “participation” 
concerns politics; its narrow definition being a direct voice 
in policy making, where literary debates in the private realm 
prepare for/spill over into the political debate in the public 
realm, why also culturally relevant issues can become topics 
for debate.
Critique 1:
Benhabib argues that participation must be replaced by a 
socio­political debate, that goes on all the time, everywhere, 
in different ways and contexts, since expanding the public 
sphere will also raise the “culture and traditions” agenda ­ 
not as culture and traditions as such, but as “problems of 
meaning in the present” (cf. 1992 85­87).
Critique 2:
The majority’s benevolent solution to “difference is tol­
erance,” but according to Pier Paolo Pasolini, “this ‘difference’ 
[…] remains the same both with regard to those who have 
decided to tolerate him and those who have decided to con­
demn him. No majority will ever be able to banish from its 
consciousness the feeling of the ‘difference’ of minorities. (in 
Warner 1992, 383­384)
155Appendix 3: Summary of criticism of  
Habermas’ communicative action model
Public and Reason vs. Mass and Opinion
Habermas’ position:
Whereas exposure to the mass media in general increased 
with a person's position in the stratification system, here 
this relationship was reversed; advertisements and radio 
commercials reached lower status groups more extensively 
and more frequently than higher ones. […] In a phase of 
more or less unconcealed class antagonism […] the public 
sphere itself was torn between the "two nations" ­ and thus 
the public presentation of private interests eo ipso (by/of 
itself) took on a political significance. (Habermas 1991, 191)
Critique 1:
Fraenkel: “With the help of parliamentary discussion, public 
opinion makes its desires known to the government, and 
the government makes its policies known to public opinion. 
Public opinion reigns, but does not govern.” (Fraenkel 1958 
quoted in Habermas 1991, 239)
Kramer: “The problem is that it is impossible to discern 
whether public opinion has come about by way of public 
communication or through opinion management.” (1992)
Critique 2:
Leibholz: “The will of the [political] parties is identical with 
that of the active citizenry, so that the party happening to 
hold the majority represents the public opinion ­ whereby 
public opinion also governs.” (1952 quoted in Habermas 1991, 
239)
Garnham: “A problem for media’s role in the opinion/reason 
debate is that it never adapted fully to the political concept 
156 of representation [i.e. reason], but remains largely trapped 
within a paradigm of direct individual face­to­face communi­
cation [i.e. opinion].” (1992, 367)
Communicative action
Habermas’ position:
Clarity, attitude and truthfulness (summed up as ‘formal 
pragmatics’) are universals of any speech­acts anywhere, 
why this can be extended also to all other types of com­
munication. Clarity, attitude and truthfulness are also 
what Habermas claimed link, e.g., art and literature to, e.g., 
science and law – and morality.   
Critique 1:
Derrida: ‘An essential quality of writing is its ‘iterability’; 
remaining intelligible despite the absence of any particular 
addressee or receiver, or even sender or author.’  
Lee: ‘Can a theory of communicative action based on an 
essentially [dualistic] speaker­hearer model of speech­acts 
be adequate for the mixed, large­scale communicative 
modes characteristic of modern societies?’  
Critique 2:
Lee: ‘The additional claim that all languages contain speech­
acts that fit our [European] typologies would also not entail 
the universality of such acts but would rather point to the 
robustness of our schemes of translation. […] questions 
could also be raised about the applicability of a general 
theory of writing or textuality to mixed modes of semi­
osis, such as television and movies, which combine visual 
and oral modalities and whose production includes print­
mediated processes as diverse as script­writing and audience 
surveying.’  
157Appendix 4: Three points of underhand 
revision of and by Habermas’ public sphere 
and communicative action
The Welfare State vs. the Market
Original Stance Revised Stance
The welfare state’s legal and 
administrative functions can 
successfully overrule market­
mechanisms, whereby the 
political sphere becomes an 
“adjunct for a legislator,” as the 
welfare state’s political format 
is already set.
The bankruptcy of state 
socialism [read: the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe] has 
shown that the legal­admin­
istrative mode of regulating 
[the state is] inappropriate.
A losing communication­battle 
is fought by “weak institutions” 
[e.g. workers, minorities, 
etc.] against those organised 
powers that communicate with 
the ambition to “influence the 
decisions of consumers, voters 
and clients,” why the welfare 
state must intervene to 
secure the interests of “weak 
institutions.”
Neither the borders between 
“high” and “low” culture, nor 
between “culture” and “pol­
itics,” may be so sharp after 
all, nor may the voice of “weak 
institutions” be so weak after 
all, making intervention less 
relevant.
The degree of power­infusion 
is measured by the extent to 
which informal, non­public 
opinions (“cultural” assump­
tions) are fed into the circuit of 
formal, quasi­public opinion 
making by the media that state 
and economy are trying to 
influence.
Discursively accomplished 
formation of opinion and will 
is a “veiled version” of majority 
power, not a medium for the 
potential rationalization of 
power altogether.
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159Appendix 6: The SOPA–PIPA debate
The below summary is an extract from Benkler et al.’s study of 
the SOPA–PIPA debate, published in July 2013 under the title Social 
Mobilization and the Networked Public Sphere: Mapping the SOPA–
PIPA Debate.
Ten core findings:
1. the networked public sphere is much more dynamic than many 
previous descriptions. (Benkler et al. 2013, 40)
2. subject­area, professional media, in this case tech media, 
played a much larger role in shaping the political debate than 
the traditional major outlets. (ibid., 41)
3. traditional non­governmental organizations like the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge played a critical role 
as information centers and as core amplifiers in the attention 
backbone [see also #5] that transmits the voices of various, 
more peripheral players to the wider community. (ibid., 42)
4. the widespread experimentation carried out by new and spe­
cial­purpose sites facilitated the conversion of discussion into 
action. (ibid., 44)
5. highly visible sites within the controversy network were able 
to provide an attention backbone for less visible sites or 
speakers, overcoming the widely perceived effect of the power­
law distribution of links. (ibid., 44)
6. individuals play a much larger role than was feasible for all but 
a handful of major mainstream media in the past. (ibid., 44)
7. the network was highly effective at mobilizing and amplifying 
expertise to produce a counter­narrative to the one provided 
by proponents of the law. (ibid., 44)
8. consumer boycotts and pressure facilitated by online com­
munities played a key role in shaping business support and 
opposition. (ibid., 45)
9. at least on questions of intellectual property, the long­decried 
fragmentation and polarization of the Net was nowhere to be 
seen. (ibid., 45)
160 10. the narrative and online actions that are observable in the 
digital record are highly consistent with the description of 
events that we took away from interviews and personal 
knowledge. (ibid., 45)
Inferences and implications: locating the SOPA–PIPA 
debate in a larger context:
By the end of the 17 months under study, a diverse network of 
actors, for­profit and non­profit, media and non­media, individ­
uals and collectives, left, right, and politically agnostic, had 
come together. They fundamentally shifted the frame of the 
debate, experimented with diverse approaches and strategies 
of communication and action, and ultimately blocked legislation 
that had started life as a bipartisan, lobby­backed, legislative 
juggernaut. While it is certainly possible that behind­the­scenes 
manoeuvring was more important and not susceptible to capture 
by Benkler et al.’s methods, what is clear is that by ProPublica’s 
tally, before 18 January 2012, SOPA–PIPA had 80 publicly declared 
supporters and 31 opponents, but by the next day, the bills had 
65 supporters and 101 opponents. The 18 January online protest 
campaign and its anchor, the Wikipedia blackout, were the core 
interventions that blocked the acts. But Benkler et al.’s study 
suggests that this day’s events cannot be understood in terms of 
lobbying or backroom deals; rather, this outcome represents the 
fruits of the online discourse and campaign by many voices and 
organisations, most of which are not traditional sources of power 
in shaping public policy in the United States.
161Appendix 7: Debate fork visualisation
The chart below shows how each contributed CL argument is 
intended to be attached either to an existing box on the fork, or 
is used to add as the first box of a new fork, branching out from 
whatever existing box the contributor finds still being in line with 
his/her views.
By clicking any existing box all the arguments will appear that all/
any of the contributors added to it in support of the view that box 
states, for review in chronological or contributors’ order.
The topic below is simply a sample topic and is not meant to illus­
trate any actual debate.
Q: Study 
English @ 
school in 
Grade 1?
Good 
idea, as 
English is 
helpful
Make 
studying 
English a 
priority
Bring in 
specialist 
teachers
Increase 
school 
budgets
No good Idea, as 
kids need other 
skills first
Full focus 
on other 
subjects
Keep it as 
currently 
organised
English still 
a lower 
priority
Let 
current 
teacher 
do this
Within 
existing 
school 
budgets
Parents 
pay extra 
for "early" 
English
Make it 
optional, 
let parents 
decide
Start 
earlier­ 
but not in 
grade 1
Start with 
english 
even later
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